Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects when an 'Agent ID Administrator' role adds an owner to a service principal in Azure Active Directory. This activity could indicate an attempt to escalate privileges or maintain persistence within the Azure environment by granting control over service principals to potentially unauthorized entities.
This rule detects the creation, patching, or updating of Kubernetes 'clusterrolebindings', 'rolebindings', or 'roles' within 'prod', 'production', or 'default' namespaces. It specifically excludes actions performed by the 'system:clusterrole-aggregation-controller' to reduce false positives related to legitimate system operations. This activity could indicate an attempt to escalate privileges or establish persistence within critical Kubernetes environments.
This rule detects anomalous mass device wipe or deletion activity in Microsoft Intune by comparing current activity against an actor's historical behavior. It identifies four patterns: first-time wipers with high volume, known actors statistically far above their norm (Z-score), thin-history actors exceeding their personal peak, and time-compressed bursts of wipes. The rule calculates a severity based on the volume and rate of wipes.
This rule detects the assignment of highly privileged roles such as 'Global Administrator', 'Intune Administrator', or 'Cloud Device Administrator' within Azure Active Directory. This activity is often a precursor to significant malicious actions, including mass device wipes, as highlighted by the referenced threat intelligence. Monitoring these assignments helps identify potential privilege escalation or unauthorized administrative access.
Detects the creation of hidden local accounts using the 'net user' command where the username ends with a '$' symbol. This technique is used by the Andariel group for RID hijacking attacks to maintain stealthy persistence.
Detects the creation of hidden local accounts using the 'net user' command where the username ends with a '$' symbol. This technique is used by the Andariel group for RID hijacking attacks to maintain stealthy persistence.
Detects suspicious modifications to Power Automate flow permissions, including sharing flows or changing role assignments. This could indicate a compromised account attempting to gain unauthorized access or persistence within the Power Platform environment.
This rule detects multiple TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) associated with advanced adversaries, including QEMU virtualization abuse for defense evasion, creation of malicious scheduled tasks (specifically 'TPMProfiler'), rogue account or service creation (e.g., 'CtxAppVCOMService' or 'AppMgmt' service via 'sc.exe'), port forwarding/tunneling commands (using 'ssh' or 'portproxy' with specific ports), credential access attempts via 'vssuirun.exe' or printing 'NTDS.dit', and potential DLL sideloading involving 'ADNotificationManager.exe' and 'vcruntime140_1.dll'. It also includes IOCs for specific IPs, domains, and file hashes.
Detects when an API access service account is granted domain authority.
Detects when an Google Workspace user is granted admin privileges.
Detects the addition of a new member to the local administrator group, which could be legitimate activity or a sign of privilege escalation activity
Detects the creation of a dMSA service account using the New-ADServiceAccount cmdlet in certain OUs.
The fact that the cmdlet is used to create a dMSASvc account in a specific OU is highly suspicious.
It is a pattern trying to exploit the BadSuccessor privilege escalation vulnerability in Windows Server 2025.
On top of that, if the user that is creating the dMSASvc account is not a legitimate administrator or does not have the necessary permissions,
it is a strong signal of an attempted or successful abuse of the BaDSuccessor vulnerability for privilege escalation within the Windows Server 2025 Active Directory environment.
The fact that the cmdlet is used to create a dMSASvc account in a specific OU is highly suspicious.
It is a pattern trying to exploit the BadSuccessor privilege escalation vulnerability in Windows Server 2025.
On top of that, if the user that is creating the dMSASvc account is not a legitimate administrator or does not have the necessary permissions,
it is a strong signal of an attempted or successful abuse of the BaDSuccessor vulnerability for privilege escalation within the Windows Server 2025 Active Directory environment.
Detects rapid password change (Event ID 4724) or attempt (Event ID 4723) events on local administrator accounts within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of the BlueHammer zero-day local privilege escalation (LPE), where an attacker temporarily overwrites a local admin's password to spawn a SYSTEM shell and immediately restores the original hash to evade detection.
Change to authentication method could be an indicator of an attacker adding an auth method to the account so they can have continued access.
Detects modification of dMSA link attributes (msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink) via PowerShell scripts.
This command line pattern could be an indicator an attempt to exploit the BadSuccessor privilege escalation vulnerability in Windows Server 2025.
This command line pattern could be an indicator an attempt to exploit the BadSuccessor privilege escalation vulnerability in Windows Server 2025.
Detects the creation of a dMSASvc account using the New-ADServiceAccount cmdlet in certain OUs.
The fact that the Cmdlet is used to create a dMSASvc account in a specific OU is highly suspicious.
It is a pattern trying to exploit the BadSuccessor privilege escalation vulnerability in Windows Server 2025.
On top of that, if the user that is creating the dMSASvc account is not a legitimate administrator or does not have the necessary permissions,
it is a strong signal of an attempted or successful abuse of the BaDSuccessor vulnerability for privilege escalation within the Windows Server 2025 Active Directory environment.
The fact that the Cmdlet is used to create a dMSASvc account in a specific OU is highly suspicious.
It is a pattern trying to exploit the BadSuccessor privilege escalation vulnerability in Windows Server 2025.
On top of that, if the user that is creating the dMSASvc account is not a legitimate administrator or does not have the necessary permissions,
it is a strong signal of an attempted or successful abuse of the BaDSuccessor vulnerability for privilege escalation within the Windows Server 2025 Active Directory environment.
This rule monitors SAP environments by correlating Change Documents (PFCG) with Security Audit logs to detect when a high-privilege role is assigned to a user. It specifically looks for additions to the AGR_USERS table and correlates this activity with security audit events to attribute the action to a specific source IP and user.
Detects the modification of sensitive authorization objects (CD1251) within a role. This identifies potential 'backdoor' privilege escalation where a standard role is granted administrative powers (e.g., Debugging or System Table access) via PFCG.
Detects the assignment of administrative privileges or roles within SAP HANA DB.
This rule monitors SAP systems for high-privileged role assignments by correlating Change Documents (PFCG, AGR_USERS table) with Security Audit logs. It identifies instances where a non-administrative user account assigns a role to another user (or themselves), providing visibility into potential unauthorized privilege escalation or account manipulation within the SAP environment.
Detects the assignment of highly privileged SAP profiles via Change Documents.
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