Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects outbound network connections initiated by the Windows Installer utility (msiexec.exe) to non-private (external) IP addresses over standard web ports (80/443). Msiexec.exe can be abused to download and execute malicious payloads or packages from remote locations.
Correlates an MSI downloaded by a browser with silent msiexec execution on the same device within fifteen minutes. This rule detects potential malicious software installation initiated by a user downloading an MSI package via a web browser, followed by a silent execution of that package using msiexec.exe. This technique is often used by attackers to install malware without user interaction.
Detects a spoofed utility executable (like CrystalDiskInfo via MSI) loading the malicious autorun.dll from the downloads path, indicative of a cryptojacking campaign.
Detects a command shell using cURL to download an MSI package and immediately install it silently with msiexec, matching a reported RMM delivery workflow. This rule specifically looks for command-line executions involving 'cmd.exe', 'powershell.exe', or 'pwsh.exe' that use 'curl' to download a '.msi' file and then execute 'msiexec' with silent installation flags.
Detects various indicators of SharkLoader activity, including the deployment of decoy MSI files, execution of suspicious masqueraded processes, use of double-extension files, and the creation of malicious DLL components in specific AppData subdirectories.
This rule detects potentially malicious behavior where a PDF reader or command-line utility (executing a PDF) spawns msiexec.exe shortly after, when the parent process is running from a suspicious directory (e.g., AppData, ProgramData, or other temp locations). This pattern is commonly associated with dropper activity where a malicious PDF is opened and subsequently triggers an MSI installer to deploy malware.
This rule detects potentially malicious usage of msiexec.exe. It monitors for two primary suspicious behaviors: 1) msiexec.exe spawning common command-line or scripting interpreters such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or mshta.exe, which often indicates lateral movement or execution of malicious payloads; and 2) msiexec.exe executing an installation process with silent or quiet command-line flags, which may be used to hide malicious software installation from the user.
This rule detects persistence mechanisms associated with the Turla STOCKSTAY backdoor. It monitors for the creation or modification of Registry Run keys, the execution of msiexec for suspicious MSI package installations (DiplomacyEduAI.msi, Copia.msi), and the presence of known STOCKSTAY component executables (e.g., MicrosoftUpdateOneDrive.exe, SMEditor.exe) in the %LOCALAPPDATA%/Programs/SMN/ directory.
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe where the command line points to a remote resource via HTTP, HTTPS, or a UNC path. This behavior is indicative of an adversary using msiexec to download and execute a malicious MSI package, leveraging it as a proxy for malicious code execution.
This rule detects the execution of Living Off The Land Binaries (LOLBins) such as certutil.exe, msiexec.exe, regsvcs.exe, regasm.exe, rundll32.exe, cscript.exe, and wscript.exe, when their command lines contain keywords indicative of malicious activity like 'download', 'encode', 'decode', 'http', 'ftp', or 'javascript'. It specifically filters out executions originating from explorer.exe or svchost.exe to reduce false positives and triggers when two or more such events occur within an hour on the same computer by the same user.
This rule detects the execution of ScreenConnect client services or MSI installers when initiated by common scripting or installer processes such as wscript.exe, cscript.exe, powershell.exe, or msiexec.exe. This behavior can indicate the abuse of legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools for malicious purposes, such as initial access, persistence, or remote control by adversaries.
Detects msiexec.exe silently downloading and installing an MSI payload from an external URL. This behavior is often indicative of malicious activity where an attacker uses msiexec to fetch and execute a malicious installer without user interaction.
Detects the specific Seedworm MSI dropper 'update_ms.msi' executed via msiexec. This rule identifies process execution where 'msiexec.exe' is the process and its command line contains 'update_ms.msi', indicating the execution of a known malicious MSI file associated with the Seedworm APT group.
This rule detects the execution of ScreenConnect client services or MSI installers when initiated by common scripting or installer processes such as wscript.exe, cscript.exe, powershell.exe, or msiexec.exe. This behavior can indicate the abuse of legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools for malicious purposes, such as initial access, persistence, or remote control by adversaries.
Detects the execution of known Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins) such as certutil.exe, msiexec.exe, regsvcs.exe, and regasm.exe when their command line contains suspicious keywords like 'download', 'http', or 'encode'. This activity can indicate an attempt to download malicious payloads or bypass security controls.
Detects execution chains where a suspicious DLL (autorun.dll) is loaded from user-controlled directories and followed by a silent MSI installation. This pattern is commonly associated with malware staging and secondary payload deployment.
This rule detects the execution of Living Off The Land Binaries (LOLBins) such as certutil.exe, msiexec.exe, regsvcs.exe, regasm.exe, rundll32.exe, cscript.exe, and wscript.exe, when their command lines contain keywords indicative of malicious activity like 'download', 'encode', 'decode', 'http', 'ftp', or 'javascript'. It specifically filters out executions originating from explorer.exe or svchost.exe to reduce false positives and triggers when two or more such events occur within an hour on the same computer by the same user.
This rule detects the delivery of a Microsoft Installer (MSI) package via HTTP that exhibits characteristics of a malicious file. It specifically looks for HTTP responses (flow:to_client) containing a URI with the ".msi" extension (http.uri; content:".msi"; nocase;) and the magic bytes "D0 CF 11 E0" (content:"|D0 CF 11 E0|"; depth:4;) which are indicative of an OLE2 compound document file format, commonly used by MSI files. The rule classifies this activity as 'trojan-activity'.
This rule detects various stages of a cryptojacking campaign, as described by Microsoft, involving initial access via autorun.dll sideloading, silent MSI installations, execution of RuntimeHost.exe from suspicious locations, scheduled task creation for persistence, .NET process hollowing, Windows Defender exclusions, and persistence via Startup folder shortcuts and Registry Run keys. The campaign leverages ScreenConnect for remote access and .NET utilities for process hollowing, ultimately leading to GPU mining cryptojacking.
Detects the execution of cURL commands downloading an MSI installer and passing it to msiexec for silent installation, matching UNC3753's SuperOps RMM staging tactic.
This rule detects various stages of a cryptojacking campaign, as described by Microsoft, involving initial access via autorun.dll sideloading, silent MSI installations, execution of RuntimeHost.exe from suspicious locations, scheduled task creation for persistence, .NET process hollowing, Windows Defender exclusions, and persistence via Startup folder shortcuts and Registry Run keys. The campaign leverages ScreenConnect for remote access and .NET utilities for process hollowing, ultimately leading to GPU mining cryptojacking.
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