Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a suspicious sequence where an account undergoes a help-desk-initiated password or credential reset, followed shortly (within 30 minutes) by the registration of a new multi-factor authentication (MFA) device for that same account. This pattern is characteristic of social engineering attacks, such as those used by UNC3944/Scattered Spider, where an adversary impersonates a user to gain initial access and subsequently establishes persistence by adding an MFA device they control.
Detects the registration of a new MFA device or authenticator by a user shortly after a password reset event, where the registration originates from an IP address classified as a hosting provider, datacenter, or VPN. This pattern is indicative of a help-desk or vishing-based account takeover attack where an adversary registers their own MFA device to gain persistent access.
Detects when a user registers a new MFA or authentication method, such as a software token or authenticator app, within one hour of a suspicious sign-in event. This pattern is commonly indicative of an adversary establishing persistence or bypassing authentication controls following account compromise via phishing or credential harvesting.
This rule monitors for updates to a user's multi-factor authentication (MFA) configuration, specifically detecting when a new device is registered or activated. Attackers often register their own devices as MFA second factors to maintain persistent access to a compromised user account.
Detects instances where a user account registers the PhoneAppOTP MFA method and subsequently performs a successful authentication using that method within a defined window, followed by authentication attempts originating from non-browser, likely automated, UserAgents (e.g., node, python, axios). This pattern may indicate an adversary who has registered their own MFA device to gain persistent, automated access to the account.
Detects modifications to a user account's authentication methods, specifically when an increase in the number of configured multi-factor authentication (MFA) devices or methods occurs. This is often associated with an adversary enrolling their own device to bypass MFA or maintain persistent access.
Detects Microsoft Intune MDM enrollment events occurring shortly after an OAuth 2.0 device code authentication for the same user. This pattern is indicative of an adversary using stolen OAuth tokens or Primary Refresh Tokens (PRT) to perform rogue MDM enrollment, a technique used to maintain persistence and bypass standard security controls such as password resets.
Detects anomalous activity where a user performs a device-code authentication followed rapidly by a device registration event and the subsequent issuance of a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) or x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential. This pattern is often indicative of OAuth device-authorization flow abuse, where an adversary attempts to register a malicious device to gain persistent access.
Detects suspicious Entra ID (Azure AD) events related to device registration, Primary Refresh Token (PRT) issuance, and account-level flags (such as 'enforceMfa' or broker mode) that are indicative of persistence techniques used in device code phishing campaigns, such as the ARToken platform.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user performs a device-code authentication followed by a device registration or PRT issuance within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary using an OAuth device code flow to phish an initial access token, subsequently using it to register an adversary-controlled device for persistent access or to bypass Conditional Access policies.
Detects modifications or additions to Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) security information for high-value users, specifically targeting those with executive titles (Director, VP, President, etc.). This behavior is frequently associated with account takeover attempts where an attacker registers their own MFA device to a compromised privileged account to maintain persistence.
Detects rapid, non-interactive sign-ins to the Microsoft Device Registration Service following a device-code authentication. This pattern is characteristic of attackers using scripted clients (such as python-requests) to automate the registration of rogue devices after harvesting tokens via device-code phishing.
This rule detects scenarios where a user completes a device-code authentication flow, followed immediately (within 10 minutes) by the registration of an unmanaged, non-compliant device to their account. This behavior is indicative of potential token theft (e.g., EvilTokens) where an adversary uses a stolen token to register their own device as a persistent, unmanaged entity, bypassing standard corporate device enrollment controls.
This rule detects scenarios where a user completes a device-code authentication flow, followed immediately (within 10 minutes) by the registration of an unmanaged, non-compliant device to their account. This behavior is indicative of potential token theft (e.g., EvilTokens) where an adversary uses a stolen token to register their own device as a persistent, unmanaged entity, bypassing standard corporate device enrollment controls.
This rule detects scenarios where a user completes a device-code authentication flow, followed immediately (within 10 minutes) by the registration of an unmanaged, non-compliant device to their account. This behavior is indicative of potential token theft (e.g., EvilTokens) where an adversary uses a stolen token to register their own device as a persistent, unmanaged entity, bypassing standard corporate device enrollment controls.
This rule detects scenarios where a user completes a device-code authentication flow, followed immediately (within 10 minutes) by the registration of an unmanaged, non-compliant device to their account. This behavior is indicative of potential token theft (e.g., EvilTokens) where an adversary uses a stolen token to register their own device as a persistent, unmanaged entity, bypassing standard corporate device enrollment controls.
Detects when a user account updates their multi-factor authentication (MFA) details to include a higher count of registered devices than previously recorded. This behavior could indicate an attacker adding their own device to a compromised account to bypass MFA or maintain persistent access.
Detects when a user registers a new MFA or authentication method, such as a software token or authenticator app, within one hour of a suspicious sign-in event. This pattern is commonly indicative of an adversary establishing persistence or bypassing authentication controls following account compromise via phishing or credential harvesting.
Detects network connection events involving a specific known malicious IP address (5.230.71.51) identified as participating in unauthorized Intune enrollment or Entra ID device registration processes.
Detects network connection events involving a specific known malicious IP address (5.230.71.51) identified as participating in unauthorized Intune enrollment or Entra ID device registration processes.
This rule detects anomalous behavior where a single user account registers multiple devices within a very short timeframe (80 seconds). This pattern often follows the theft of a device code or OAuth authorization token, where an adversary attempts to rapidly enroll multiple rogue devices to maintain persistent access or bypass MFA controls.
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