Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
Sweeps email telemetry for exact matches against known Kimsuky (APT-C-55) infrastructure email addresses. Matches are exact and case-insensitive. MatchType separates inbound mail from the actor and outbound mail to the actor.
Sweeps Defender XDR telemetry for known NEBULA / KNTRAT indicators (SHA256 hashes, C2 IP, decoy domain and URLs, burner publisher emails). Hash matching is scoped per table (execution hash only in process events), noisy tooling is excluded from command-line matches, network hits are limited to connection events, and results are aggregated per device and IOC.
Detects unusual volumes of redirects through WebSEAL. Open or manipulable redirects
on an authentication gateway are valuable to an attacker: a link that genuinely
begins on the organisation's own trusted domain will survive scrutiny that an
external link would not.
Onboarding: ISAM-WEBSEAL is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 85).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webserver where sourcename='ISAM-WEBSEAL' and action='REQUEST_REDIRECTED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, url, uriquery, returncode
on an authentication gateway are valuable to an attacker: a link that genuinely
begins on the organisation's own trusted domain will survive scrutiny that an
external link would not.
Onboarding: ISAM-WEBSEAL is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 85).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webserver where sourcename='ISAM-WEBSEAL' and action='REQUEST_REDIRECTED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, url, uriquery, returncode
Sweeps email telemetry for exact matches against known Kimsuky (APT-C-55) infrastructure email addresses. Matches are exact and case-insensitive. MatchType separates inbound mail from the actor and outbound mail to the actor.
Detects instances where an email previously detected as malware or phishing and quarantined is subsequently released and the recipient interacts with/clicks URLs contained within the email.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
Detects incoming emails containing QR code references in the body along with registration/invitation subjects and common document or image attachments, where the QR code URL is either missing (undecoded) or points to domains other than Google Forms, potentially indicating a phishing attempt attempting to bypass standard URL inspection.
Detects network, file, process, and email interactions associated with known IOCs related to Power BI phishing and rogue ScreenConnect campaigns over a 30-day lookback period.
Sweeps email telemetry for exact matches against known Kimsuky (APT-C-55) infrastructure email addresses. Matches are exact and case-insensitive. MatchType separates inbound mail from the actor and outbound mail to the actor.
Sweeps email telemetry for exact matches against known Kimsuky (APT-C-55) infrastructure email addresses. Matches are exact and case-insensitive. MatchType separates inbound mail from the actor and outbound mail to the actor.
Detects network, file, process, and email interactions associated with known IOCs related to Power BI phishing and rogue ScreenConnect campaigns over a 30-day lookback period.
Detects historical network connections, URL clicks, browser launches, email URLs, and process command lines associated with Wazza phishkit infrastructure IOCs including boegl-krysl.eu, coppietersrecherche.eu, and beacon-surge-sync.workers.dev.
Detects network, file, process, and email interactions associated with known IOCs related to Power BI phishing and rogue ScreenConnect campaigns over a 30-day lookback period.
Sweeps Defender XDR telemetry for known NEBULA / KNTRAT indicators (SHA256 hashes, C2 IP, decoy domain and URLs, burner publisher emails). Hash matching is scoped per table (execution hash only in process events), noisy tooling is excluded from command-line matches, network hits are limited to connection events, and results are aggregated per device and IOC.
Azure AD Device Code Flow Token Phishing
Cortex XDR
Detects potential device code phishing attacks by identifying OAuth token requests associated with the device code flow that originate from unmanaged or non-compliant devices. The rule specifically monitors for suspicious Cmsi (Client Managed Service Identity) activity or the use of unbound sign-in tokens within the device code flow for targeted Microsoft productivity and management applications.
Detects network, file, process, and email interactions associated with known IOCs related to Power BI phishing and rogue ScreenConnect campaigns over a 30-day lookback period.
Detects potential AiTM or credential harvesting campaigns where a device visits known lure or redirect paths (such as specific domains or workers.dev paths) and subsequently accesses the Microsoft device code authentication page within a 15-minute window.
This rule monitors for network and user interaction with known phishing domains that impersonate Microsoft, Outlook, or Teams services. It aggregates data from DNS queries, device network connections, inbound email URL links, and web URL click events to identify potential phishing attempts using a community-sourced watchlist from phishunt.io.
Sweeps Defender XDR telemetry for known NEBULA / KNTRAT indicators (SHA256 hashes, C2 IP, decoy domain and URLs, burner publisher emails). Hash matching is scoped per table (execution hash only in process events), noisy tooling is excluded from command-line matches, network hits are limited to connection events, and results are aggregated per device and IOC.
Detects historical network connections, URL clicks, browser launches, email URLs, and process command lines associated with Wazza phishkit infrastructure IOCs including boegl-krysl.eu, coppietersrecherche.eu, and beacon-surge-sync.workers.dev.
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