Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects when a user account is deleted on a Windows system. This event (EventID 4726) is critical for monitoring potential malicious activity, such as an attacker attempting to remove traces of their presence or disrupt operations by deleting legitimate user accounts.
This rule detects when a single user makes multiple changes to security groups within a short timeframe (binned hourly). Specifically, it looks for Event IDs 4752 (A security-enabled global group was changed), 4753 (A security-enabled local group was changed), or 4754 (A security-enabled universal group was changed). This could indicate an attempt to manipulate group memberships for privilege escalation or lateral movement.
Detects the creation of new members in the 'Domain Admins' or 'Enterprise Admins' groups by monitoring Windows Security Event ID 4728. This event indicates that a member was added to a security-enabled global group. The rule specifically looks for additions to highly privileged administrative groups, which could indicate unauthorized privilege escalation or persistence.
This rule detects suspicious changes to account delegation settings by monitoring Security Event ID 5136 for modifications to the 'msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo' attribute. It specifically looks for instances where an account's delegation settings are changed two or more times within an hour, which could indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or elevate privileges through constrained delegation.
Detects the creation or modification of Kubernetes ClusterRoles, ClusterRoleBindings, and RoleBindings, which can be used for privilege escalation within a Kubernetes cluster. The rule specifically flags activities related to 'cluster-admin' roles as critical and other administrative roles as high severity.
This rule detects a high volume of account changes (creation or modification) within a one-hour window by a single user. Specifically, it looks for 10 or more instances of EventID 4720 (A user account was created) or EventID 4722 (A user account was enabled) originating from the same SubjectUserName within an hour.
This rule detects when a single user removes permissions from 5 or more mailboxes within a one-hour window in an Exchange environment. This activity could indicate an attempt to cover tracks or disrupt access to mailboxes by an attacker.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events in Okta that could indicate a help-desk social engineering attack or account takeover. Specifically, it looks for a user's password being reset, followed by the enrollment of a new MFA factor or device for that same user, all occurring within a short time frame (1 hour) and potentially from distinct session IDs or device hashes. This pattern suggests an attacker has gained initial access (e.g., via social engineering the help desk) and is immediately attempting to establish persistence by enrolling their own MFA device.
This rule detects the creation or modification of user accounts on Windows systems by monitoring Security Event IDs 4741 (A security-enabled local group was created) and 4742 (A computer account was changed). It summarizes the count of such changes per hour by the subject user name, which can help identify unusual or excessive account management activities.
This rule detects a high volume of group membership changes (additions or removals) by a single user within a one-hour window. Event IDs 4728 (A member was added to a security-enabled global group), 4729 (A member was removed from a security-enabled global group), and 4730 (A member was removed from a security-enabled universal group) are monitored. A count of 5 or more such events by the same user within an hour is flagged as suspicious, potentially indicating malicious account manipulation or privilege escalation attempts.
This rule detects suspicious device enrollment attempts via Microsoft Intune Company Portal from a country not previously observed in a user's 7-day sign-in history. It identifies two primary patterns: sustained successful sign-ins from a new country, indicating a potential active session and successful device enrollment (High Severity), or Conditional Access Policy (CAP) blocked attempts from a new country, suggesting an attacker probing with stolen credentials (Medium Severity). The detection aims to identify identity theft leading to unauthorized device enrollment.
Detects suspicious activity involving multiple password resets for different users initiated by a single user within a one-hour timeframe in Azure AD. This could indicate an attacker attempting to gain control over multiple accounts.
This rule detects the creation of new service principals or the assignment of new role assignments to existing service principals in Azure Active Directory. It specifically looks for assignments that grant high-privilege roles such as "Contributor", "Owner", or "Global Admin". The rule aggregates these changes by target and time, highlighting instances where multiple changes or distinct initiators are involved.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving API key rotation followed by high usage. It correlates audit logs for API key operations (rotate, update, create) with cloud application events showing API requests or token usage. Specifically, it looks for instances where an API key is rotated, updated, or created, and then subsequently used more than 50 times within a day by the same actor. This could indicate an adversary gaining access to an API key and then rapidly utilizing it for malicious purposes.
Cortex Policy or Rule Modification
Cortex XDR
This rule detects modifications to Cortex prevention policies or detection rules. Specifically, it looks for creation, editing, or deletion of policy profiles, and editing, reordering, or reverting of prevention policy rules. Authorized personnel can be added to the email filter and this rule can serve as a detection for unauthorized tampering.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving API key rotation followed by high usage. It correlates audit logs for API key operations (rotate, update, create) with cloud application events showing API requests or token usage. Specifically, it looks for instances where an API key is rotated, updated, or created, and then subsequently used more than 50 times within a day by the same actor. This could indicate an adversary gaining access to an API key and then rapidly utilizing it for malicious purposes.
This rule detects suspicious device enrollment attempts via Microsoft Intune Company Portal from a country not previously observed in a user's 7-day sign-in history. It identifies two primary patterns: sustained successful sign-ins from a new country, indicating a potential active session and successful device enrollment (High Severity), or Conditional Access Policy (CAP) blocked attempts from a new country, suggesting an attacker probing with stolen credentials (Medium Severity). The detection aims to identify identity theft leading to unauthorized device enrollment.
This rule detects attempts to modify user accounts via LDAP. It specifically looks for TCP traffic on port 389 (LDAP) containing the hexadecimal representation of '0' (likely part of an LDAP message structure) and the case-insensitive string 'modify'. A threshold of 5 such events within 60 seconds from the same source IP triggers the alert, indicating potential malicious activity related to account manipulation.
Detects assignment of highly privileged directory roles in Azure AD, including
Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator.
Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator.
Detects suspicious activity involving multiple password resets for different users initiated by a single user within a one-hour timeframe in Azure AD. This could indicate an attacker attempting to gain control over multiple accounts.
This rule detects when an 'Agent ID Administrator' role adds an owner to a service principal in Azure Active Directory. This activity could indicate an attempt to escalate privileges or maintain persistence within the Azure environment by granting control over service principals to potentially unauthorized entities.
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