Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
435 detections
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Identifies Storm-1175 utilizing the rclone utility (often renamed) with MEGA or Mega-CMD configurations to exfiltrate vast data troves before encryption.
This rule detects the creation of the 'class-wc-subscription-diagnostics.php' backdoor file followed by a network connection to the command and control (C2) domain 'generate.2faplugin.org' within a 30-minute window on the same device. This correlation indicates a potential supply chain compromise targeting ShapedPlugin, where backdoored pro plugins are distributed via official channels, leading to 2FA exfiltration.
Detects a non-OneDrive client invoking createUploadSession after creating staged command output or archives, indicative of GraphWorm activity.
Detects a high volume of successful network connections to multiple unique cloud storage services (Dropbox, Box.com, OneDrive) from a single device and user account within an hour. This could indicate data exfiltration or unauthorized access to cloud storage.
Detects upload of malicious payloads to file hosting services for staging
This rule detects an unusually high volume of file sharing events from a single user in OneDrive within a one-hour window. Specifically, it looks for five or more 'SharingSet' or 'AnonymousLinkCreated' operations by the same UserId within an hour, which could indicate data exfiltration or unauthorized sharing.
Detects the staging of Miasma exfiltration payloads, specifically JSON files matching the 'results-*.json' naming convention, and Git operations interacting with these files. Miasma is known to exfiltrate harvested credentials by creating public GitHub repositories and committing encrypted JSON files with this specific naming convention.
Detects upload of offensive security tools to cloud storage for staging
Detects upload of backdoored container images to internal registries
This rule detects suspicious activity where a Python process initiates network communication to known command and control (C2) domains, immediately followed by accessing SQLite database files (e.g., 'places.sqlite' or 'Cookies'). This pattern is indicative of malware or adversary activity attempting to exfiltrate browser history or session cookies after establishing C2.
This rule detects unusually large network uploads from devices. It identifies successful network connections where individual transfers exceed 100MB and aggregates these transfers by account name and hour. The rule then flags any account that has uploaded a total of 1TB or more within a single hour. This pattern could indicate data exfiltration, unauthorized data synchronization, or other malicious activities involving significant data transfer volumes.
This rule detects an unusually high volume of file sharing events from a single user in OneDrive within a one-hour window. Specifically, it looks for five or more 'SharingSet' or 'AnonymousLinkCreated' operations by the same UserId within an hour, which could indicate data exfiltration or unauthorized sharing.
This rule detects when a single process account initiates a high volume (10 or more) of file move operations to folders associated with cloud storage services (e.g., 'cloud', 'dropbox', 'drive') within a one-hour window. This behavior could indicate data exfiltration or staging for exfiltration.
This rule detects outbound network connections to URLs associated with common file sharing services (e.g., Dropbox, Mega, Gofile) or temporary email providers (e.g., Temp-Mail). Such connections can indicate data exfiltration attempts, use of unsanctioned services, or communication with command and control infrastructure.
Recent reporting indicates the campaign targeted GitHub repositories by inserting malicious GitHub Actions / CI workflows designed to steal secrets and credentials.
5,561 repositories were affected in roughly six hours
Attackers pushed 5,718 malicious commits.
The objective was credential theft from CI/CD environments, including:
cloud credentials
SSH keys
access tokens
CI/CD secrets
The campaign reportedly used:
fake automation-style commit identities such as build-bot, ci-bot, or similar
malicious .github/workflows changes
workflow triggers that either:
executed automatically on push / pull request, or
remained dormant until manually triggered
Web reporting further states the payload collected environment variables, cloud metadata credentials, and repository runner secrets, then exfiltrated them to 216.126.225.129:8443.
5,561 repositories were affected in roughly six hours
Attackers pushed 5,718 malicious commits.
The objective was credential theft from CI/CD environments, including:
cloud credentials
SSH keys
access tokens
CI/CD secrets
The campaign reportedly used:
fake automation-style commit identities such as build-bot, ci-bot, or similar
malicious .github/workflows changes
workflow triggers that either:
executed automatically on push / pull request, or
remained dormant until manually triggered
Web reporting further states the payload collected environment variables, cloud metadata credentials, and repository runner secrets, then exfiltrated them to 216.126.225.129:8443.
This rule detects when a single process account initiates a high volume (10 or more) of file move operations to folders associated with cloud storage services (e.g., 'cloud', 'dropbox', 'drive') within a one-hour window. This behavior could indicate data exfiltration or staging for exfiltration.
Detects the execution of WinSCP or Rclone binaries, which are frequently used by threat actors like UNC3753 to exfiltrate staged data. This rule specifically looks for process creation events where the image name is 'winscp.exe' or 'rclone.exe'.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration to OneDrive cloud storage. It specifically looks for HTTP PUT requests to onedrive.live.com or graph.microsoft.com with a URI containing '/content' and a data size greater than 10000 bytes. This combination suggests a large file upload to OneDrive.
This rule detects attempts to exfiltrate data to Google Drive cloud storage. It specifically looks for HTTP POST requests to 'www.googleapis.com' with the URI containing '/upload/drive/' and a data size greater than 10000 bytes. This pattern is indicative of a file upload operation to Google Drive.
This rule detects unusually large network uploads from devices. It identifies successful network connections where individual transfers exceed 100MB and aggregates these transfers by account name and hour. The rule then flags any account that has uploaded a total of 1TB or more within a single hour. This pattern could indicate data exfiltration, unauthorized data synchronization, or other malicious activities involving significant data transfer volumes.
Detects the execution of WinSCP or Rclone binaries, which are heavily utilized by threat actors like UNC3753 as portable utilities to rapidly exfiltrate staged data.
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