Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network indicators associated with the Exvicy/ErrTraffic 'ClickFix' campaign. The rule identifies the retrieval of malicious HTML lure templates from compromised WordPress sites and subsequent telemetry/registration calls to an attacker-controlled 'api.php' script, which are precursors to the fake Cloudflare Turnstile 'Win+R' execution sequence.
Detects HTTP proxy requests for script files (.hta, .js, .ps1) where the HTTP referer indicates the request originated from a search engine or known ad/syndication network. This behavior is highly indicative of 'ClickFix' phishing campaigns, where users are lured from malicious search results or advertisements to download and execute scripts.
Detects known file hashes associated with SideCopy/ReverseRAT.
Detects incoming email messages where the Reply-To header address domain differs from the Sender From address domain. This technique is commonly used in phishing attacks to redirect victim replies to an attacker-controlled mailbox while maintaining a spoofed appearance in the original sender field.
This rule detects potential phishing attempts where the sender's display name is formatted as an email address and the sender's domain uses a capital 'I' character to mimic a well-known service provider (typosquatting/homoglyph attack), such as 'gmaiI.com'. It identifies discrepancies between the actual sender domain and the normalized domain name after character replacement.
Detects the execution of MSI installers from user-writable directories (e.g., Downloads, Temp, Public) that masquerade as legitimate software applications like Spotify, Zoom, or Microsoft Teams. This behavior is indicative of 'ClickFix' style social engineering lures, where users are prompted to download and execute malicious installers.
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe (the Windows Installer) as a child process of remote support applications such as Quick Assist, Microsoft Remote Assistance (msra.exe), or AnyDesk. This pattern is commonly associated with remote access trojans and unauthorized software deployment during social engineering campaigns.
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe (the Windows Installer) as a child process of remote support applications such as Quick Assist, Microsoft Remote Assistance (msra.exe), or AnyDesk. This pattern is commonly associated with remote access trojans and unauthorized software deployment during social engineering campaigns.
Detects a potential vishing or technical support scam scenario by identifying a burst of email traffic to a user (email bombing) followed within one hour by the execution of a remote assistance tool (Quick Assist, Microsoft Remote Assistance, or AnyDesk) on the same user's endpoint.
Detects the execution of a malicious Electron-based installer masquerading as Anthropic's Claude AI (ClaudeOpus5-desktop.exe). The rule monitors for the specific filename or known malicious hashes, as well as the spawning of an embedded malicious loader process associated with the RevStealer infection chain.
Detects the presence of known AnonyMousKIT Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) shared components (legacy.js, Core.js, ToolsController.php) by matching specific file hashes or detecting these filenames in small files. This rule is designed to identify backend infrastructure used by phishing resellers.
Detects phishing messages that deliberately mix writing systems/scripts/homoglyphs in the Subject line as ONE corroborating signal within a broader, multi-signal phishing pattern. Hardened against false positives: brand/product tokens (e.g. Microsoft, PayPal) are stripped before the Latin-script check so a lone brand mention in non-Latin correspondence doesn't count as mixed-script; the suspicious-URL signal requires a high-confidence credential/urgency term (not generic business vocabulary); sender risk requires the domain to be new to both the recipient and the organization; and at least three independent signal categories (not two) must corroborate the language-confusion signal before the rule fires.
Detects a specific adversarial pattern used to bypass authentication protections, where a browser process first navigates to an attacker-controlled identity verification or CAPTCHA challenge page, followed by an immediate navigation to legitimate Microsoft device code authentication endpoints within the same process session.
This rule monitors network traffic, DNS queries, and user web clicks to detect interactions with known malicious domains associated with credential harvesting and phishing campaigns, specifically those impersonating security or SSO portals.
Detects known file hashes associated with SideCopy/ReverseRAT.
Detects a mass influx of OAuth consent grant events for a single application from multiple users within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of a consent phishing campaign, where attackers lure users into granting excessive permissions to a malicious application to steal access tokens.
Detects mass-phishing consent campaigns by monitoring non-admin users consenting to multi-tenant or unverified-publisher applications requesting non-basic-profile OAuth scopes. The rule aggregates multiple consent events for the same application over a 1-hour window to identify potentially malicious consent-phishing activity.
Detects mass-phishing consent campaigns by monitoring non-admin users consenting to multi-tenant or unverified-publisher applications requesting non-basic-profile OAuth scopes. The rule aggregates multiple consent events for the same application over a 1-hour window to identify potentially malicious consent-phishing activity.
Detects mass-phishing consent campaigns by monitoring non-admin users consenting to multi-tenant or unverified-publisher applications requesting non-basic-profile OAuth scopes. The rule aggregates multiple consent events for the same application over a 1-hour window to identify potentially malicious consent-phishing activity.
Detects mass-phishing consent campaigns by monitoring non-admin users consenting to multi-tenant or unverified-publisher applications requesting non-basic-profile OAuth scopes. The rule aggregates multiple consent events for the same application over a 1-hour window to identify potentially malicious consent-phishing activity.
Detects mass-phishing consent campaigns by monitoring non-admin users consenting to multi-tenant or unverified-publisher applications requesting non-basic-profile OAuth scopes. The rule aggregates multiple consent events for the same application over a 1-hour window to identify potentially malicious consent-phishing activity.
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