Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects activities associated with the MacSync backdoor, specifically focusing on persistence mechanisms such as LaunchAgent manipulation, .repair-run scripts, and suspicious GIT hook usage. It also correlates these events with the termination of macOS notification agents (BTMNotificationAgent, NotificationCenter, BackgroundTaskManagementAgent), which is a tactic used to suppress security alerts during malicious operations.
Detects the use of PowerShell to add an exclusion to Microsoft Defender. The detection looks for common obfuscation flags (Hidden, NonI, NoP, Bypass) in the command line and targets the MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore executable or DLL for exclusion, which is a common persistence or evasion technique. It excludes parent processes known for administrative activity to reduce noise.
Detects the execution of the Kothamine injector by correlating three distinct stages: the use of PowerShell to create an AV exclusion for 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore', the dropping of the 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore' binary into the user's AppData directory, and subsequent process injection (OpenProcess/VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory/CreateRemoteThread) into explorer.exe.
Detects the execution of the Kothamine injector by correlating three distinct stages: the use of PowerShell to create an AV exclusion for 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore', the dropping of the 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore' binary into the user's AppData directory, and subsequent process injection (OpenProcess/VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory/CreateRemoteThread) into explorer.exe.
Detects the execution of the Kothamine injector by correlating three distinct stages: the use of PowerShell to create an AV exclusion for 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore', the dropping of the 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore' binary into the user's AppData directory, and subsequent process injection (OpenProcess/VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory/CreateRemoteThread) into explorer.exe.
Detects the execution of the Kothamine injector by correlating three distinct stages: the use of PowerShell to create an AV exclusion for 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore', the dropping of the 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore' binary into the user's AppData directory, and subsequent process injection (OpenProcess/VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory/CreateRemoteThread) into explorer.exe.
Detects attempts to bypass or tamper with the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI). This rule monitors for command-line arguments indicative of reflection-based patching of AmsiUtils and forced AmsiScanBuffer failures, as well as registry modifications to AMSI providers.
Detects sophisticated in-memory loader activity characterized by a sequence of events: process module loads involving AMSI patching (amsi.dll), fresh ntdll.dll remapping to bypass EDR hooks, and the enumeration of hypervisor-related drivers or services, often associated with advanced payload execution chains like ClickFix.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender antivirus preferences by adding exclusion paths or processes. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to bypass security software detection by excluding their malicious tools or staging areas from scanning.
Detects the use of PowerShell cmdlets (Add-MpPreference or Set-MpPreference) to modify Microsoft Defender exclusions (paths, processes, or extensions). This behavior is often associated with adversaries attempting to evade security detection by excluding malicious files or processes from being scanned by Microsoft Defender.
Detects a coordinated malicious installation chain involving the creation of specific mutexes, establishment of persistence via Windows Registry Run keys, and subsequent tampering with Microsoft Defender exclusions using PowerShell. This sequence is indicative of the CHOSEN BRICK malware installation process.
This rule detects the loading of known-vulnerable or malicious kernel drivers (BYOVD) followed by the termination of major EDR or security-related processes on the same host within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to disable security controls to evade detection after achieving kernel-level privileges.
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities on a Windows host aimed at inhibiting system recovery, such as deleting shadow copies, modifying boot recovery configurations, deleting backup catalogs, or stopping security and backup-related services. This rule aggregates distinct categories of these actions by DeviceId and Account to identify potential malicious intent characteristic of ransomware or data destructive attacks.
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities on a Windows host aimed at inhibiting system recovery, such as deleting shadow copies, modifying boot recovery configurations, deleting backup catalogs, or stopping security and backup-related services. This rule aggregates distinct categories of these actions by DeviceId and Account to identify potential malicious intent characteristic of ransomware or data destructive attacks.
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities on a Windows host aimed at inhibiting system recovery, such as deleting shadow copies, modifying boot recovery configurations, deleting backup catalogs, or stopping security and backup-related services. This rule aggregates distinct categories of these actions by DeviceId and Account to identify potential malicious intent characteristic of ransomware or data destructive attacks.
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities on a Windows host aimed at inhibiting system recovery, such as deleting shadow copies, modifying boot recovery configurations, deleting backup catalogs, or stopping security and backup-related services. This rule aggregates distinct categories of these actions by DeviceId and Account to identify potential malicious intent characteristic of ransomware or data destructive attacks.
Detects network communication associated with the Rapuncel MaaS (Malware-as-a-Service) campaign, specifically identifying the Command and Control (C2) connection, GitHub Pages-based redirect chains, and subsequent delivery of large, suspicious ZIP archives containing renamed executable/system files.
Detects evidence of potential adversarial interference with Windows Defender updates and MRT.exe (Malicious Software Removal Tool). The rule correlates high volumes of temporary file creation in user directories with unauthorized access to MRT.exe by third-party processes and repeated Windows Defender update failures, indicating a potential attempt to disrupt endpoint security operations.
This rule detects administrative changes to Conditional Access (CA) policies in Entra ID (Azure AD), specifically monitoring for the disabling of policies, transitioning them to report-only mode, or the removal of critical security grant controls such as MFA or Compliant Device requirements. It also alerts on the outright deletion of any CA policy, which could indicate an adversary attempting to bypass security controls or maintain persistent access.
Detects attempts to tamper with or disable AWS security monitoring controls, specifically GuardDuty detectors and AWS Config recording. Attackers frequently disable these services to evade detection after gaining administrative permissions in a cloud environment.
Detects the deletion of Azure Monitor diagnostic settings or log profiles that export subscription-level Activity Logs. This action disables logging, effectively blinding security visibility into tenant operations, and is often used by adversaries as a defense-evasion technique before conducting further malicious activities.
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