Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a multi-stage activity where PowerShell is used to download a ZIP file, followed by the execution of a batch script (1.bat) that subsequently launches LockScreenContentServer.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DLL side-loading chain designed to execute malicious code via legitimate processes.
Detects the loading of an unsigned or invalidly signed DLL from commonly abused user-writable directories (Temp, AppData, Public). This behavior is characteristic of DLL side-loading techniques, often used by threat actors like the Lazarus Group to execute malicious code via a legitimate, trusted application.
Detects a file named dnsapi.dll created/modified outside System32/SysWOW64/WinSxS (the only legitimate locations for the real system DLL). Now requires the file to BOTH land in one of the known NeedyMantis sideload staging folders AND match the published 3448-byte spoofed-config size -- previously the size check alone could match unrelated dnsapi.dll copies anywhere on disk; requiring both signals together removes that bypass.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events characteristic of NeedyMantis's hands-on-keyboard activity. The rule identifies file staging (creation or modification of suspicious DLLs from network shares) followed by remote command execution (via Impacket-like service interaction) and subsequent execution of binaries vulnerable to DLL sideloading.
This rule detects potential DLL sideloading by monitoring known legitimate Windows binaries that are commonly abused to load malicious DLLs from non-standard directories (i.e., not System32, SysWOW64, or WinSxS). This activity is often associated with the TerminalFix / Lorem Ipsum Loader campaign.
Detects a suspicious execution sequence associated with the SectopRAT loader. The rule monitors for ReportDump.exe being launched from a ProgramData directory by common scheduling or service host processes, followed immediately by the loading of a malicious sdkcra.dll library.
Detects the loading of known DLLs (WinSparkle.dll, libcurl.dll, vim64.dll, dbghelp.dll, jli.dll, nvml.dll) from suspicious or non-standard file paths. The rule cross-references these image loads with file activity, identifying potential side-loading scenarios where a library is loaded from an unexpected directory or within an archive-related context. It also includes an explicit hash-based detection for a known malicious file.
Detects host enumeration activities (listing processes, user information, and directory contents) performed by known legitimate binaries (e.g., poedit.exe, curl.exe, vim.exe) shortly after they have executed a suspicious sideloading event. This pattern is characteristic of the NeedyMantis actor performing initial discovery before C2 beaconing.
Detects specific malicious archive payloads associated with NeedyMantis that contain a second-stage loader and spoofed system DLLs (e.g., dnsapi.dll, ws2_32.dll, msvcrt140.dll). These archives utilize XOR encoding or RtlDecompressBuffer packing and are designed for DLL sideloading.
Detects a multi-stage activity where PowerShell is used to download a ZIP file, followed by the execution of a batch script (1.bat) that subsequently launches LockScreenContentServer.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DLL side-loading chain designed to execute malicious code via legitimate processes.
This rule detects instances of 'javaw.exe' executing from unusual directories (e.g., AppData, Temp, Users\Public) while loading a 'jli.dll' file from a related non-standard path, or simultaneously being associated with a scheduled task execution involving 'GlobalTellurSync'. This behavior is indicative of potential DLL side-loading or a persistence mechanism where a legitimate Java executable is repurposed to run malicious code.
This rule detects instances of 'javaw.exe' executing from unusual directories (e.g., AppData, Temp, Users\Public) while loading a 'jli.dll' file from a related non-standard path, or simultaneously being associated with a scheduled task execution involving 'GlobalTellurSync'. This behavior is indicative of potential DLL side-loading or a persistence mechanism where a legitimate Java executable is repurposed to run malicious code.
This rule detects instances of 'javaw.exe' executing from unusual directories (e.g., AppData, Temp, Users\Public) while loading a 'jli.dll' file from a related non-standard path, or simultaneously being associated with a scheduled task execution involving 'GlobalTellurSync'. This behavior is indicative of potential DLL side-loading or a persistence mechanism where a legitimate Java executable is repurposed to run malicious code.
Detects a specific persistence chain attributed to DragonForce where the 'javaw.exe' process side-loads a malicious 'jli.dll' from a non-standard, user-writable directory. The rule correlates this DLL image load with the subsequent reading of an encrypted, host-bound payload file ('rvsdiqw.txt') by the same process, which is then decrypted and injected into memory.
Detects a specific persistence chain attributed to DragonForce where the 'javaw.exe' process side-loads a malicious 'jli.dll' from a non-standard, user-writable directory. The rule correlates this DLL image load with the subsequent reading of an encrypted, host-bound payload file ('rvsdiqw.txt') by the same process, which is then decrypted and injected into memory.
Detects a specific persistence chain attributed to DragonForce where the 'javaw.exe' process side-loads a malicious 'jli.dll' from a non-standard, user-writable directory. The rule correlates this DLL image load with the subsequent reading of an encrypted, host-bound payload file ('rvsdiqw.txt') by the same process, which is then decrypted and injected into memory.
Detects anomalous execution of PowerShell commands spawned by processes identified as 'javaw.exe' or 'GlobalTellurSync.exe' (associated with DragonForce backdoor activity). The detection focuses on instances where these processes launch from non-standard user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) and execute PowerShell commands that contain obfuscated arguments or payloads, while excluding standard scheduled task invocations.
Detects anomalous execution of PowerShell commands spawned by processes identified as 'javaw.exe' or 'GlobalTellurSync.exe' (associated with DragonForce backdoor activity). The detection focuses on instances where these processes launch from non-standard user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) and execute PowerShell commands that contain obfuscated arguments or payloads, while excluding standard scheduled task invocations.
This rule detects potential DLL sideloading activity where legitimate, signed binaries (such as COTFileReadApp.exe or DeElevate64.exe) are executed from non-standard directories (e.g., AppData, Temp, Downloads) while loading specifically identified malicious or sideloaded DLLs. The detection identifies patterns where these binaries operate outside their expected vendor installation paths, indicating a likely attempt to hijack execution flow.
This rule detects potential DLL side-loading attempts involving the legitimate Microsoft Defender binary 'mpextms.exe'. The rule triggers when 'mpextms.exe' is executed from a non-standard, user-writable directory (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads) and subsequently loads a specific 'endpointdlp.dll' from an equally suspicious location, indicating a potential attempt to masquerade malicious code execution behind a trusted process.
Detects the two Windows-networking-named DLLs the report confirms as sideloaded via the normal OS loader (WinSparkle.dll, libcurl.dll) plus vim64.dll (a filename Vim's real installer never produces at all). Path check now covers any location outside a small allowlist of known-legitimate vendor install folders, not just ProgramData, so it also catches the reported ProgramData\\USOShared, ProgramData\\VIM, and ProgramData\\TightVNC\\VIM placements. Known limitation: the one reported case where the malicious WinSparkle.dll sits at the exact canonical Program Files\\Poedit path cannot be distinguished by path alone -- that specific sideload is instead caught by the companion 'Extensionless Archive Paired with Same-Named DLL Drop' rule via the archive-pairing signal.
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