Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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KQL Query
Get stats on ASR audit events - count events and machines per rule.
These queries check telemetry from the Exploit Guard rule: Rule: Block Office applications from creating child processes.
(Rule ID d4f940ab-401b-4efc-aadc-ad5f3c50688a).
Read more about it here: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.
Oftentimes organizations enable this rule in audit mode and check the results before setting block mode.
You can use query #2 to measure the rule impact on your network in audit mode before turning it to block mode.
Query #1 is used after setting it to block mode - to analyze the block stats.
Tags: #ASR.
Query #1: block stats.
(Rule ID d4f940ab-401b-4efc-aadc-ad5f3c50688a).
Read more about it here: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.
Oftentimes organizations enable this rule in audit mode and check the results before setting block mode.
You can use query #2 to measure the rule impact on your network in audit mode before turning it to block mode.
Query #1 is used after setting it to block mode - to analyze the block stats.
Tags: #ASR.
Query #1: block stats.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Trickbot: Pervasive & underestimated.
Trickbot is a very prevalent piece of malware with an array of malicious capabilities. Originally designed to steal banking credentials, it has since evolved into a modular trojan that can deploy other malware, disable security software, and perform command-and-control (C2) operations.
Trickbot is frequently spread through email. An attacker will send a target a message with an attachment containing a malicious macro. If the target enables the macro, it will write a JScript Encoded (JSE) file to disk (JScript is a Microsoft dialect of ECMAScript). The JSE file will then be launched using wscript.exe to perform a variety of malicious tasks, particularly reconnaissance.
The following query detects when Office applications have launched wscript.exe to run a JSE file.
See Detect rundll.exe being used for reconnaissance and command-and-control for another query related to Trickbot activity.
Reference - https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266/
Trickbot is a very prevalent piece of malware with an array of malicious capabilities. Originally designed to steal banking credentials, it has since evolved into a modular trojan that can deploy other malware, disable security software, and perform command-and-control (C2) operations.
Trickbot is frequently spread through email. An attacker will send a target a message with an attachment containing a malicious macro. If the target enables the macro, it will write a JScript Encoded (JSE) file to disk (JScript is a Microsoft dialect of ECMAScript). The JSE file will then be launched using wscript.exe to perform a variety of malicious tasks, particularly reconnaissance.
The following query detects when Office applications have launched wscript.exe to run a JSE file.
See Detect rundll.exe being used for reconnaissance and command-and-control for another query related to Trickbot activity.
Reference - https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266/
These queries check telemetry from the Exploit Guard rule: Rule: Block Office applications from creating child processes.
(Rule ID d4f940ab-401b-4efc-aadc-ad5f3c50688a).
Read more about it here: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.
Oftentimes organizations enable this rule in audit mode and check the results before setting block mode.
You can use query #2 to measure the rule impact on your network in audit mode before turning it to block mode.
Query #1 is used after setting it to block mode - to analyze the block stats.
Tags: #ASR.
Query #1: block stats.
(Rule ID d4f940ab-401b-4efc-aadc-ad5f3c50688a).
Read more about it here: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.
Oftentimes organizations enable this rule in audit mode and check the results before setting block mode.
You can use query #2 to measure the rule impact on your network in audit mode before turning it to block mode.
Query #1 is used after setting it to block mode - to analyze the block stats.
Tags: #ASR.
Query #1: block stats.
These queries check telemetry from the Exploit Guard rule: Rule: Block Office applications from creating child processes.
(Rule ID d4f940ab-401b-4efc-aadc-ad5f3c50688a).
Read more about it here: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.
Oftentimes organizations enable this rule in audit mode and check the results before setting block mode.
You can use query #2 to measure the rule impact on your network in audit mode before turning it to block mode.
Query #1 is used after setting it to block mode - to analyze the block stats.
Tags: #ASR.
Query #1: block stats.
(Rule ID d4f940ab-401b-4efc-aadc-ad5f3c50688a).
Read more about it here: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.
Oftentimes organizations enable this rule in audit mode and check the results before setting block mode.
You can use query #2 to measure the rule impact on your network in audit mode before turning it to block mode.
Query #1 is used after setting it to block mode - to analyze the block stats.
Tags: #ASR.
Query #1: block stats.
These queries check telemetry from the Exploit Guard rule: Rule: Block Office applications from creating child processes.
(Rule ID d4f940ab-401b-4efc-aadc-ad5f3c50688a).
Read more about it here: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.
Oftentimes organizations enable this rule in audit mode and check the results before setting block mode.
You can use query #2 to measure the rule impact on your network in audit mode before turning it to block mode.
Query #1 is used after setting it to block mode - to analyze the block stats.
Tags: #ASR.
Query #1: block stats.
(Rule ID d4f940ab-401b-4efc-aadc-ad5f3c50688a).
Read more about it here: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.
Oftentimes organizations enable this rule in audit mode and check the results before setting block mode.
You can use query #2 to measure the rule impact on your network in audit mode before turning it to block mode.
Query #1 is used after setting it to block mode - to analyze the block stats.
Tags: #ASR.
Query #1: block stats.
Detects an attacker trying to enable the Outlook security setting "EnableUnsafeClientMailRules" which allows Outlook to run applications or execute macros. This setting can be manipulated via the command line, typically through registry modification commands.
Detects changes to registry values related to Outlook security settings, which could indicate an attempt to modify Outlook's behavior for persistence or other malicious purposes. This rule specifically looks for modifications within the 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\<version>\Outlook\Security\' registry path.
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