Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
203 detections
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Detects creation of the mmcompat.pth file in Python site-packages, the mrmustard stealer's persistence mechanism designed to survive package uninstall.
Detects modification of targeted registry keys commonly used for persistence
and defense evasion via startup execution.
and defense evasion via startup execution.
Detects new file creation or modification events within the /Library/Caches/ directory of user profiles on macOS. Adversaries may utilize these directories for persistence, staging, or hiding malicious payloads.
Detects instances where a process creates, renames, or copies a file into the /Library/Caches/ directory where the resulting file's SHA256 hash matches the SHA256 hash of the initiating process. This behavior suggests a binary or script is creating a copy of itself within a writable system cache directory, a common technique for establishing persistence or running code from a less conspicuous location.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack chain associated with the SnappyClient RAT (Operation Turb00). The detection logic correlates: 1. Execution of known malicious processes (AlphVector, WizardDa42, VirtualAr, or Crisp); 2. Persistence mechanisms including specific registry keys (CadenceOptimizer) or file artifacts (shortcut links, scheduled tasks, Mayanex data dir, or CorsairUtil DLL); and 3. Outbound network traffic on ports 3333 or 3334 to external IP addresses.
This rule detects the creation of specific hidden files ('.Maccy', '.lock', '.config') within the 'Library/Application Support/com.apple.finder.core/' directory on macOS. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms, configuration tampering, or malicious activity related to the Finder application environment.
Detects artifacts related to the ValleyRAT malware family, specifically identifying markers such as 'Phantom Persistence Module', 'RegisterApplicationRestart', and specific 'RSL_' strings within process command lines, image paths, or module loads using Windows Event Logs and Sysmon data.
This rule detects the creation of executable files within specific directories in the user's AppData Roaming profile, specifically matching patterns associated with known persistence or malicious staging filenames (xwreg or xgdf). This location is frequently abused by attackers to store persistent payloads that execute outside of standard program directories.
This rule detects potentially suspicious process creation or file modification activities associated with Autodesk applications or generic 'appcompat' paths. The detection logic flags processes executing with the '-uiDll' command-line argument and specific file operations (Creation/Modification) involving configuration or log files, often associated with unauthorized software tampering or suspicious binary execution patterns.
Detects modifications to Windows service registry keys (ImagePath, Start, or Type) performed by the native reg.exe or regedit.exe command-line utilities. This behavior is often associated with the creation or modification of services for persistence or privilege escalation.
This rule detects the creation or modification of executable files (.exe, .dll, .sys) within critical Windows system directories (C:\Windows\System32\ or C:\Windows\SysWOW64\). Such activity can indicate an attempt to establish persistence, elevate privileges, or inject malicious code into legitimate system processes.
Detects artifacts related to the ValleyRAT malware family, specifically identifying markers such as 'Phantom Persistence Module', 'RegisterApplicationRestart', and specific 'RSL_' strings within process command lines, image paths, or module loads using Windows Event Logs and Sysmon data.
Detects unauthorized modifications to FreeBSD init scripts located in /etc/rc.d/, /usr/local/etc/rc.d/, or /etc/rc.subr. These directories are used for system service startup. The rule specifically monitors for modifications related to the BRICKSTORM persistence mechanism, which targets these scripts to execute malicious binaries such as /usr/local/libexec/ipsec/blacklist.
Identifies file, registry, network, and process indicators associated with the @mastra/* npm supply chain compromise. This rule detects the presence of specific malicious files, registry modifications for persistence, outbound network connections to known command and control (C2) infrastructure, and the execution of malicious scripts related to the attack.
This rule detects the creation or modification of executable files (.exe, .dll, .sys) within critical Windows system directories (C:\Windows\System32\ or C:\Windows\SysWOW64\). Such activity can indicate an attempt to establish persistence, elevate privileges, or inject malicious code into legitimate system processes.
Detects artifacts related to the ValleyRAT malware family, specifically identifying markers such as 'Phantom Persistence Module', 'RegisterApplicationRestart', and specific 'RSL_' strings within process command lines, image paths, or module loads using Windows Event Logs and Sysmon data.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that point to the ProgramData directory, which is a common persistence location for malware like SystemBC. The rule excludes common, benign software installers and updaters that frequently use this directory to avoid false positives.
Detects registry modifications to SyncRootManager occurring alongside cldflt.sys activity, which may indicate manipulation of cloud synchronization roots.
Detects modifications to the Windows Registry 'shutdownwithoutlogon' value within the 'Policies\System' key. This setting controls whether the 'Shut Down' option is available on the Windows logon screen. Adversaries may modify this to impede access to system power controls or as part of a configuration hardening/persistence tactic.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of network connections indicative of information stealer activity, specifically targeting behaviors observed with malware like VVS Stealer. It identifies instances where a non-browser process, originating from common user-writable or temporary directories (AppData, Temp, Downloads, Users\Public), first connects to an external IP discovery service (ipify.org) and then subsequently communicates with Discord services (discord.com or discordapp.com) within a ten-minute window. This pattern suggests that malware is collecting the victim's public IP address before exfiltrating stolen data (e.g., account or browser information) to Discord infrastructure, often used as a command and control or data exfiltration channel by stealers.
Detects the execution of a malicious Node.js process using a fake ESLint loader named 'vscode-eioesocxetd.js'. This malware persists by modifying the global 'require' function and setting the 'global['!']' property to ensure its presence across process restarts, typically masquerading within npm package directories.
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