Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
640 detections
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Detects a burst of uploads to Box from a single account. Where mass download suggests
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
Detects a burst of uploads to Box from a single account. Where mass download suggests
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
Detects a burst of uploads to Box from a single account. Where mass download suggests
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
Detects a burst of uploads to Box from a single account. Where mass download suggests
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
Detects the sequential relationship of data staging using tools like WinRAR and subsequent exfiltration using tools like Rclone, WinSCP, or FileZilla on a single host within a 24-hour window.
Suspicious Connection to Custom GPT
Cortex XDR
Detects outbound web traffic to OpenAI ChatGPT Custom GPTs where the URL slug contains keywords potentially indicative of unauthorized or non-standard usage, such as keywords implying premium, professional, or official status, which could be used as a cover for data exfiltration or credential gathering via malicious or typo-squatted GPT instances.
Detects the creation of specific GitHub repositories ('tpcp-docs' or 'docs-tpcp') associated with TeamPCP stealer fallback exfiltration activity, including subsequent release or asset creation.
Detects a sequential pattern where a browser process (Chrome, Edge, or Safari) accesses an AI chat platform's conversation API, followed within 5 minutes by a network connection to a known unauthorized exfiltration destination (api.pbapi.xyz). This pattern suggests the potential use of a browser-based tool or extension (e.g., Poper Blocker or similar) to intercept and exfiltrate AI chat history.
Detects the first-ever observed network connection from a device to WhatsApp Web or Telegram Web within a 30-day lookback period. This behavior is used to identify potentially unauthorized companion-device linking to a user's messenger account, which could indicate credential theft or unauthorized access.
Detects a sequential pattern where a browser process (Chrome, Edge, or Safari) accesses an AI chat platform's conversation API, followed within 5 minutes by a network connection to a known unauthorized exfiltration destination (api.pbapi.xyz). This pattern suggests the potential use of a browser-based tool or extension (e.g., Poper Blocker or similar) to intercept and exfiltrate AI chat history.
Detects the first-ever observed network connection from a device to WhatsApp Web or Telegram Web within a 30-day lookback period. This behavior is used to identify potentially unauthorized companion-device linking to a user's messenger account, which could indicate credential theft or unauthorized access.
This rule performs a retrospective hunt for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the ClosedQuorum malware. It identifies suspicious activity by matching against known file hashes, specific filenames, and network traffic directed towards services (such as DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral, and Discord) which the malware uses for C2 or data exfiltration. The detection logic aggregates results from file system, process, and network telemetry.
Detects a sequential pattern where a browser process (Chrome, Edge, or Safari) accesses an AI chat platform's conversation API, followed within 5 minutes by a network connection to a known unauthorized exfiltration destination (api.pbapi.xyz). This pattern suggests the potential use of a browser-based tool or extension (e.g., Poper Blocker or similar) to intercept and exfiltrate AI chat history.
Detects the first-ever observed network connection from a device to WhatsApp Web or Telegram Web within a 30-day lookback period. This behavior is used to identify potentially unauthorized companion-device linking to a user's messenger account, which could indicate credential theft or unauthorized access.
Detects the first-ever observed network connection from a device to WhatsApp Web or Telegram Web within a 30-day lookback period. This behavior is used to identify potentially unauthorized companion-device linking to a user's messenger account, which could indicate credential theft or unauthorized access.
Detects the installation of unauthorized AI-related browser extensions followed by outbound network communication from the browser process to known external AI service API endpoints within one hour. This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration via shadow AI tools, bypassing standard enterprise DLP controls.
Detects a sequential pattern where a browser process (Chrome, Edge, or Safari) accesses an AI chat platform's conversation API, followed within 5 minutes by a network connection to a known unauthorized exfiltration destination (api.pbapi.xyz). This pattern suggests the potential use of a browser-based tool or extension (e.g., Poper Blocker or similar) to intercept and exfiltrate AI chat history.
Detects network connection attempts by known AI agent or development-related runtime processes (python, node, etc.) to external endpoints that are not contained within a defined allowlist of LLM and infrastructure providers. This is intended to identify potential data exfiltration or unauthorized command and control communication originating from LLM-powered applications.
Detects potential insider threats or departing employees by correlating abnormal bulk data downloads from cloud repositories (SharePoint/OneDrive/Box/etc.) with subsequent sensitive data access and exfiltration signals. It uses baseline behavioral profiling, requires a threshold of sensitive file interactions, and mandates high-confidence exfiltration indicators (removable media usage, suspicious external domains, or multiple combined destination events) to reduce noise. Archive/staging activity is used as an optional confidence booster.
Detects the installation of unauthorized AI-related browser extensions followed by outbound network communication from the browser process to known external AI service API endpoints within one hour. This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration via shadow AI tools, bypassing standard enterprise DLP controls.
This rule detects anomalous activity involving cloud-based shell services (AWS CloudShell, Azure Cloud Shell, GCP Cloud Shell). It triggers on two main conditions: (1) First-time usage of these shell environments by a principal within the detection window, and (2) The execution of commands associated with data staging, ingress tool transfer, or exfiltration (e.g., curl, wget, storage copy commands).
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