Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
213 detections
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This rule detects potential credential harvesting attempts by identifying emails that contain keywords commonly associated with phishing (e.g., 'password', 'update', 'verify' in the subject) and URLs that suggest login or account pages (e.g., 'form', 'login', 'account'). It aggregates these events from the same sender over a one-hour period and flags senders with three or more such emails.
This rule detects emails where the sender's address contains keywords like 'paypal', 'amazon', or 'apple' but does not originate from their official domains (e.g., '@paypal.com'). This pattern is indicative of lookalike domain phishing attempts, where attackers try to impersonate legitimate brands to trick recipients.
Detects POST requests to pages matching credential harvesting patterns
UNC3753 Infrastructure Connection
Cortex XDR
Detects DNS requests to domains matching known UNC3753 data leak sites or helpdesk impersonation patterns utilized during vishing campaigns. This rule specifically looks for the domain "business-data-leaks.com" and domains ending with "-itdesk.com", "-helpdesk.com", or "-it.com".
Detects the execution of the zenity dialog tool spawned by unusual parents (like IDEs or bash scripts) to create fake password prompts on Linux. The Linux variant of UNK_DeadDrop utilizes this to trick developers into providing their system passwords, enabling root access and GNOME Keyring extraction.
This rule detects emails where the sender's address contains keywords like 'paypal', 'amazon', or 'apple' but does not originate from their official domains (e.g., '@paypal.com'). This pattern is indicative of lookalike domain phishing attempts, where attackers try to impersonate legitimate brands to trick recipients.
This rule detects HTTP responses that appear to be a phishing kit landing page. It looks for specific keywords in the HTTP response body, such as 'img', 'logo', 'password', and 'Submit', indicating a page designed to collect credentials. Additionally, it checks if the HTTP host is an IP address, which is often used in phishing campaigns to bypass domain-based reputation checks or to host pages directly on compromised servers.
This rule detects potential phishing emails sent over SMTP that request sensitive information. It looks for specific keywords in the email subject and content, such as "verify", "account", and "click here", indicating an attempt to trick the recipient into revealing credentials or other sensitive data.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests where the client body contains the keywords 'company', 'role', and 'email' (case-insensitive). This combination of keywords in a POST request body is indicative of a phishing reconnaissance attempt, where an attacker is trying to collect organizational data through a form submission.
This rule detects bulk phishing campaign delivery by monitoring SMTP traffic for a high volume of emails containing the 'Subject:' header. Specifically, it triggers an alert if 20 or more emails with a 'Subject:' header are sent to the internal network (HOME_NET) on port 25 within a 60-second window from the same source.
This rule detects HTTP responses that contain content indicative of a survey lure page used for information gathering. It specifically looks for the presence of keywords such as 'survey', 'name', 'email', and 'company' within the HTTP response body, suggesting an attempt to collect personal or organizational information.
This rule detects potential credential phishing pages served to a user over HTTP. It looks for HTTP responses containing both "Enter your password" and "Sign in" (case-insensitive) in the file data, and where the HTTP host is an IP address rather than a domain name. This combination of indicators suggests a generic phishing attempt designed to trick users into providing their credentials.
This rule detects potential spearphishing attempts targeting high-value individuals (CEO, CFO, IT Admin) within an organization. It looks for emails sent to these individuals with subjects commonly associated with financial phishing or social engineering lures, such as "Invoice," "Wire Transfer," "Payment," "Urgent," or "Purchase Order." The rule also checks if these emails contain attachments, which is a common vector for delivering malware or credential harvesting documents in phishing campaigns. It summarizes the attempts by sender, recipient, and day, counting the number of attempts and listing the attachments.
Tycoon2FA Domain Network Traffic
Cortex XDR
Detects DNS queries or network connections resolving to known Tycoon2FA credential harvesting, kill switch, and link management domains post-takedown. This rule specifically targets precise indicators of compromise (IoCs) associated with the rebuilt Tycoon2FA infrastructure.
This rule detects inbound emails from 'azure-noreply@microsoft.com' that are delivered to the inbox, are the first contact from this sender, and contain specific keywords in the subject line such as 'severity', 'activated', 'deactivated', 'alert', 'invoice', 'payment', 'order', or 'fund'. This could indicate phishing attempts or social engineering using a spoofed Microsoft sender to deliver urgent or financially-themed messages.
This rule detects potential social engineering attempts in external direct messages (DMs) by identifying messages that impersonate IT helpdesk or support personnel, or discuss 'working from home' scenarios. It specifically looks for keywords like 'helpdesk', 'help desk', 'IT support', and 'working from home' in the recipient details or sender display name of external messages within the last 5 days. The goal is to surface lures that aim to trick users into revealing sensitive information or performing actions under false pretenses.
This rule detects various indicators associated with the Booking.com phishing campaign targeting hotels and customers. It identifies suspicious web requests to non-Booking.com domains containing 'op_token' and 'complaint' or 'reservation' keywords, especially when combined with punycode, 'booklng' typos, or management-related subdomains. It also looks for partner kit patterns involving 'sign-in/?tpo_token=' and 'booklng' in URLs. Additionally, it identifies suspicious emails from newly generated Gmail accounts with specific subjects ('Automatic reply', 'Availability', 'Reservation') containing 'op_token' in the subject or body.
Detects Booking.com partner phishing kit artifacts described by Bridewell (op_token complaint lures, tpo_token sign-in flow, booklng subdomain, punycode homograph infra).
Detects the execution of osascript to display a deceptive dialog box mimicking 'System Preferences' to harvest user passwords. This technique was observed being used by the Atomic Stealer (AMOS) malware.
Detects suspicious network connections to 'outlook-one.vercel.app' or 'api.telegram.org' when initiated by common web browsers (msedge.exe, chrome.exe, firefox.exe) or Outlook (outlook.exe). This pattern can indicate phishing attempts, credential harvesting, or data exfiltration via Telegram bots.
Azure Device Code OAuth Consent
Cortex XDR
This rule detects suspicious activity related to Microsoft 365 Device Code OAuth consent flows. It specifically looks for device code authentications that are single-factor or lack MFA, and then groups these by IP address and client application. The rule identifies suspicious patterns such as a high number of logins, unique users, or unique applications from a single IP address, or rapid login attempts within a short timeframe, which could indicate enumeration or phishing attempts.
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