Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,235 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
566
292
81
73
60
Contributors
327
202
141
86
72
Categories
730
429
291
252
179
Platforms
1,209
21
17
3
2
Products / Services
388
374
201
58
53
MITRE Techniques
18,116
15,638
12,587
8,397
6,227
1,235
CVEs
15
8
4
2
2
IDS Classtypes
3
IDS Protocols
3
1
Detects PowerShell executing a WebClient DownloadFile method and saving the output directly into the Windows Startup folder, indicating persistence setup. This technique was observed in a campaign deploying obfuscated batch scripts disguised as PNG files into the Startup folder.
This rule connects the creation of the 'Edgre' persistence registry key, which contains 'zuidrt.hta', to the actual process execution of 'zuidrt.hta'. This activity is associated with Operation XENOFISCAL, where the SideCopy threat group deploys the XenorRAT malware.
Identifies the persistence module setting the autostart registry value under the deceptive OneDriveHealthTask moniker.
Detects the use of the Electron setLoginItemSettings API for startup persistence. This API allows Electron-based applications to configure themselves to launch automatically when a user logs in, which can be abused by adversaries to maintain access to a system.
Detects the creation or modification of registry run keys that establish persistence for the Prinz Eugen ransomware. The rule specifically looks for registry entries under 'Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run' that contain common environment variables (e.g., %APPDATA%, %TEMP%) and specific filenames or paths associated with Prinz Eugen ransomware (e.g., 'servertool', 'encrypt.exe', '\Music\', '\Desktop\').
Detects modifications to the 'Run' registry key for persistence, specifically looking for indicators associated with Prinz Eugen ransomware such as 'servertool', 'encrypt.exe', 'lock.exe', or 'ransom' in the registry value data. It excludes common legitimate paths to reduce false positives.
This rule detects modifications to specific registry keys that are commonly used for persistence by malware. The rule looks for Event ID 4657 (A registry value was modified) and checks if the ObjectName corresponds to known malicious registry paths related to Run keys, RunOnce, or service configurations. This indicates an attempt to establish persistence or alter system behavior for malicious purposes.
Detects addition of malicious login items on macOS for user-context persistence
Detects PS1Bot generating randomly named .lnk files in the Windows Startup folder using PowerShell.
This rule detects modifications to specific registry keys that are commonly used for persistence by malware. The rule looks for Event ID 4657 (A registry value was modified) and checks if the ObjectName corresponds to known malicious registry paths related to Run keys, RunOnce, or service configurations. This indicates an attempt to establish persistence or alter system behavior for malicious purposes.
Detects modification of registry Run keys for autostart persistence
Detects addition of malicious login items on macOS for user-context persistence
Detects malicious files written to Office XLSTART or Word STARTUP folders
Detects suspicious modifications to Registry Run and RunOnce keys that include common scripting or command execution keywords (powershell, cmd, .bat). This activity is often associated with persistence mechanisms where adversaries attempt to execute malicious code upon user login.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms related to browser extensions. It looks for processes launching Chrome or Edge with the '--load-extension' command-line argument, which can be used to load unpacked extensions. Additionally, it monitors registry modifications to 'ExtensionInstallForcelist' that contain 'http' or 'crx', indicating a forced installation of an extension, potentially from a remote source or a local file.
Detects the creation of hidden executables deep within the AppData\Roaming directory, a characteristic behavior of PureHVNC for persistence.
Detects the creation of the '.bun_ran' run-once marker in a temporary directory or suspicious Python '.pth' startup hooks (e.g., 'langchain_core-setup.pth') indicative of the Hades loader variant. The '.bun_ran' file acts as a marker for the loader, while '.pth' files can be used to inject malicious code into Python's import mechanism, achieving persistence or execution.
Detects multiple registry value set events where the registry value data contains keywords like 'ransom' or 'payment', or the registry key contains 'Run'. This behavior can indicate ransomware activity attempting to establish persistence or communicate its demands.
This rule detects modifications to Windows Registry Run keys (Run, RunOnce, RunOnceEx, Policies\Run) where the new value contains common scripting interpreters like PowerShell, cmd, cscript, or wscript, and the path is not within the System32 directory. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to establish persistence by ensuring their malicious script or command executes upon user login.
Detects modification of macOS re-opened applications list for persistence on login
Detects fileless malware storing payloads in registry keys for evasion
Page 40 of 59