Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
175 detections
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Detects instances where the WLDR Agent attempts to execute code via 'Start-ModuleJob' and subsequently hits an error condition, forcing a fallback to native PowerShell 'Start-Job' cmdlets. This pattern of falling back from a specialized execution environment to standard, potentially less-monitored, background jobs can indicate an attempt to bypass existing runspace restrictions or execution policies.
Detects instances where the WLDR Agent attempts to execute code via 'Start-ModuleJob' and subsequently hits an error condition, forcing a fallback to native PowerShell 'Start-Job' cmdlets. This pattern of falling back from a specialized execution environment to standard, potentially less-monitored, background jobs can indicate an attempt to bypass existing runspace restrictions or execution policies.
Detects instances where the WLDR Agent attempts to execute code via 'Start-ModuleJob' and subsequently hits an error condition, forcing a fallback to native PowerShell 'Start-Job' cmdlets. This pattern of falling back from a specialized execution environment to standard, potentially less-monitored, background jobs can indicate an attempt to bypass existing runspace restrictions or execution policies.
This rule detects the use of the 'EnumTimeFormatsEx' Windows API function by monitoring device events. This API is used to enumerate time formats supported by a locale. While potentially benign, it is frequently used in reconnaissance or anti-sandbox techniques by malware to determine environment settings or to fingerprint the target system.
Detects DLL side-loading attempts and suspicious process executions associated with the HijackLoader (wingo) malware distribution chain. The rule monitors for specific common applications loading known vulnerable DLLs from suspicious non-standard directories (e.g., ProgramData, Temp) and tracks rare parent-child process relationships associated with this campaign.
Detects mpr.dll loaded by non-standard processes followed by an SMB (port 445) connection from the same process, consistent with Cavern Manticore's WNetAddConnection2 routine that lazily resolves the API via P/Invoke (bypassing the static import table) and marshals stolen credentials to authenticate to remote network resources.
Detects the execution of known command-line artifacts and tools associated with direct and indirect system call resolution, such as SysWhispers, HellsGate, and HellHall. These techniques are commonly employed by adversaries to bypass user-mode EDR hooks by invoking NT syscalls directly.
This rule detects scenarios where common administrative or attack tools (e.g., whoami, net, ipconfig, psexec) are used within the same 5-minute window as network communication to known Large Language Model (LLM) service providers. This pattern may indicate an attacker using LLMs to assist with post-exploitation discovery, script generation, or data analysis based on local system reconnaissance.
Detects the execution of the Snowlight dropper (wusvc.exe) masquerading as a Windows Update service. The rule identifies instances where wusvc.exe is spawned by services.exe from an unconventional path, signaling a potential malicious service installation associated with the UNC5221 VSHELL RAT campaign. The payload is known to utilize Hell's Gate/Halo's Gate direct syscall techniques to evade security API hooks.
Detects the creation of specific file artifacts associated with the VILE ransomware. The VILE ransomware Go-based binary is known for employing ETW tracing suppression and direct NT system calls to bypass EDR user-mode hooking. Identifying these unique filenames on the host acts as a high-fidelity indicator that the VILE binary is actively present and executing.
This rule detects scenarios where common administrative or attack tools (e.g., whoami, net, ipconfig, psexec) are used within the same 5-minute window as network communication to known Large Language Model (LLM) service providers. This pattern may indicate an attacker using LLMs to assist with post-exploitation discovery, script generation, or data analysis based on local system reconnaissance.
Detects behavior indicative of the SNOWLIGHT dropper, which uses direct syscalls to perform memory allocation (VirtualAlloc/VirtualProtect with PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE) and subsequent process access to LSASS or other critical security processes (MsMpEng.exe, csrss.exe, winlogon.exe). The detection specifically looks for the absence of ntdll.dll in the call stack during these operations, signaling an EDR bypass attempt via direct syscalls within a 60-second window.
Detects a non-system process that allocates executable memory (consistent with custom syscall stub staging) and subsequently opens a handle to the LSASS process. This behavior correlates the preparation of custom syscall stubs (often used to bypass user-mode API hooking) with the direct interaction with LSASS, which is a high-confidence indicator of credential dumping activity.
Detects behavior indicative of LegionLoader where an unsigned process spawned by msiexec.exe or cmd.exe from the AppData\Roaming directory dynamically loads system DLLs (ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, etc.) followed immediately by API function resolution via GetProcAddress. This sequence is a common technique used by malware to obfuscate function imports, evade static analysis, and hide malicious functionality.
Detects execution of potential BeepRAT shellcode loaders (tcc.exe or LuaJit.exe) using specific command-line arguments, as well as the creation of associated files (temp.bin, config.ini.c) or execution patterns initiated by HFY.exe.
This rule detects suspicious inter-process communication (IPC) attempts using WM_COPYDATA messaging, where processes (often script interpreters or unsigned binaries) interact with high-value GUI-based applications (like browsers or shell environments). This pattern is a common indicator of process injection techniques, such as hijacking existing Windows callbacks to execute code within the context of a target process.
Detects svchost.exe (hosting Windows Store Install Service) loading InstallServicePlugin.dll from a UNC path or making outbound SMB connections as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. This indicates successful UNCanny coercion where the SYSTEM-level service performs LoadLibraryW against an attacker-controlled UNC path, enabling NTLM machine account capture or SYSTEM code execution.
Detects behavior patterns associated with Payouts King ransomware, including direct syscall-style API calls (NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtWriteVirtualMemory, CreateRemoteThread) from processes other than trusted system binaries, and the loading of ntdll.dll from non-standard file paths (outside System32/SysWOW64). It also includes a hash-based detection for known Payouts King malicious samples.
Detects process doppelganging using NTFS transactional operations
Detects abuse of native Windows API calls for process injection and execution
This rule detects EDR evasion techniques associated with the SNOWLIGHT dropper used by UNC5221. It identifies two specific behaviors: the manual loading of ntdll.dll from non-standard Windows directories, which suggests an attempt to bypass EDR hooks through manual mapping and direct syscalls, and the loading of amsi.dll by processes running from user-writable directories (e.g., Temp, Downloads), indicative of an in-memory AMSI bypass.
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