Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a suspicious sequence of identity-related operations performed by a single user within a 2-hour window. The chain consists of a password reset, MFA method modification, new device registration, and a subsequent privilege escalation event (such as role assignment or application consent). This pattern is consistent with helpdesk-vishing campaigns often used by threat actors like Scattered Spider to perform full account takeovers.
Detects the registration of a new MFA device or authenticator by a user shortly after a password reset event, where the registration originates from an IP address classified as a hosting provider, datacenter, or VPN. This pattern is indicative of a help-desk or vishing-based account takeover attack where an adversary registers their own MFA device to gain persistent access.
Detects potential post-authentication persistent actions (e.g., OAuth app grants, MFA changes, mailbox rule updates) performed shortly after a successful Google Workspace login, specifically flagging actions originating from IP addresses different from the login session to identify session hijacking or token replay (AiTM) activity. Includes suppression for known corporate IP ranges, trusted OAuth application consents, and recurring user behavior.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user's registered phone number or recovery contact method is updated, followed shortly by an MFA factor reset or new factor enrollment. This pattern is a common indicator of a SIM-swap attack, where an attacker intercepts SMS-based MFA codes after hijacking the victim's phone number.
Detects MFA or credential reset activities on high-value or privileged accounts that lack a corresponding out-of-band verification signal, such as manager approval or identity proofing, within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of social engineering attempts where attackers manipulate help-desk procedures to bypass identity protections.
Detects a sequence of events where a user performs a device-code authentication followed rapidly by a device enrollment, and subsequently continues to access cloud services (Microsoft Graph, Exchange Online, Intune) shortly after their account password has been reset. This pattern is indicative of persistent access maintained via a registered device or OAuth token that survives credential remediation.
Detects high-risk administrative actions in Microsoft 365, such as new MFA method registration, OAuth app consent grants, or email forwarding rule creation, occurring in sessions that lack fresh authentication (often indicative of a session-cookie replay attack).
Detects the enrollment of a new security key or passkey shortly after an unfamiliar or suspicious sign-in event within Google Workspace. This behavior is indicative of an adversary establishing persistent access following a successful session hijack or credential phishing campaign, specifically targeting authentication mechanisms to bypass existing security controls.
Detects MFA method resets, security info updates, or new authentication device registrations targeting privileged or administrator accounts in Azure AD/Entra ID audit logs. This activity is often indicative of social engineering campaigns, including AI-driven voice or video deepfake impersonation of employees contacting helpdesk support to gain unauthorized account access.
Detects suspicious help-desk activity where a user password is reset by an administrator followed shortly by a new MFA factor being enrolled for that same user. This pattern is characteristic of Scattered Spider-style social engineering and vishing attacks to bypass MFA without deploying malware.
Detects suspicious help-desk activity where a user password is reset by an administrator followed shortly by a new MFA factor being enrolled for that same user. This pattern is characteristic of Scattered Spider-style social engineering and vishing attacks to bypass MFA without deploying malware.
Detects an Azure AD/Entra ID device registration or join event occurring within 60 minutes of an account-recovery action (password reset, MFA reset, or account unlock) for the same user identity. This sequence is indicative of an attacker registering a managed device to maintain persistent, long-term access following a successful account takeover or vishing-based helpdesk credential reset.
Detects a potential OAuth device code phishing abuse pattern where an authenticated device code sign-in is immediately followed by a new device registration or Primary Refresh Token (PRT) issuance for the same user, potentially originating from a different device or IP address.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized device registration or Intune enrollment activity by monitoring Azure Sign-in logs. It specifically flags accounts that exhibit rapid, multiple device registration attempts (>= 2 in 5 minutes) combined with suspicious indicators such as scripted User Agents ('python-requests'), the presence of Primary Refresh Tokens (PRT), specific device naming patterns, or concurrent Intune enrollment activity. These behaviors are common indicators of automated adversary activity aiming to bypass conditional access policies by enrolling illicit devices.
This rule detects scenarios where a device registration event occurs within 15 minutes of a device-code authentication sign-in for the same user. This pattern is indicative of potential account manipulation where an adversary registers their own device to an existing account to maintain persistent access or bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA).
Detects potential post-authentication persistent actions (e.g., OAuth app grants, MFA changes, mailbox rule updates) performed shortly after a successful Google Workspace login, specifically flagging actions originating from IP addresses different from the login session to identify session hijacking or token replay (AiTM) activity. Includes suppression for known corporate IP ranges, trusted OAuth application consents, and recurring user behavior.
Detects device registration events where the device name does not conform to the expected organizational naming convention. This may indicate an attempt to register unauthorized or rogue devices in the environment.
Detects a suspicious sequence where an account undergoes a help-desk-initiated password or credential reset, followed shortly (within 30 minutes) by the registration of a new multi-factor authentication (MFA) device for that same account. This pattern is characteristic of social engineering attacks, such as those used by UNC3944/Scattered Spider, where an adversary impersonates a user to gain initial access and subsequently establishes persistence by adding an MFA device they control.
Detects suspicious account management activities, such as password resets or MFA re-enrollment, performed by an operator on a high-privileged or administrator account outside of typical business hours (06:00-20:00). This behavior is often indicative of help-desk impersonation or credential takeover attempts targeting Identity Provider (IdP) administrative roles.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events indicating account takeover: a password reset, followed by an MFA factor re-enrollment, and concluding with a successful login from a geographically impossible location compared to recent history. This pattern often signifies a help-desk-assisted account compromise or token theft.
Detects successful authentication events associated with the Azure AD Device Registration Service (resource ID 01cb2876-7ebd-4aa4-9cc9-d28bd4d359a9). This rule identifies successful registrations or sign-ins to the service, which may be leveraged by adversaries to register unauthorized devices for persistent access or to bypass conditional access policies.
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