Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The analytic identifies cloud instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. This activity is significant because it can indicate unauthorized or suspicious changes by potentially compromised or malicious users. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, configuration changes, or potential disruption of cloud services, posing a significant risk to the organization's cloud infrastructure.
Detects potential command execution via webshell in SAP NetViewer through JSP files with 'cmd' or similar parameters. This rule is designed to identify exploitation of vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-31324, which allows remote code execution via a webshell by looking for specific URI patterns and query parameters indicative of command execution attempts, including common Linux commands and base64 encoded commands.
The analytic identifies DNS queries to domains associated with the 3CX supply chain attack. This activity is significant because it can indicate a potential compromise stemming from the 3CX supply chain attack, which is known for distributing malicious software through trusted updates. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to establish a foothold in the network, exfiltrate sensitive data, or further propagate malware, leading to extensive damage and data breaches.
This query helps reviewing admin reported email submissions
The analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts on a PaperCut NG server by analyzing its debug log data. It detects unauthorized or suspicious access attempts from public IP addresses and searches for specific URIs associated with known exploits. The detection leverages regex to parse unstructured log data, focusing on admin login activities. This activity is significant as it can indicate an active exploitation attempt on the server. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, potentially leading to data breaches or further compromise of the server.
Show usb mounted devices and drive letters
This query helps reviewing top submitters of admin submissions
'Identifies when a recently created Group was added to a privileged built in domain local group or global group such as the Enterprise Admins, Cert Publishers or DnsAdmins. Be sure to verify this is an expected addition.
References: For AD SID mappings - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-security-groups.'
References: For AD SID mappings - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-security-groups.'
One of the tricks used in phishing is obfuscating the domain name in a URL by
using the @ symbol. This technique goes all the way back to the original RFC
for URLs, RFC 1738. When you specify an @ in the DNS portion of a URL it denotes
that the left side of the DNS name holds a username and password for
authentication to the server on the right side of the @ sign. Unfortunately,
an attacker can use this technique to trick a user by formatting the URL as
http://www.trusteddomain.com@www.realdomain.com/. When a user sees the link
may they think they're going to www.trusteddomain.com when in fact they are
going to www.realdomain.com. For a working example, try this:
http://www.google.com@www.bing.com/.
This query finds this technique in URLs embedded within e-mails and highlights
the fake and real domains.
using the @ symbol. This technique goes all the way back to the original RFC
for URLs, RFC 1738. When you specify an @ in the DNS portion of a URL it denotes
that the left side of the DNS name holds a username and password for
authentication to the server on the right side of the @ sign. Unfortunately,
an attacker can use this technique to trick a user by formatting the URL as
http://www.trusteddomain.com@www.realdomain.com/. When a user sees the link
may they think they're going to www.trusteddomain.com when in fact they are
going to www.realdomain.com. For a working example, try this:
http://www.google.com@www.bing.com/.
This query finds this technique in URLs embedded within e-mails and highlights
the fake and real domains.
This query identifies web content filtering events in Advanced Hunting.
This rule detects user logins from multiple distinct states or countries within a one-hour window, leveraging GeoIP enrichment. It specifically looks for successful login events where a user logs in from at least two different states or at least one country, indicating potential 'impossible travel' or suspicious access patterns.
URLs clicked in Email
Qakbot operators have been abusing the Craigslist messaging system to send malicious emails. These emails contain non-clickable links to malicious domains impersonating Craigslist, which the user is instructed to manually type into the address bar to access.
Detects POST requests to the F5 BIG-IP iControl Rest API "bash" endpoint, which allows the execution of commands on the BIG-IP. This activity can indicate an attacker exploiting a public-facing application to gain initial access and execute arbitrary commands.
Identify emails that were send from an address external to your company and where email was send to more then 50 distinct corporate users.
Update corporatedomain.com to your corporate domain to have it excluded.
Update 50 if you want to adjust the distinct user count.
Update corporatedomain.com to your corporate domain to have it excluded.
Update 50 if you want to adjust the distinct user count.
Count of recipient's email addresses by subject
Count of recipient's email addresses by subject
Count of sender's email addresses by subject
This analytic identifies outbound LDAP traffic to external IP addresses. It leverages network traffic data to detect connections on ports 389 (LDAP) or 636 (LDAPS) that are not directed to private IP ranges (RFC1918). This activity is significant because outbound LDAP traffic can indicate potential data exfiltration or unauthorized access attempts. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit this to access sensitive directory information, leading to data breaches or further network compromise. The rule specifically excludes traffic between internal source and destination IPs.
This rule detects successful user logins where the user's termination date is in the past, indicating a login from a terminated employee. This could signify unauthorized access or a failure in account deprovisioning processes. The rule requires a context data source that provides user termination dates, such as Azure AD Context or Workday.
This rule detects outbound network connections to IP addresses that have been observed for the first time within the last 24 hours. It specifically excludes connections to private IP address ranges (RFC1918). The detection relies on correlating current network connection events with historical 'first seen' data for IP addresses from an entity graph.
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