Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
489 detections
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Detects the execution of the VSCode CLI (code.exe) with the 'tunnel' argument, particularly when executed from uncommon directories like ProgramData or Users\Public, or when automated via piped input. This technique is actively abused by Kimsuky to establish covert C2 channels that bypass traditional network detections.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communications over non-standard ports. It identifies devices that make a high number of network connections to distinct remote IP addresses on ports other than common ones (80, 443, 53, 22, 21, 25, 110, 143, 993, 995) and not to private IP ranges. The rule aggregates connection counts and distinct remote IPs over 15-minute intervals and flags activity where there are more than 30 connections and more than 2 distinct remote IPs.
POW Proxy-over-Web Custom HTTP Headers
Cortex XDR
Detects HTTP traffic containing the custom POST headers used by the SHADOW-AETHER-064 'POW' (Proxy over Web) tool to encapsulate SOCKS5 traffic inside HTTP requests forwarded through JSP webshells. The full header set per Trend Micro's analysis is X-Act, X-Sid, X-Host, X-Port, and X-Status. The X-Act header carries one of five specific command values (CONNECT, SEND, RECV, DISCONNECT, PING) which provides an additional fidelity boost. The combination of two or more of these headers in a single HTTP transaction is exclusive to the POW tool.
Detects execution of Python with PySoxy SOCKS5 proxy arguments (-ssl, -remote_port, -remote_ip) alongside compiled bytecode (.pyc) execution. PySoxy is a 10-year-old open-source SOCKS5 proxy that ReliaQuest observed being deployed via ClickFix as a secondary encrypted access path alongside PowerShell-based C2. The specific combination of these three argument flags with .pyc execution is rare in legitimate use and represents the PySoxy invocation pattern verbatim.
Detects the creation of specific file names associated with EarthWorm and ReverseSocks5 tunneling tools in common temporary directories (/tmp/ and /var/tmp/) on Linux systems. These tools are often used for command and control and data exfiltration.
Detects the creation of specific file names associated with EarthWorm and ReverseSocks5 tunneling tools in common temporary directories (/tmp/ and /var/tmp/) on Linux systems. These tools are often used for command and control and data exfiltration.
Detects the creation of specific file names used by CL-STA-1132 for EarthWorm and ReverseSocks5 tunneling tools in /tmp/ and /var/tmp/ directories on Linux systems. This activity has been observed in CVE-2026-0300 exploitation.
Detects the creation of specific file names used by CL-STA-1132 for EarthWorm and ReverseSocks5 tunneling tools in /tmp/ and /var/tmp/ directories. These file names are highly specific to the CL-STA-1132 campaign.
Flags Sysmon DNS query events (EID 22) for several weak DGA / DNS-tunnel style heuristics: very long first label, many dot-separated labels, a long alphanumeric prefix (encoded-chunk style), or a suffix on budget/phishing-heavy gTLDs and alternate naming TLDs. Noisy by design — align thresholds with Suricata custom rules in suricata/custom/detecton-lab-dns-dga-hints.rules. Does not replace resolver analytics, ET DNS rules, or ML DGA classifiers.
Identifies potential network tunneling, proxying, and reverse shell activities by correlating process creation with outbound public network connections. This rule looks for known tunneling and proxy tool filenames and specific command-line arguments indicative of such activities, then correlates these process events with successful or attempted outbound network connections to public IP addresses.
Detects process executions containing SSH tunneling or port forwarding parameters correlated with outbound network connections to external public IPs. This may indicate protocol tunneling for evasion or data exfiltration.
This query detects activity associated with the BlueHammer, RedSun, and UnDefend toolset used in post‑exploitation campaigns (including "Nightmare Eclipse" intrusions). It identifies:
- Execution of suspicious binaries (FunnyApp.exe, RedSun.exe, undef.exe, z.exe) and command‑line flags (-h, -aggressive).
- File creation in unusual user directories (e.g., Pictures or two‑letter Downloads subfolders).
- BeigeBurrow tunneling via agent.exe.
- Reconnaissance commands (whoami /priv, cmdkey /list, net group).
- Network connections to known‑malicious IP addresses.
- Use of the REDSUN named pipe for privilege escalation.
The query combines process, file, and network events to surface potential hands‑on‑keyboard activity and follow‑on tooling
- Execution of suspicious binaries (FunnyApp.exe, RedSun.exe, undef.exe, z.exe) and command‑line flags (-h, -aggressive).
- File creation in unusual user directories (e.g., Pictures or two‑letter Downloads subfolders).
- BeigeBurrow tunneling via agent.exe.
- Reconnaissance commands (whoami /priv, cmdkey /list, net group).
- Network connections to known‑malicious IP addresses.
- Use of the REDSUN named pipe for privilege escalation.
The query combines process, file, and network events to surface potential hands‑on‑keyboard activity and follow‑on tooling
Detects the command line execution of VS Code initiating a remote tunnel. Threat actors like Tropic Trooper use this technique (e.g., via GitHub or Microsoft providers) to establish interactive remote access while blending in with legitimate developer activity.
This query detects activity associated with the BlueHammer, RedSun, and UnDefend toolset used in post‑exploitation campaigns (including "Nightmare Eclipse" intrusions). It identifies:
- Execution of suspicious binaries (FunnyApp.exe, RedSun.exe, undef.exe, z.exe) and command‑line flags (-h, -aggressive).
- File creation in unusual user directories (e.g., Pictures or two‑letter Downloads subfolders).
- BeigeBurrow tunneling via agent.exe.
- Reconnaissance commands (whoami /priv, cmdkey /list, net group).
- Network connections to known‑malicious IP addresses.
- Use of the REDSUN named pipe for privilege escalation.
The query combines process, file, and network events to surface potential hands‑on‑keyboard activity and follow‑on tooling
- Execution of suspicious binaries (FunnyApp.exe, RedSun.exe, undef.exe, z.exe) and command‑line flags (-h, -aggressive).
- File creation in unusual user directories (e.g., Pictures or two‑letter Downloads subfolders).
- BeigeBurrow tunneling via agent.exe.
- Reconnaissance commands (whoami /priv, cmdkey /list, net group).
- Network connections to known‑malicious IP addresses.
- Use of the REDSUN named pipe for privilege escalation.
The query combines process, file, and network events to surface potential hands‑on‑keyboard activity and follow‑on tooling
Detects instances where 'explorer.exe' initiates network connections to domains associated with Cloudflare Tunnel (trycloudflare.com). This behavior can indicate the use of tunneling software, potentially for malicious purposes such as command and control, data exfiltration, or bypassing network restrictions. While Cloudflare Tunnel has legitimate uses, its connection by 'explorer.exe' is unusual and warrants investigation.
This rule detects network connections (both inbound and outbound) on TCP/UDP port 18789, excluding connections initiated by processes from well-known publishers like Microsoft, Apple, and Google. This port is not commonly used by legitimate applications and could indicate the presence of custom malware, command and control (C2) communication, or other unauthorized network activity.
This rule detects multiple TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) associated with advanced adversaries, including QEMU virtualization abuse for defense evasion, creation of malicious scheduled tasks (specifically 'TPMProfiler'), rogue account or service creation (e.g., 'CtxAppVCOMService' or 'AppMgmt' service via 'sc.exe'), port forwarding/tunneling commands (using 'ssh' or 'portproxy' with specific ports), credential access attempts via 'vssuirun.exe' or printing 'NTDS.dit', and potential DLL sideloading involving 'ADNotificationManager.exe' and 'vcruntime140_1.dll'. It also includes IOCs for specific IPs, domains, and file hashes.
This query searches for multiple indicators associated with the STAC4713 and STAC3725 campaigns (often linked to PayoutsKing/GOLD ENCOUNTER). It utilizes a fast free-text pre-filter followed by a case statement to categorize specific TTPs, including QEMU abuse, rogue scheduled tasks, suspicious services/accounts, covert tunneling, and credential access.
On March 11, 2026, the global medical technology giant Stryker experienced a severe cyberattack when Iranian-linked hackers called Handala Hack affiliated with Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) used wiper malware to permanently erase data from its network. Based On the List of IOC’s seen from the previous attacks from the threat group I’ve done threat hunt.
On March 11, 2026, the global medical technology giant Stryker experienced a severe cyberattack when Iranian-linked hackers called Handala Hack affiliated with Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) used wiper malware to permanently erase data from its network. Based On the List of IOC’s seen from the previous attacks from the threat group I’ve done threat hunt.
Detects Azure AD application registrations with redirect URIs pointing to known tunneling, reverse proxy, or attacker interaction/callback infrastructure. This can indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or exfiltrate data.
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