Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
98 detections
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Detects a suspicious pattern often associated with Storm-3168 (JADEPUFFER) activity: prolonged, high-volume Azure resource enumeration by one service principal, followed shortly by a second service principal performing rapid, multi-subscription enumeration from the same source IP address.
This rule detects potentially malicious reconnaissance or enumeration activity by tracking high volumes of read-only API calls (LIST/read operations) across multiple Azure resource providers (e.g., VMs, Subscriptions, Web sites, Storage, Recovery Services) performed by a single identity within a 30-minute window.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of AWS CloudTrail events where a single identity performs a burst of discovery and enumeration activities (reconnaissance) followed shortly by requests to access sensitive secrets, credentials, or sensitive files (e.g., .env files). This pattern is indicative of an attacker who has gained initial access and is pivoting to identify and exfiltrate credentials.
Detects anomalous, high-velocity enumeration of IAM entities and cloud infrastructure resources by a single principal within a 5-minute window. This behavior is consistent with automated reconnaissance performed by agentic AI or scripted tools, often used to map cloud environments prior to exploitation.
Detects anomalous, high-velocity enumeration of IAM entities and cloud infrastructure resources by a single principal within a 5-minute window. This behavior is consistent with automated reconnaissance performed by agentic AI or scripted tools, often used to map cloud environments prior to exploitation.
This rule monitors Microsoft Graph API audit events to detect potentially malicious reconnaissance or enumeration activity. It identifies actors who access a diverse range of resource categories (such as directory, tenant, privilege, application, repository, and mailbox) within a short 30-minute window, suggesting automated discovery or unauthorized data mapping rather than standard administrative tasks.
Detects high-volume or sequential Microsoft Graph API requests targeting sensitive directory, mailbox, application, and site endpoints. This behavior is consistent with reconnaissance activity where an adversary enumerates users, groups, service principals, and accessible resources within a compromised cloud tenant.
Detects anomalous reconnaissance activity targeting sensitive Microsoft Graph control-plane endpoints, including directory roles, MFA settings, application registrations, service principals, and OAuth consent configurations. The rule identifies high-volume access across multiple distinct sensitive endpoints within a short time frame, which is indicative of an adversary enumerating infrastructure to identify opportunities for privilege escalation, persistence, or bypass of security controls.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency cloud management API requests across multiple sensitive paths (such as directory roles, applications, and service principals) from a single account. This pattern is indicative of automated enumeration or discovery of cloud infrastructure, permissions, and identity configurations, which is often a precursor to further exploitation.
Detects high-volume, multi-endpoint enumeration activity against the Microsoft Graph API, involving a high frequency of requests across sensitive tenant resources (users, groups, applications, roles, mailboxes, etc.). This behavior is consistent with post-compromise reconnaissance by an adversary attempting to map the environment.
This rule detects potential reconnaissance activity against Microsoft Graph API endpoints, indicative of an adversary enumerating tenant resources such as users, groups, applications, and directory roles. It monitors for high volumes of diverse Graph API queries originating from a single user or application identity within a short time window, which is a common behavior pattern for automated discovery tools.
Detects anomalous, systematic enumeration of multiple Microsoft Graph API resource categories (e.g., users, groups, applications, sites) by a single identity, IP, or application within a short time window. This activity often indicates an adversary performing discovery or reconnaissance against the M365 tenant environment.
This rule monitors for high-volume, suspicious activity involving the enumeration of sensitive cloud resources across multiple Azure services (e.g., Kubernetes cluster secrets, KeyVault secrets, Backup vault items, and DataFactory/Web connections). An alert is triggered when a single identity performs a high number of operations across multiple distinct resource types within a one-hour window, which is indicative of credential harvesting or cloud reconnaissance.
This rule detects high-frequency and broad-scope enumeration of multiple Microsoft Graph API endpoints by a single identity. By monitoring for access to diverse sensitive categories (organization, users, groups, directoryroles, sites, messages) within a short timeframe, it flags activity patterns consistent with reconnaissance, account discovery, or unauthorized data exploration.
Detects anomalous reconnaissance activity targeting sensitive Microsoft Graph control-plane endpoints, including directory roles, MFA settings, application registrations, service principals, and OAuth consent configurations. The rule identifies high-volume access across multiple distinct sensitive endpoints within a short time frame, which is indicative of an adversary enumerating infrastructure to identify opportunities for privilege escalation, persistence, or bypass of security controls.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency access to sensitive Microsoft Graph API endpoints by a single service principal or user identity. The rule flags identities that interact with five or more distinct categories of sensitive resources (e.g., users, groups, applications, sites) within a 30-minute window, suggesting automated reconnaissance or environment discovery.
Detects high-frequency requests to various Microsoft Graph API endpoints, such as users, groups, applications, and mailboxes, within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to map out a target's cloud identity infrastructure and environment, often as a precursor to more focused attacks like phishing, data exfiltration, or lateral movement within M365.
This rule monitors for high-volume, suspicious activity involving the enumeration of sensitive cloud resources across multiple Azure services (e.g., Kubernetes cluster secrets, KeyVault secrets, Backup vault items, and DataFactory/Web connections). An alert is triggered when a single identity performs a high number of operations across multiple distinct resource types within a one-hour window, which is indicative of credential harvesting or cloud reconnaissance.
This rule monitors for high-volume, suspicious activity involving the enumeration of sensitive cloud resources across multiple Azure services (e.g., Kubernetes cluster secrets, KeyVault secrets, Backup vault items, and DataFactory/Web connections). An alert is triggered when a single identity performs a high number of operations across multiple distinct resource types within a one-hour window, which is indicative of credential harvesting or cloud reconnaissance.
This rule monitors for high-volume, suspicious activity involving the enumeration of sensitive cloud resources across multiple Azure services (e.g., Kubernetes cluster secrets, KeyVault secrets, Backup vault items, and DataFactory/Web connections). An alert is triggered when a single identity performs a high number of operations across multiple distinct resource types within a one-hour window, which is indicative of credential harvesting or cloud reconnaissance.
This rule monitors for high-volume, suspicious activity involving the enumeration of sensitive cloud resources across multiple Azure services (e.g., Kubernetes cluster secrets, KeyVault secrets, Backup vault items, and DataFactory/Web connections). An alert is triggered when a single identity performs a high number of operations across multiple distinct resource types within a one-hour window, which is indicative of credential harvesting or cloud reconnaissance.
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