Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Sweeps Defender XDR telemetry for known NEBULA / KNTRAT indicators (SHA256 hashes, C2 IP, decoy domain and URLs, burner publisher emails). Hash matching is scoped per table (execution hash only in process events), noisy tooling is excluded from command-line matches, network hits are limited to connection events, and results are aggregated per device and IOC.
Sweeps Defender XDR telemetry for known NEBULA / KNTRAT indicators (SHA256 hashes, C2 IP, decoy domain and URLs, burner publisher emails). Hash matching is scoped per table (execution hash only in process events), noisy tooling is excluded from command-line matches, network hits are limited to connection events, and results are aggregated per device and IOC.
Detects a suspicious two-stage browser activity sequence where a user accesses a Maze survey-builder lure (t.maze.co) followed by a navigation to a Cloudflare Workers subdomain hosting a spoofed Microsoft Authentication device-code phishing page. This pattern is indicative of a multi-stage phishing attack aimed at credential or device token theft.
Detects emails from free-mail domains (@mail.com or @outlook.com) that contain a specific malicious infrastructure indicator in the InternetMessageId or originate from a known suspicious IP address associated with TA419-style spoofing campaigns. This indicates the email was relayed through unauthorized infrastructure rather than the expected legitimate mail providers.
Detects historical network connections, URL clicks, browser launches, email URLs, and process command lines associated with Wazza phishkit infrastructure IOCs including boegl-krysl.eu, coppietersrecherche.eu, and beacon-surge-sync.workers.dev.
This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
This rule monitors for network and user interaction with known phishing domains that impersonate Microsoft, Outlook, or Teams services. It aggregates data from DNS queries, device network connections, inbound email URL links, and web URL click events to identify potential phishing attempts using a community-sourced watchlist from phishunt.io.
Detects inbound phishing emails containing brand mentions for Signal, WhatsApp, or Telegram alongside lure phrases related to verification, 2FA, or device linking. The rule specifically filters for emails containing URLs while excluding messages originating from official domains associated with these services.
Detects historical network connections, URL clicks, browser launches, email URLs, and process command lines associated with Wazza phishkit infrastructure IOCs including boegl-krysl.eu, coppietersrecherche.eu, and beacon-surge-sync.workers.dev.
Detects historical network connections, URL clicks, browser launches, email URLs, and process command lines associated with Wazza phishkit infrastructure IOCs including boegl-krysl.eu, coppietersrecherche.eu, and beacon-surge-sync.workers.dev.
Detects potential AiTM or credential harvesting campaigns where a device visits known lure or redirect paths (such as specific domains or workers.dev paths) and subsequently accesses the Microsoft device code authentication page within a 15-minute window.
Detects potential AiTM or credential harvesting campaigns where a device visits known lure or redirect paths (such as specific domains or workers.dev paths) and subsequently accesses the Microsoft device code authentication page within a 15-minute window.
Detects emails from free-mail domains (@mail.com or @outlook.com) that contain a specific malicious infrastructure indicator in the InternetMessageId or originate from a known suspicious IP address associated with TA419-style spoofing campaigns. This indicates the email was relayed through unauthorized infrastructure rather than the expected legitimate mail providers.
Detects emails from free-mail domains (@mail.com or @outlook.com) that contain a specific malicious infrastructure indicator in the InternetMessageId or originate from a known suspicious IP address associated with TA419-style spoofing campaigns. This indicates the email was relayed through unauthorized infrastructure rather than the expected legitimate mail providers.
Detects phishing messages that deliberately mix writing systems/scripts or use homoglyphs in the Subject line as ONE corroborating signal within a broader, multi-signal phishing pattern. This is the only translation that implements true sender-novelty checking via baseline lookups (a sending domain must be new to both the specific recipient and the organization as a whole to add risk). A weighted score (script-mixing=2, homoglyph=3, phishing vocabulary=2, sender-novelty=1, threshold=6) requires multiple corroborating signals before firing. Note: unlike the SPL/S1QL/CQL/CortexQL translations, this version does not strip brand/product tokens before the script check.
IOC hunt across DNS, network, and file-hash telemetry for the Ledger Google Ads phishing campaign. Vercel redirect domains are matched by exact hostname (DNS query name / parsed URL host) rather than substring, eliminating false positives from unrelated strings that merely contain a look-alike domain fragment. GCS bucket and Google Sites path IOCs remain substring-matched since the bucket IDs and page slugs are already highly specific.
Detects emails that appear to have been injected or sent using the 'swaks' SMTP testing tool rather than a standard Mail User Agent (MUA). The rule identifies this activity by looking for the 'swaks' signature in the 'X-Mailer' header or by matching a specific 'Message-Id' pattern typical of swaks.
Detects anomalous device-authorization-grant (RFC 8628) activity indicative of device-code phishing attacks (e.g., Tycoon2FA). The rule identifies user accounts exhibiting a rapid succession of 'authorization_pending' (70016) status polling attempts followed by a successful token issuance (0), constrained to a short time window and excluding known first-party Microsoft CLI/dev-tool applications.
Detects emails from free-mail domains (@mail.com or @outlook.com) that contain a specific malicious infrastructure indicator in the InternetMessageId or originate from a known suspicious IP address associated with TA419-style spoofing campaigns. This indicates the email was relayed through unauthorized infrastructure rather than the expected legitimate mail providers.
This rule detects known malicious activity including network connections to a specific C2 IP address (69.48.229.140), downloading files from specific C2 URLs, the presence of known malicious file hashes (SHA256), and communications involving specific actor-associated email addresses.
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