Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Find distinct evasion and execution activities.
Associated with the Robbinhood ransomware campaign.
Associated with the Robbinhood ransomware campaign.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, RDP ransomware persists as Wadhrama.
The ransomware known as Wadhrama has been used in human-operated attacks that follow a particular pattern. The attackers often use Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to gain initial access to a device or network, exfiltrate credentials, and maintain persistance.
The following query checks for possible Wadhrama-related activity, by detecting any use of Windows Management Instrumentation command-line utility, or WMIC, to delete local backups. The attackers often delete all local backups on an infected device before actually running the ransomware.
Other techniques used by the group associated with Wadhrama are listed under See also.
Reference - https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/Wadhrama
The ransomware known as Wadhrama has been used in human-operated attacks that follow a particular pattern. The attackers often use Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to gain initial access to a device or network, exfiltrate credentials, and maintain persistance.
The following query checks for possible Wadhrama-related activity, by detecting any use of Windows Management Instrumentation command-line utility, or WMIC, to delete local backups. The attackers often delete all local backups on an infected device before actually running the ransomware.
Other techniques used by the group associated with Wadhrama are listed under See also.
Reference - https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/Wadhrama
This query identifies attempts to stop System Restore and prevent the system from creating restore points, which can be used to recover data encrypted by ransomware
This query checks alerts related to file backup deletion and enriches with additional alert evidence information
This rule detects when Shadow Copies are being deleted. This is a know actions that is performed by TA.
This query detects know commands that have been used by the ransomware actors.
Some information from Mitre Attack:
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
This query detects know commands that have been used by the ransomware actors.
Some information from Mitre Attack:
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
This YARA rule detects the VanHelsing ransomware based on specific byte patterns associated with its file encryption routines, network enumeration capabilities, shadow copy deletion, and ransomware note dropping. The rule includes two main versions of the ransomware's functionality, indicating potential evolution or different variants.
Detects the launch of specific utilities (like ntdsutil, vssadmin, diskshadow, esentutl) on key servers. These utilities can be used by adversaries to access or copy the Active Directory domain database (NTDS.dit) or inhibit system recovery, which are common techniques for credential dumping and persistence.
Yara rule that detects VanHelsing ransomware.
This rule detects attempts to delete Windows Volume Shadow Copies using PowerShell commands that interact with WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation). Specifically, it looks for PowerShell scripts containing `Get-WmiObject`, `gwmi`, `Get-CimInstance`, or `gcim` in conjunction with `Win32_ShadowCopy` and a deletion method like `.Delete()`, `Remove-WmiObject`, `rwmi`, `Remove-CimInstance`, or `rcim`. This technique is commonly employed by ransomware families, such as Sodinokibi/REvil, to prevent system recovery.
The analytic detects the creation of shadow copies using `vssadmin.exe` or `wmic.exe`. This activity is significant because creating shadow copies can be a precursor to ransomware attacks or data exfiltration, allowing attackers to bypass file locks and access sensitive data. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could enable attackers to maintain persistence, recover deleted files, or prepare for further malicious activities, posing a significant risk to the integrity and confidentiality of the system. Adversaries may create shadow copies to access the NTDS.dit file for credential dumping or to exfiltrate data.
The analytic detects the deletion of shadow copies using the vssadmin.exe or wmic.exe utilities. This activity is significant because deleting shadow copies is a common tactic used by attackers to prevent recovery and hide their tracks. If confirmed malicious, this action could hinder incident response efforts and allow attackers to maintain persistence and cover their activities, making it crucial for security teams to investigate promptly.
The following analytic detects when AWS S3 bucket versioning is suspended by a user. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify `PutBucketVersioning` events with the `VersioningConfiguration.Status` set to `Suspended`. This activity is significant because disabling versioning can prevent recovery of deleted or modified data, which is a common tactic in ransomware attacks. If confirmed malicious, this action could lead to data loss and hinder recovery efforts, severely impacting data integrity and availability.
The analytic detects the execution of the "swapoff" command with the "-a" argument, which disables the swapping of all paging devices on a Linux system. This activity is significant because disabling swap can be a tactic used by malware, such as Awfulshred, to evade detection and hinder forensic analysis. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to manipulate system memory management, potentially leading to data corruption, system instability, or evasion of memory-based detection mechanisms.
This analytic detects the use of PowerShell to delete shadow copies, a common tactic used by ransomware to prevent data recovery. It specifically looks for PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) events containing keywords like "ShadowCopy" along with "Delete" or "Remove" in the ScriptBlockText. Successful execution of such commands can lead to irreversible data loss and hinder recovery efforts.
The following analytic detects the modification of registry keys to disable System Restore on a machine. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with System Restore settings. This activity is significant because disabling System Restore can hinder recovery efforts and is a tactic often used by Remote Access Trojans (RATs) to maintain persistence on an infected system. If confirmed malicious, this action could prevent system recovery, allowing the attacker to sustain their foothold and potentially cause further damage or data loss.
This analytic is developed to detect the usage of BitLocker commands used to disable or impact boot settings. The malware ShrinkLocker uses various commands to change how BitLocker handles encryption, potentially bypassing TPM requirements, enabling BitLocker without TPM, and enforcing specific startup key and PIN configurations. Such modifications can weaken system security, making it easier for unauthorized access and data breaches. Detecting these changes is crucial for maintaining robust encryption and data protection.
The following analytic detects when AWS S3 bucket versioning is suspended by a user. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify `PutBucketVersioning` events with the `VersioningConfiguration.Status` set to `Suspended`. This activity is significant because disabling versioning can prevent recovery of deleted or modified data, which is a common tactic in ransomware attacks. If confirmed malicious, this action could lead to data loss and hinder recovery efforts, severely impacting data integrity and availability.
The analytic detects modifications to the Windows error recovery boot configurations using `bcdedit.exe` with flags such as "recoveryenabled" and "no". This activity is significant because ransomware often disables recovery options to prevent system restoration, making it crucial for SOC analysts to investigate. If confirmed malicious, this could hinder recovery efforts, allowing ransomware to cause extensive damage and complicate remediation.
The following analytic detects the execution of a suspicious `bcdedit` command that reconfigures a host from safe mode back to normal boot. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on command-line executions involving `bcdedit.exe` with specific parameters. This activity is significant as it may indicate the presence of ransomware, such as BlackMatter, which manipulates boot configurations to facilitate encryption processes. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to maintain control over the boot process, potentially leading to further system compromise and data encryption.
The following analytic detects the execution of "bcdedit.exe" with parameters to set the boot status policy to ignore all failures. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt by ransomware to prevent a compromised machine from booting into automatic repair mode, thereby hindering recovery efforts. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to maintain control over the infected system, complicating remediation and potentially leading to further damage.
The following analytic detects the execution of a suspicious `bcdedit` command that configures a host to boot in safe mode with network support. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving `bcdedit.exe` with specific parameters. This activity is significant because it is a known technique used by BlackMatter ransomware to force a compromised host into safe mode for continued encryption. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass certain security controls, persist in the environment, and continue their malicious activities.
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