Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects MFA fatigue or push-bombing attacks where a user account experiences an abnormally high volume of MFA request denials in a short duration (10 minutes), followed by a successful authentication event. The rule specifically looks for evidence where the successful authentication potentially originates from a different IP address than the failed attempts.
Detects multiple MFA push notifications generated within a short timeframe for a single user during a Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) flow. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to perform MFA fatigue/push harassment to gain unauthorized access via SSPR or to bypass account security controls.
Detects multiple MFA push notifications generated within a short timeframe for a single user during a Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) flow. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to perform MFA fatigue/push harassment to gain unauthorized access via SSPR or to bypass account security controls.
Detects session hijacking (AiTM) attempts where a failed or interrupted sign-in (ResultType 50199) is followed by a successful login using the same SessionId but with an Axios user-agent, indicating automated replay of a stolen session token rather than legitimate browser usage.
Detects successful multi-factor authentication (MFA) events associated with risk signals categorized as 'unfamiliarFeatures' in Azure AD sign-in logs. This combination is often indicative of an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attack, where the attacker has captured authentication tokens or is forcing an MFA prompt and receiving immediate approval from a new or suspicious device and network location.
This rule detects two suspicious patterns related to authentication: (1) 'MFA Fatigue' or 'Push Bombing' where a user experiences a high volume of MFA push denials followed by an acceptance in a short timeframe, and (2) potential account takeover where a help-desk initiated password reset is followed by an MFA re-registration or new device enrollment by the same user within 30 minutes.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events indicative of social engineering. An administrator or help-desk account resets a user's password, followed within 15 minutes by the target user performing a successful MFA authentication from a device or IP address not associated with that user in the preceding 30 days, suggesting an attacker hijacked the session or coerced the user after the password reset.
Detects a burst of multiple MFA push authentication denial events for a single user within a 10-minute window, indicative of an MFA fatigue (push-bombing) attack. This behavior is often followed by an attempt to wait for the user to inadvertently approve the notification.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user modifies their MFA phone number, followed within 30 minutes by a sign-in event flagged with 'impossibleTravel' or 'unfamiliarFeatures' risk. This pattern is indicative of potential SIM-swap fraud, where an attacker has hijacked the user's phone number to receive MFA prompts and then attempts to access the account from an anomalous location.
Detects repeated MFA authentication failures for specific Microsoft applications (like OfficeHome, My Apps, My Sign-Ins) from the same user and source IP, typically indicative of an MFA fatigue (prompt bombing) attack. The rule identifies multiple authentication failures or interruptions (ErrorCode 50074 or 50140) from unmanaged or unregistered devices, which suggests an adversary attempting to force a user to approve an MFA request.
Detects MFA fatigue or push-bombing attacks where a user account experiences an abnormally high volume of MFA request denials in a short duration (10 minutes), followed by a successful authentication event. The rule specifically looks for evidence where the successful authentication potentially originates from a different IP address than the failed attempts.
Detects high-frequency authentication attempts originating from user agents associated with automation frameworks (Selenium, Playwright, Puppeteer, etc.). This pattern is often indicative of automated credential stuffing, brute force attacks, or CAPTCHA/2FA bypass attempts orchestrated by headless browsers.
Detects multiple MFA push notifications generated within a short timeframe for a single user during a Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) flow. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to perform MFA fatigue/push harassment to gain unauthorized access via SSPR or to bypass account security controls.
Detects a suspicious sequence where an account undergoes a help-desk-initiated password or credential reset, followed shortly (within 30 minutes) by the registration of a new multi-factor authentication (MFA) device for that same account. This pattern is characteristic of social engineering attacks, such as those used by UNC3944/Scattered Spider, where an adversary impersonates a user to gain initial access and subsequently establishes persistence by adding an MFA device they control.
Detects a pattern of MFA fatigue or 'push-bombing' where a user receives 5 or more MFA challenge requests within 10 minutes, immediately followed by a successful authentication event. This pattern is characteristic of attackers who have obtained user credentials and are attempting to bypass MFA by repeatedly triggering push notifications until the user grants access.
Detects high-frequency authentication attempts originating from user agents associated with automation frameworks (Selenium, Playwright, Puppeteer, etc.). This pattern is often indicative of automated credential stuffing, brute force attacks, or CAPTCHA/2FA bypass attempts orchestrated by headless browsers.
Detects a suspicious sequence where an account undergoes a help-desk-initiated password or credential reset, followed shortly (within 30 minutes) by the registration of a new multi-factor authentication (MFA) device for that same account. This pattern is characteristic of social engineering attacks, such as those used by UNC3944/Scattered Spider, where an adversary impersonates a user to gain initial access and subsequently establishes persistence by adding an MFA device they control.
Detects a suspected Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) fatigue attack, characterized by a user denying three or more consecutive MFA authentication requests in a short period (10 minutes) followed by a successful authentication approval. This behavior often indicates an adversary bombarding a user with push notifications to eventually solicit an accidental or coerced approval.
Detects a pattern of MFA fatigue or 'push-bombing' where a user receives 5 or more MFA challenge requests within 10 minutes, immediately followed by a successful authentication event. This pattern is characteristic of attackers who have obtained user credentials and are attempting to bypass MFA by repeatedly triggering push notifications until the user grants access.
Detects a burst of MFA push/approval prompts (5+ in 10 minutes) to one user culminating in an eventual approval after repeated denials/timeouts — the push-bombing technique Scattered Spider and Mutant Spider pair with helpdesk vishing to exhaust remaining MFA resistance.
Detects a suspicious pattern where a user account experiences a burst of multiple MFA failures followed by an anomalous successful authentication within a short 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of automated MFA fatigue attacks or attempts to exploit MFA bypass vulnerabilities.
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