Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of Certipy, an open-source tool used for enumerating and exploiting Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS). The rule monitors for common command-line arguments used during various stages of AD CS attack lifecycle, including finding misconfigurations, requesting certificates, relaying, and template exploitation.
Detects the execution of Certipy, an open-source tool used for enumerating and exploiting Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS). The rule monitors for common command-line arguments used during various stages of AD CS attack lifecycle, including finding misconfigurations, requesting certificates, relaying, and template exploitation.
Detects several potentially malicious activities related to Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS). This includes high volumes of failed requests (potential enumeration), requests for sensitive templates (privilege escalation), and potential impersonation attempts using Subject Alternative Names (SANs). These activities are associated with AD CS abuse techniques.
Detects remote file access (via SMB, named pipes, or TCP) to the Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) 'CertLog' directory. This directory contains the CA database (.edb), which holds issued certificates and archived private keys. Access to these files from a non-CA host is a strong indicator of an attempt to exfiltrate the CA database for offline certificate and private key recovery.
Detects several potentially malicious activities related to Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS). This includes high volumes of failed requests (potential enumeration), requests for sensitive templates (privilege escalation), and potential impersonation attempts using Subject Alternative Names (SANs). These activities are associated with AD CS abuse techniques.
Detects the addition of a 'msDS-KeyCredentialLink' attribute to an Active Directory object (Event 5136), which is indicative of the Shadow Credentials attack vector, followed by a successful PKINIT authentication (Event 4768) for that account. This combination suggests that an adversary has successfully established persistent access using a forged or unauthorized device credential and is now utilizing it for authentication.
Detects successful Kerberos PKINIT authentication (Event 4768, PreAuthType 16) issued by on-premises certificate authorities. This activity is a potential indicator of Shadow Credentials or Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) abuse where attackers use forged or stolen certificates to authenticate as domain users or machines.
Detects the execution of Certipy, an open-source tool used for enumerating and exploiting Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS). The rule monitors for common command-line arguments used during various stages of AD CS attack lifecycle, including finding misconfigurations, requesting certificates, relaying, and template exploitation.
Detects the execution of Certipy, an open-source tool used for enumerating and exploiting Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS). The rule monitors for common command-line arguments used during various stages of AD CS attack lifecycle, including finding misconfigurations, requesting certificates, relaying, and template exploitation.
Detects the execution of Certipy, an open-source tool used for enumerating and exploiting Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS). The rule monitors for common command-line arguments used during various stages of AD CS attack lifecycle, including finding misconfigurations, requesting certificates, relaying, and template exploitation.
Monitors Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) for an unusual volume of certificate requests from a single requester within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of enumeration or exploitation activity by tools such as Certify or Certipy, which often perform rapid certificate requests to identify vulnerable templates or request certificates for unauthorized identities.
Detects unauthorized modifications to Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) template objects (pKICertificateTemplate) using Windows Event ID 5136. This behavior is indicative of ESC4-style attacks, where an adversary with write access to a certificate template modifies security descriptors, enrollment rights, or sensitive configuration flags (like enabling enrollee-supplied SANs or adding a Client Authentication EKU) to facilitate privilege escalation or persistence.
Detects successful logon events (Event ID 4624) utilizing Schannel (TLS client certificate) or PKU2U (peer authentication) logon processes. This behavior may indicate an attacker using forged or stolen certificates to authenticate against a system, potentially bypassing Kerberos-based authentication monitoring.
Detects several potentially malicious activities related to Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS). This includes high volumes of failed requests (potential enumeration), requests for sensitive templates (privilege escalation), and potential impersonation attempts using Subject Alternative Names (SANs). These activities are associated with AD CS abuse techniques.
AD CS ESC8 Certificate Request via NTLM
Cortex XDR
Detects Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificate requests that utilize NTLM authentication rather than Kerberos. This behavior is indicative of potential NTLM relay attacks (ESC8), where an attacker forces a machine account to authenticate to the AD CS web enrollment endpoint via NTLM to obtain a certificate on behalf of that machine.
Detects Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificate requests where the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) contains a User Principal Name (UPN) that does not match the requester's identity. This pattern indicates potential exploitation of ESC1 or ESC6 certificate template misconfigurations, allowing an attacker to request certificates for arbitrary identities.
Detects NTLM network logons (NtLmSsp) for accounts that may have been targets of certificate-based identity abuse (e.g., ESC1). Attackers often leverage this technique to extract NTLM hashes from PKINIT TGT PACs and subsequently utilize Pass-the-Hash for lateral movement within the network.
Detects the issuance of certificates using templates associated with the Certificate Request Agent. This is a critical component of the ESC3 attack vector, where an adversary first acquires an Enrollment Agent certificate and subsequently uses it to enroll for certificates on behalf of other privileged users or principals.
Detects several potentially malicious activities related to Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS). This includes high volumes of failed requests (potential enumeration), requests for sensitive templates (privilege escalation), and potential impersonation attempts using Subject Alternative Names (SANs). These activities are associated with AD CS abuse techniques.
Detects ESC1-style ADCS certificate enrollment where a requester supplies an arbitrary SAN on a misconfigured template (CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT), enabling impersonation of any account. CISA's red team used this to certify a rogue machine account.
This rule monitors for successful certificate enrollments (Event ID 4886 and 4887) using sensitive certificate templates typically reserved for domain controllers or Kerberos authentication. It specifically alerts when these requests are made by user accounts that do not end in '$' (machine accounts) and are not known service accounts like 'CAService', which may indicate unauthorized attempts to obtain high-privilege credentials via AD Certificate Services (AD CS).
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