Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
74 detections
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Detects the load of the vulnerable Dell BIOS update driver as reported in CVE-2021-21551
Detects driver load of the System Informer tool
Detects driver load of the Process Hacker tool
Detects the execution of Process Hacker based on binary metadata information (Image, Hash, Imphash, etc).
Process Hacker is a tool to view and manipulate processes, kernel options and other low level options.
Threat actors abused older vulnerable versions to manipulate system processes.
Process Hacker is a tool to view and manipulate processes, kernel options and other low level options.
Threat actors abused older vulnerable versions to manipulate system processes.
This query will hunt for files matching the current abuse.ch recent threat feed based on Sha256. Currently the query is set up to analyze the last day worth of events, but this is configurable using the MaxAge variable.
'This query uses Sysmon Image Load (Event ID 7) and Process Create (Event ID 1) data to look for COM Event System being used to load a newly seen DLL.'
This query is looking for rarely seen processes which are launched as a service.
Author: Jouni Mikkola
More info: https://threathunt.blog/rare-process-launch-as-a-service/
Author: Jouni Mikkola
More info: https://threathunt.blog/rare-process-launch-as-a-service/
Identifies suspicious child processes of SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll that may be evidence of the SUNBURST backdoor
References:
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html
- https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/71ffdd4cab4b6acd5cbcd1a0691ff82f
To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimProcessEvent)'
References:
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html
- https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/71ffdd4cab4b6acd5cbcd1a0691ff82f
To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimProcessEvent)'
This analytic identifies the creation of a service with a known name used by CLOP ransomware for persistence and high-privilege code execution. It detects this activity by monitoring Windows Event Logs (EventCode 7045) for specific service names ("SecurityCenterIBM", "WinCheckDRVs"). This activity is significant because the creation of such services is a common tactic used by ransomware to maintain control over infected systems. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute code with elevated privileges, maintain persistence, and potentially disrupt or encrypt critical data.
Detects the execution of Process Hacker, a tool used to view and manipulate processes and other low-level system options. Detection is based on binary metadata such as image path, original filename, description, product name, and known file hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256, IMPHASH). Threat actors have been known to abuse older, vulnerable versions of Process Hacker to manipulate system processes.
Detects the execution of System Informer, a legitimate but powerful task manager tool that can be used to view and manipulate processes, kernel options, and other low-level operations. Its capabilities make it a potential tool for adversaries to gain system information, escalate privileges, or evade defenses.
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