Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
107 detections
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This rule detects potential command and control (C2) activity associated with the Koktevrat malware, specifically looking for WebSocket handshake requests (HTTP GET with 'Upgrade' header) to domain names that follow a generated pattern (8-27 alphanumeric characters ending in .icu or .cfd).
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) activity associated with the Koktevrat malware, specifically looking for WebSocket handshake requests (HTTP GET with 'Upgrade' header) to domain names that follow a generated pattern (8-27 alphanumeric characters ending in .icu or .cfd).
This rule detects outbound TLS connections to suspicious domain names characteristic of the Koktevrat malware's DGA. The rule identifies SNI strings that match a specific regex pattern (8-16 alphanumeric characters followed by .icu or .cfd TLDs), which is indicative of automated C2 communication.
Detects anomalous network traffic patterns characterized by rapid domain rotation, where multiple distinct domains resolve to a known set of IronToll C2 infrastructure IP addresses within a short timeframe (48 hours). Added an explicit 2-day lookback window — the original query had no time bound at all, so every scheduled run re-scanned the table's entire retention period and would keep re-surfacing the same historical match indefinitely instead of only genuinely recent activity.
Detects anomalous network traffic patterns characterized by rapid domain rotation, where multiple distinct domains resolve to a known set of IronToll C2 infrastructure IP addresses within a short timeframe (48 hours). Added an explicit 2-day lookback window — the original query had no time bound at all, so every scheduled run re-scanned the table's entire retention period and would keep re-surfacing the same historical match indefinitely instead of only genuinely recent activity.
Detects anomalous network traffic patterns characterized by rapid domain rotation, where multiple distinct domains resolve to a known set of IronToll C2 infrastructure IP addresses within a short timeframe (48 hours). Added an explicit 2-day lookback window — the original query had no time bound at all, so every scheduled run re-scanned the table's entire retention period and would keep re-surfacing the same historical match indefinitely instead of only genuinely recent activity.
Detects anomalous network traffic patterns characterized by rapid domain rotation, where multiple distinct domains resolve to a known set of IronToll C2 infrastructure IP addresses within a short timeframe (48 hours). Added an explicit 2-day lookback window — the original query had no time bound at all, so every scheduled run re-scanned the table's entire retention period and would keep re-surfacing the same historical match indefinitely instead of only genuinely recent activity.
This rule detects outbound TLS connections to suspicious domain names characteristic of the Koktevrat malware's DGA. The rule identifies SNI strings that match a specific regex pattern (8-16 alphanumeric characters followed by .icu or .cfd TLDs), which is indicative of automated C2 communication.
This rule detects outbound TLS connections to suspicious domain names characteristic of the Koktevrat malware's DGA. The rule identifies SNI strings that match a specific regex pattern (8-16 alphanumeric characters followed by .icu or .cfd TLDs), which is indicative of automated C2 communication.
Detects anomalous network traffic patterns characterized by rapid domain rotation, where multiple distinct domains resolve to a known set of IronToll C2 infrastructure IP addresses within a short timeframe (48 hours). Added an explicit 2-day lookback window — the original query had no time bound at all, so every scheduled run re-scanned the table's entire retention period and would keep re-surfacing the same historical match indefinitely instead of only genuinely recent activity.
This rule detects network communication associated with the REVSTEALER 'EtherHiding' technique. It monitors for POST requests to Polygon network RPC endpoints containing specific contract interaction signatures ('eth_call' with '0x4965e13f' and a specific contract address), as well as TLS connections to known malicious domains and fallback RPC providers used to resolve C2 instructions from blockchain data.
This rule detects network communication associated with the REVSTEALER 'EtherHiding' technique. It monitors for POST requests to Polygon network RPC endpoints containing specific contract interaction signatures ('eth_call' with '0x4965e13f' and a specific contract address), as well as TLS connections to known malicious domains and fallback RPC providers used to resolve C2 instructions from blockchain data.
Detects potential DGA fallback beaconing: repeated lookups (~10 per 5 days) of algorithmically-generated .com domains with a failed-resolution cadence, matching the botking implant's C2 fallback behavior.
Detects DNS queries containing high-entropy domain labels that exhibit patterns common to Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA). The rule triggers when a threshold of such suspicious queries is exceeded from a single source within a 60-second window, which is a common indicator of malware beaconing or C2 communication.
Detects network activity associated with the BumbleBee malware, including domain-generation algorithm (DGA) pattern matches within TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) fields and direct connections to known C2 infrastructure IP addresses over HTTPS.
Detects HTTP outbound traffic to domains using the .sbs TLD that follow a specific 'file' followed by dictionary words naming convention, associated with the ClickFix campaign. The rule specifically identifies staging requests matching a /curl/<hex-id> URI pattern used to deliver secondary payloads.
Detects DNS TXT queries for the _beacon fallback command-and-control subdomain under mangorbit.com, associated with the Open VSX evil twin extension campaign.
Possible EtherHiding - outbound eth_call JSON-RPC request to blockchain RPC endpoint
Detects network traffic characterized by a specific rotating domain generation algorithm (DGA) pattern using .xyz TLD with a 10-digit timestamp, in combination with a specific URI structure containing 'script?id=' and the suspicious 'tag=WinUpdateHelper' parameter. This behavior is indicative of C2 communication.
Detects DNS requests or network connections to the typosquatted domain and hardcoded IP associated with the DAEMON Tools supply chain attack, as well as additional network relations tied to the installer.
Detects high-frequency DNS queries for long, random-looking subdomains that result in NXDomain responses, a behavioral indicator of malware using Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) for command-and-control beaconing.
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