Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
317 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
126
70
32
24
23
Contributors
98
55
29
20
16
Categories
176
166
98
69
60
Platforms
251
64
48
27
3
Products / Services
80
72
50
31
29
MITRE Techniques
18,116
15,638
12,585
8,395
6,225
CVEs
7
IDS Classtypes
29
2
1
IDS Protocols
27
2
1
1
Detects instances where explorer.exe (the Windows Shell) launches common scripting or command-line binaries with suspicious arguments often associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering attacks. These attacks involve tricking users into copying and pasting obfuscated PowerShell, mshta, or curl commands into the Windows Run dialog to execute malicious payloads.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests initiated by the Windows PowerShell User-Agent where the destination host is a decimal-encoded IP address. This pattern is commonly associated with ClickFix-style social engineering attacks, where users are tricked into executing obfuscated PowerShell commands to download malicious payloads.
This rule detects suspicious HTTP POST requests to a /collect endpoint that contain tracking parameters (visitorId, stage, variant, events) associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering campaigns. These campaigns typically trick users into copying and pasting malicious code by simulating error prompts or CAPTCHAs.
Detects a suspected ClickFix infection sequence associated with Psychedelic Stealer. The rule identifies a user navigating to known malicious lure pages (often mimicking Cloudflare CAPTCHAs) followed shortly by the Windows Run dialog (explorer.exe) initiating msiexec.exe to execute a remote MSI file.
Detects the 'ClickFix' social engineering pattern where an adversary tricks a user into using the Windows Run dialog (explorer.exe) to execute msiexec.exe, downloading and installing a remote MSI package. This is frequently associated with malware delivery, such as Psychedelic Stealer, where users are prompted to copy and paste malicious commands under the guise of fake error messages or CAPTCHAs.
Detects a suspicious process chain where a web browser spawns the Windows Explorer process (typically representing a file dialog) which then immediately spawns a command interpreter (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or mshta.exe). This pattern is consistent with ClickFix or similar attacks where a user is tricked into pasting a malicious command into a browser-triggered file selection window address bar.
Detects activity indicative of the 'ClickFix' social engineering technique, where users are tricked into manually executing obfuscated commands (often from fake CAPTCHA or error prompts) via the Windows Run dialog or command-line interfaces. The rule correlates suspicious process execution (e.g., mshta, powershell, certutil, curl) originating from explorer.exe with the detection of common encoded/obfuscated command line patterns, or interactions with the Windows RunMRU registry key, which logs commands typed into the Run dialog.
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' social engineering campaign, which commonly targets users with fake error messages to trick them into executing malicious commands. The rule identifies communication with known malicious infrastructure (domains and IP addresses) found in CommonSecurityLog events, while implementing filters to exclude common security scanners and deduplicating per-host alerts.
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' social engineering campaign, which commonly targets users with fake error messages to trick them into executing malicious commands. The rule identifies communication with known malicious infrastructure (domains and IP addresses) found in CommonSecurityLog events, while implementing filters to exclude common security scanners and deduplicating per-host alerts.
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' social engineering campaign, which commonly targets users with fake error messages to trick them into executing malicious commands. The rule identifies communication with known malicious infrastructure (domains and IP addresses) found in CommonSecurityLog events, while implementing filters to exclude common security scanners and deduplicating per-host alerts.
Detects HTTP response bodies containing indicators of 'ClickFix' social engineering lures. The rule monitors for JavaScript code designed to manipulate the user's clipboard (execCommand('copy') or clipboard.writeText) in conjunction with instructions for the user to execute the Windows Run dialog (Win+R), a common technique to trick users into executing malicious commands under the guise of solving a fake CAPTCHA or error.
Detects ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where users are tricked into pasting malicious payloads into the Windows Run dialog. The rule monitors for common scripting interpreters (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, mshta.exe, rundll32.exe) spawned by explorer.exe or mstsc.exe with suspicious command-line patterns indicative of payload delivery, such as obfuscated strings, hidden windows, or short-URL downloads.
Detects a ClickFix-style activity where an adversary uses nslookup.exe or certutil.exe to perform DNS TXT record queries for payload staging or C2 rendezvous. The rule identifies suspicious parent processes like explorer.exe or scripting hosts, correlates this with a subsequent outbound network connection from the same host, and is intended to capture DNS-based beaconing or data staging.
This rule detects persistence establishment via Scheduled Task creation shortly (within 15 minutes) after a suspicious PowerShell process execution. The PowerShell execution matches the 'ClickFix' pattern, characterized by hidden/bypass window styles and the invocation of remote download or execution cmdlets (e.g., IEX, IRM).
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' social engineering campaign, which commonly targets users with fake error messages to trick them into executing malicious commands. The rule identifies communication with known malicious infrastructure (domains and IP addresses) found in CommonSecurityLog events, while implementing filters to exclude common security scanners and deduplicating per-host alerts.
This rule detects network traffic originating from internal hosts to the domain 'msfconfig.icu'. It specifically monitors for GET requests to '/tmp/system.txt' and TLS connections using the same domain as an SNI, which are associated with the delivery of ClickFix XMRig miner payloads.
Detects msiexec.exe being executed with a remote HTTP(S) URL argument that includes a token-based query parameter. This pattern is characteristic of ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where a user is tricked into manually executing a command to download and run a malicious MSI file.
Detects a specific social-engineering pattern known as 'ClickFix' where a user is manipulated into opening the Windows Run dialog (explorer.exe) to manually execute commands. The rule identifies suspicious command-line arguments typically associated with initial access (e.g., PowerShell hidden/encoded execution, web downloads) followed by the execution of MSI installers or related malicious binaries (e.g., rnpkeys.exe) within a 30-minute window, indicative of the Sauron Loader infection chain.
Detects suspicious command-line execution patterns originating from explorer.exe, characteristic of 'ClickFix' social engineering attacks where users are tricked into copying and pasting malicious commands into a terminal or Run dialog. The rule monitors for the usage of system binaries (mshta, powershell, rundll32, etc.) combined with network-fetching arguments or suspicious execution flags (hidden windows, encoded commands).
This rule detects the 'ClickFix' social engineering technique where a user is manipulated into manually invoking the Windows Run dialog (Win+R) and pasting a malicious command. The rule monitors for instances where explorer.exe spawns command interpreters like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or mshta.exe with suspicious command-line patterns indicative of encoded payloads, script execution, or remote downloads.
This rule detects network traffic patterns indicative of the Lumma Stealer 'ClickFix' phishing campaign. It identifies outbound requests to suspicious domains ending in .cyou utilizing specific user agents (WinHttp or Microsoft BITS), which are characteristic of malicious PowerShell scripts attempting to retrieve secondary payloads.
Page 2 of 16