Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
747 detections
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Detects the addition of a file path exclusion to Windows Defender via the command-line registry utility (reg.exe), followed immediately by the execution of gpupdate to force a policy refresh. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to exclude malicious directories from security scanning and ensure the configuration change takes immediate effect.
Detects attempts to disable Windows Defender Tamper Protection via direct Registry modification or by executing PowerShell commands. Disabling Tamper Protection is a common tactic used by adversaries to facilitate further malicious activity, such as impairing security controls or deleting malware artifacts without interference from Windows Defender.
This rule detects multiple distinct methods of modifying, impairing, or disabling Microsoft Defender Antivirus exclusions and tamper protection settings. It identifies suspicious activity through PowerShell commands (Add-MpPreference, Set-MpPreference, Invoke-CimMethod, TamperProtection modification), direct registry modification of Defender exclusion paths, and the use of scheduled tasks to maintain or enforce these changes. The rule flags endpoints where two or more of these distinct techniques are observed in a 24-hour period.
This rule detects unauthorized memory modification of ntdll.dll, specifically targeting the EtwEventWrite function, by identifying processes writing to memory regions with execution-permission flags (e.g., PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE). This behavior is characteristic of adversaries attempting to blind Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) telemetry, often following suspicious .NET assembly loading (such as Assembly.Load) typical of malware loaders like LausivLoader.
Detects the ClosedQuorum 'unhook' evasion technique where a process patches ntdll's EtwEventWrite to suppress ETW telemetry, occurring within a 5-minute window of the same process initiating outbound network connections to known LLM C2 provider APIs or Discord webhooks used for AI-arbitrated decision cycles.
Detects the ClosedQuorum 'unhook' evasion technique where a process patches ntdll's EtwEventWrite to suppress ETW telemetry, occurring within a 5-minute window of the same process initiating outbound network connections to known LLM C2 provider APIs or Discord webhooks used for AI-arbitrated decision cycles.
Detects the execution of RatHat, a Go-based Android native daemon masquerading as 'liblocal-service.so'. The rule identifies the malware's use of ADB-derived shell commands to bypass Android Doze mode, prioritize background execution, and tamper with installed applications via pm (package manager) commands.
Detects the execution of taskkill.exe to forcibly terminate the iediagcmd.exe diagnostic process, initiated by the process GRrte.exe. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to impair security or diagnostic tools on the endpoint.
Detects the execution of RatHat, a Go-based Android native daemon masquerading as 'liblocal-service.so'. The rule identifies the malware's use of ADB-derived shell commands to bypass Android Doze mode, prioritize background execution, and tamper with installed applications via pm (package manager) commands.
Detects when a single process terminates two or more critical security, database, or backup related processes within a short window. This behavior is often associated with adversary attempts to disable security controls or disrupt database operations, commonly observed during the impact phase of an attack or preparatory to data destruction/encryption.
Detects when three or more critical security, database, or service processes are terminated on a Windows host within a short timeframe. This behavior is often indicative of an adversary attempting to disable security monitoring (e.g., Windows Defender/MsMpEng.exe) or perform disruptive activity against critical infrastructure (e.g., SQL Server processes).
This rule detects the execution, file presence, or driver loading associated with 'EDRKiller' and 'WarsawKiller', which are malicious tools used to terminate or disable endpoint security products.
Detects in-memory modification of the AmsiScanBuffer function within PowerShell processes, specifically targeting the injection of patch instructions (e.g., MOV EAX, 80070057; RET). This technique is characteristic of .NET loaders like PIVOTPIPE attempting to bypass Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) inspection before executing malicious payloads.
Detects processes attempting to interact with the Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) via loading amsi.dll, calling functions such as AmsiScanBuffer or AmsiOpenSession, or modifying related registry keys. This behavior is highly indicative of attempts to disable or bypass AMSI protection, a common step in executing malicious scripts or payloads on Windows systems.
Detects the loading of amsi.dll by common .NET loader processes, which may indicate attempts to patch or bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in memory. The rule monitors for image load events of amsi.dll and correlates them with process creation events of known loaders such as powershell.exe, rundll32.exe, and others.
Detects the loading of the Alinubx.sys (aka CcProtect.sys) kernel driver, often dropped as nvfsflt64.sys or registered as NvFsFilter, followed by a rapid, simultaneous termination of security product processes. This activity is indicative of a BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attack chain where kernel-mode primitives are used to terminate EDR/AV processes.
Detects the loading of the Alinubx.sys (aka CcProtect.sys) kernel driver, often dropped as nvfsflt64.sys or registered as NvFsFilter, followed by a rapid, simultaneous termination of security product processes. This activity is indicative of a BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attack chain where kernel-mode primitives are used to terminate EDR/AV processes.
Detects attempts to disable or modify Windows Defender security features, such as Real-time Monitoring, Tamper Protection, or adding unauthorized exclusion paths via PowerShell cmdlets or direct registry modifications.
Detects attempts to disable or modify Windows Defender security features, such as Real-time Monitoring, Tamper Protection, or adding unauthorized exclusion paths via PowerShell cmdlets or direct registry modifications.
Detects the loading of the kernel driver 'Alinubx.sys', identified as a renamed instance of the 'CcProtect.sys' driver. This driver is known to be abused in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to terminate security software processes from kernel mode, specifically observed in the context of Rapuncel infostealer campaigns.
This rule detects attempts to disable or tamper with Microsoft Defender security features by monitoring for unauthorized modifications to specific registry keys (DisableAntiSpyware, DisableRealtimeMonitoring, or the WinDefend service start type) in conjunction with related process execution activity (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, reg, or MpCmdRun) that includes keywords associated with defender configuration changes.
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