Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation of files with names containing 'winPatch' and extensions of '.zip' or '.vbs' in Windows TEMP directories, originating from PowerShell or WScript processes. This behavior is indicative of potential ingress tool transfer or staging of malicious scripts.
This rule monitors Cisco Unified Communications Manager (UCM) environments for multiple stages of an attack chain, including potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attempts against administrative interfaces, suspicious file modifications by service accounts, indicators of privilege escalation, and anomalous outbound network connections from core Cisco processes.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious download-related commands (Invoke-WebRequest, DownloadFile, WebClient, IEX, DownloadString) when initiated through conhost.exe, specifically when the originating parent process is a common shell or utility associated with shortcut (.lnk) file execution or specific command patterns.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to GitHub Actions workflows, including the creation or modification of workflow configuration files, the placement of suspicious JavaScript files in the repository's .github directory, the execution of the 'Bun' runtime within an Actions runner environment, and cloud-based events indicating workflow modification containing 'Run Copilot' strings. These patterns are often associated with CI/CD pipeline compromise, malicious automation, or unauthorized code execution within build environments.
This rule detects malicious activity associated with the GIFTEDCROOK (UAC-0226) threat actor. It identifies the use of PowerShell or cmd.exe to execute staged files from specific ProgramData paths (WC3, wt1), monitors for common NT API-based reflective injection patterns (such as NtAllocateVirtualMemory and NtWriteVirtualMemory) originating from PowerShell, tracks the creation of known staging artifacts in ProgramData, and identifies the execution of known malicious process image hashes.
This rule detects activity associated with a known malicious campaign involving 'Photo ZIP' themed lures. It identifies DNS queries to actor-controlled domains, the spawning of PowerShell by Explorer.exe with command lines referencing photo-related filenames or external file-sharing services, and the subsequent downloading of the node.exe runtime to user-accessible directories (consistent with TonRAT delivery).
This rule detects indicators of compromise associated with the TinyRCT malware, including the loading of a malicious AppDomainManager DLL by chrome_setup.exe, network connections to a known TinyRCT staging server, and the dropping of second-stage payloads such as PerfWatson2.exe to the local application data directory.
Detects the execution of the fscan network scanner binary, its use with common scanning arguments, or any network communication with the known staging IP address associated with the fscan deployment.
Detects Python processes that combine potentially dangerous pickle deserialization (pickle.loads) with network-fetching libraries (urllib, requests, socket) and decoding methods (b64decode, fromhex). This pattern is consistent with backdoors or remote access tools (RATs) that fetch encoded payloads over the network and execute them directly in memory via deserialization.
This rule detects the creation of directories or files within /var/tmp that use the hidden naming convention (dot-prefix), specifically looking for '.xlamb' or '.x'. Such hidden directories in temporary storage locations are commonly used by attackers for staging malicious tools, malware, or backdoors.
Detects download, execution, and network activity associated with the 'isp.sh' dropper script. This includes the use of common utilities like curl or wget to fetch the script from a specific C2 IP address (83.142.209.214), piping the script directly to a shell, and signs of secondary payload execution such as 'lambsys'.
Detects instances where common browser processes or Windows Explorer initiate suspicious child processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or mshta.exe. The rule uses a scoring mechanism based on the presence of encoded command indicators, web-related payloads, or specific HTA script arguments to identify potentially malicious activity such as drive-by downloads or living-off-the-land execution.
Detects instances where common browser processes or Windows Explorer initiate suspicious child processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or mshta.exe. The rule uses a scoring mechanism based on the presence of encoded command indicators, web-related payloads, or specific HTA script arguments to identify potentially malicious activity such as drive-by downloads or living-off-the-land execution.
Detects the PowerShell downloader stage of the abdrizak PostCSS typosquatting campaign. The malware decodes an AES-encrypted blob in the npm package and executes powershell with ExecutionPolicy Bypass targeting settings.ps1, or invokes curl.exe (from node.exe or powershell.exe) to download a payload from nvidiadriver.net disguised as a Windows driver update.
Detects HTTP POST requests directed to /V1/Update/GetUpdate, indicative of the OceanLotus downloader retrieving the next-stage payload (SPECTRALVIPER).
This rule monitors for the creation of specific file artifacts associated with the APT28 SimpleLoader malware, including malicious DLLs, steganographic image payloads, and configuration files dropped into non-standard or diagnostic directories.
This rule monitors for the creation of specific file artifacts associated with the APT28 SimpleLoader malware, including malicious DLLs, steganographic image payloads, and configuration files dropped into non-standard or diagnostic directories.
Detects a self-extracting 7-Zip archive that exhibits characteristics of a downloader, specifically looking for the presence of '7-Zip' strings, WinINet API calls ('WinINet', 'InternetReadFile') for downloading, and 'CreateProcessW' for launching child processes. It also looks for the string 'AppData\Local\Programs', which could indicate an installation path. The rule targets executable files (MZ header).
Detects the use of the built-in Windows utility 'certutil.exe' with arguments commonly used to download remote content (-urlcache -split -f) or decode base64 encoded files (-decode, -decodehex), when the output or operation occurs within temporary system directories such as Temp, AppData, or ProgramData, and the process is not signed by Microsoft.
Detects the use of BITSAdmin or PowerShell 'Start-BitsTransfer' to initiate file transfers, specifically targeting non-Microsoft signed processes. Adversaries often abuse the Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) to download malicious payloads or exfiltrate data, as it is a legitimate Windows service that operates in the background.
Detects the use of PowerShell commands that leverage 'Invoke-Expression' (IEX) in conjunction with 'Net.WebClient' or 'DownloadString' methods to download and execute code directly from the internet into memory.
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