Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of processes with command-line arguments containing keywords related to known supply chain attacks (e.g., solarwinds, 3cx, kaseya, npm, pypi). This rule is intended for threat hunting to identify potential exploitation attempts or malicious activity involving software supply chain components.
Detects file creation events related to known GLASSWORM VS Code extension files or WebAssembly (WASM) loader JavaScript shims. It also identifies process execution where the VS Code extension host spawns 'node.exe' with known GLASSWORM JavaScript shims. This rule aims to identify the presence and execution of the GLASSWORM malware.
Detects node.exe spawning powershell.exe as a child process, consistent with malicious npm postinstall lifecycle hooks used by the PostCSS typosquatting campaign (postcss-minify-selector-parser / postcss-minify-selector). The attack chain decrypts an AES-256-GCM blob at runtime and executes a PowerShell downloader stage.
Detects instances where 'node.exe' is copying browser history SQLite databases (Chrome, Edge, Brave) to temporary directories, potentially indicating data exfiltration or staging. This behavior has been observed in supply chain attacks like the 'easy-day-js' incident involving the 'protocal.cjs' backdoor.
Supply chain worm targeting npm packages and GitHub Actions, linked to Shai-Hulud/Hades lineage
Supply chain worm targeting npm packages and GitHub Actions, linked to Shai-Hulud/Hades lineage
Supply chain worm targeting npm packages and GitHub Actions, linked to Shai-Hulud/Hades lineage
Detects malicious node.js processes spawned from npm lifecycle hooks (e.g., install, postinstall) that exhibit suspicious command-line arguments, environment variables, or connections to known malicious domains associated with supply chain compromise campaigns.
Detects node.exe (or node) processes accessing standard shell history files across Linux (.bash_history, .zsh_history, .sh_history, fish_history) and Windows (PSReadLine history). This behavior is characteristic of infostealer payloads, such as those observed in the Polymarket Trap npm supply chain campaign, attempting to collect sensitive command-line history.
Detects suspicious child process execution originating from Node.js environments. The rule monitors for common package installation scripts (e.g., postinstall) or suspicious command-line indicators associated with known malicious patterns, such as domain connections, library masquerading, and unauthorized script execution.
Detects node.js executing known malicious npm lifecycle scripts (such as install-check.cjs, verify-peer.cjs, sync-peer.cjs, postinstall-run.js, and preinstall.js) often found in node_modules folders. These scripts are associated with the Polymarket Trap supply chain campaign, which leverages malicious npm hooks for initial access or malicious activity within a development environment.
Detects the execution of Node.js or npm processes that reference known malicious transitive npm dependencies or typosquatted packages identified in the Polymarket Trap supply chain campaign, such as 'log-taker' and various 'thirdweb' typosquats.
Detects the execution of a malicious npm package ('@withgoogle/stitch-sdk') which uses scope-squatting to impersonate a legitimate library. The rule flags the execution of preinstall scripts that involve references to the malicious exfiltration domain 'stitch-production.org' or the identified maintainer 'maximus-mcmillan', indicating unauthorized credential harvesting.
This rule detects an unusually high number of command-line executions containing keywords related to 'dependency' or 'library' and 'update' or 'upgrade' within a one-hour window on a single computer. This behavior could indicate an adversary attempting to modify system components, install malicious libraries, or compromise the software supply chain by frequently updating or upgrading software dependencies.
This rule detects a high volume of file creation events (100 or more within an hour) occurring in common development-related directories such as 'node_modules', 'packages', or 'vendor'. This activity can be indicative of legitimate software development processes like dependency installation or project builds. However, it can also signal malicious activity, particularly if observed on systems not typically used for development, or as part of a supply chain compromise where malicious dependencies are being introduced or built.
This rule detects a high frequency of process creations (Event ID 4688) with command-line arguments containing keywords indicative of software publishing or deployment, such as 'publish', 'deploy', 'artifact', or 'release'. A count of 3 or more such events within a one-hour window from the same computer and account is considered suspicious. This pattern could indicate legitimate CI/CD activities, but also potential abuse of software deployment tools or a software supply chain compromise by an adversary.
This rule detects the creation of 'requirements.txt' or 'pom.xml' files on a system. These files are commonly used in software development projects (Python and Java/Maven, respectively) to manage dependencies and project configurations. Monitoring their creation can help identify legitimate development activities, but also potential malicious actions such as supply chain compromise where an adversary might introduce or modify project dependencies.
This rule detects processes making a high number of successful network connections (10 or more within an hour) to known public container registries such as docker.io or quay.io. This activity could indicate legitimate containerization operations, but also potential malicious activity like downloading malicious container images as part of a supply chain attack, or ingress of tools.
Detects instances where a node.exe process, operating in an npm install or lifecycle hook context, executes a child process (such as cmd, powershell, or bash) that matches known suspicious patterns or actor-defined malicious filenames, indicative of potential supply chain compromise via malicious npm packages.
Detects node.exe spawning powershell.exe as a child process, consistent with malicious npm postinstall lifecycle hooks used by the PostCSS typosquatting campaign (postcss-minify-selector-parser / postcss-minify-selector). The attack chain decrypts an AES-256-GCM blob at runtime and executes a PowerShell downloader stage.
Detects PowerShell execution patterns used for host reconnaissance and application enumeration, specifically looking for combinations of Get-StartApps and Get-AppxPackage with silent error handling. This behavior was observed in the easy-day-js malware dropped via the Mastra npm supply chain compromise.
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