Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects messages sent or chats created in Microsoft Teams by external or guest users where the chat name or message content impersonates IT support, helpdesk, or other official organizational entities. It specifically looks for keywords commonly used in phishing attempts to trick users into believing the sender is a legitimate internal service.
Detects suspicious OAuth consent or connected app authorization followed by SaaS query, export, download, or bulk API activity from the same account within 24 hours, indicating possible OAuth token abuse or SaaS data exfiltration.
Detects inbound emails masquerading as ServiceNow ticket notifications that solicit sensitive information (e.g., vendor IDs, invoice numbers, bank account details) via reply-only body content. This technique evades traditional SEG scanning by avoiding malicious URLs or attachments and leveraging the reputation of legitimate, though spoofed, ServiceNow infrastructure.
Detects phishing attempts where the sender's display name implies a sensitive role (e.g., Accounts Payable, Helpdesk, Vendor) while the authenticated header-From domain utilizes a 'support' subdomain. The rule triggers when the organizational root domain extracted from the email sender address does not match the branding present in the sender display name, indicating potential brand impersonation or business email compromise.
Detects an inbound Microsoft Teams call or chat using a known STAC4749 helpdesk-impersonation persona display name, a caller UPN on a known STAC4749 .top IT-themed domain, or a source IP previously observed originating STAC4749 vishing calls.
Detects an inbound Microsoft Teams call or chat using a known STAC4749 helpdesk-impersonation persona display name, a caller UPN on a known STAC4749 .top IT-themed domain, or a source IP previously observed originating STAC4749 vishing calls.
Detects outbound HTTP/proxy connections to gouvvbo.top, the JadeProx AdaptixC2 C2 domain also hosting a credential-harvesting phishing portal that impersonates the Piar Municipality (Venezuela) tax administration system.
Detects an inbound Microsoft Teams call or chat using a known STAC4749 helpdesk-impersonation persona display name, a caller UPN on a known STAC4749 .top IT-themed domain, or a source IP previously observed originating STAC4749 vishing calls.
Detects outbound HTTP/proxy connections to gouvvbo.top, the JadeProx AdaptixC2 C2 domain also hosting a credential-harvesting phishing portal that impersonates the Piar Municipality (Venezuela) tax administration system.
Detects outbound HTTP/proxy connections to gouvvbo.top, the JadeProx AdaptixC2 C2 domain also hosting a credential-harvesting phishing portal that impersonates the Piar Municipality (Venezuela) tax administration system.
Detects potential Microsoft Teams impersonation or social-engineering activity where accounts use IT, admin, support, or security-themed display names, especially when associated with external users or impersonation indicators.
This rule detects Microsoft Teams activities such as ChatCreated, MessageSent, or TeamsImpersonationDetected where the sender's display name matches common administrative or support-themed identifiers (e.g., 'IT Support', 'Help Desk', 'Global Admin'). This behavior is commonly associated with social engineering and phishing attempts designed to trick users into divulging credentials or sensitive information by masquerading as trusted enterprise support roles.
KQL Query from file: The Hunt for QR Phisher
This rule detects instances where a user clicks on a URL identified as potentially malicious (phishing-related) and subsequently has a risky sign-in event in Azure AD. The rule correlates URL click events from email with Azure AD sign-in logs, specifically looking for sign-ins marked as risky or originating from suspicious user agents (e.g., specific axios versions). The phishing URLs are identified by keywords such as 'azureapplicationregistration.pages.dev', 'chrnobinson.com', 'workers.dev', '.pages.dev', '.web.core.windows.net', '/oauth2/v2.0/authorize', 'client_id=', and 'scope=openid'.
This rule detects potential credential harvesting attempts by identifying emails that contain keywords commonly associated with phishing (e.g., 'password', 'update', 'verify' in the subject) and URLs that suggest login or account pages (e.g., 'form', 'login', 'account'). It aggregates these events from the same sender over a one-hour period and flags senders with three or more such emails.
This rule detects URLs that contain common redirection or link parameters (u=, url=, redirect=, r=, link=, target=, dest=) where the value of the parameter is a long, alphanumeric string that appears to be an encoded domain. This pattern can indicate attempts to obfuscate the true destination of a link, often seen in phishing campaigns or malicious redirection attempts. The rule specifically looks for encoded parameters containing common top-level domains like .com, .net, or .org.
Detects network connections from common browser processes and script execution engines to the known Payroll Pirate (Storm-2755 / Storm-2657) phishing domain 'bluegraintours.com', which is associated with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session cookie and OAuth token harvesting.
Detects a PDF, SVG, HTML, or presentation attachment containing a QR code or extracted URL that leads into an enterprise authentication workflow. This rule is designed to identify phishing attempts where adversaries embed QR codes or malicious URLs within common document types to direct users to fake enterprise login pages for credential harvesting.
This rule detects potential Business Email Compromise (BEC) attempts by identifying emails where the sender's address contains keywords like 'ceo', 'finance', or 'hr', and the subject contains keywords like 'wire', 'payment', or 'invoice', but the sender's domain does not match the internal company domain. This pattern suggests an attempt to impersonate a high-ranking individual or department to trick recipients into making unauthorized financial transactions.
Detects signs of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing where a login attempt produces a reprocess error (50199) or result code 90014, immediately followed by suspicious activity using specific Firefox user-agent versions known to be associated with Tycoon 2FA reverse proxy session token capture tools.
This rule detects URLs that contain common redirection or link parameters (u=, url=, redirect=, r=, link=, target=, dest=) where the value of the parameter is a long, alphanumeric string that appears to be an encoded domain. This pattern can indicate attempts to obfuscate the true destination of a link, often seen in phishing campaigns or malicious redirection attempts. The rule specifically looks for encoded parameters containing common top-level domains like .com, .net, or .org.
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