Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of PaperCut reverse SOCKS5 bridge kit operator-side scripts (such as admin_bridge.py, live_reverse_socks5.py, start_socks.sh) or the creation of related Java bridge class artifacts.
Detects malicious behaviors involving the Chisel tunneling tool, including reverse SOCKS proxy connections with TLS verification skipped, cron-based persistence referencing watchdog scripts in hidden /var/tmp directories, and associated tool staging activities.
MSI-backed loader execution chain
Cortex XDR
This query uses the process ID of each child to match the parent process's PID, then reconstructs the chain back to explorer.exe. It also checks for the encoded PowerShell, silent MSI installation, and embedded MSI execution behaviours described in the source article.
Important caveats
- Causality scope: This finds matching process events within a shared causality ID; it does not establish that each process directly launched the next.
- Explorer root: The root process may not share the same causality ID in every telemetry scenario. If this join removes otherwise valid results, investigate the root separately.
- Strict matching: Requiring every stage will miss partial chains and variants with different command-line arguments. Consider separate alerts for the encoded PowerShell and silent MSI behaviours.
- Validation: Confirm the field names, join syntax, and causality-ID population against your tenant before deploying this as a production detection.
Important caveats
- Causality scope: This finds matching process events within a shared causality ID; it does not establish that each process directly launched the next.
- Explorer root: The root process may not share the same causality ID in every telemetry scenario. If this join removes otherwise valid results, investigate the root separately.
- Strict matching: Requiring every stage will miss partial chains and variants with different command-line arguments. Consider separate alerts for the encoded PowerShell and silent MSI behaviours.
- Validation: Confirm the field names, join syntax, and causality-ID population against your tenant before deploying this as a production detection.
Detects browser cache smuggling (ClickFix/FileFix delivery mechanisms) where a non-browser script interpreter or LOLBin accesses a browser HTTP-cache directory and writes an executable or script payload outside the cache, followed shortly by the execution of a payload from a user staging directory.
Detects web server processes (apache2, httpd) spawning a Unix shell (sh, dash, bash) which subsequently executes curl, wget, or php to perform an external HTTP fetch or download. This behavior is commonly associated with PHP or web application post-exploitation callbacks (webshells).
Detects when AI coding agent processes (such as Claude, Cursor, Copilot, Windsurf, Codeium, or Aider) spawn command shells or download utilities with command lines indicative of downloading and executing external payloads.
Detects command execution patterns on NetScaler appliances involving the extraction of system details (id, uname, hostname, nsrelease) and writing or echoing them into HTML files within NetScaler web directories, indicative of web shell installation or staging.
Detects Trays.exe started with the -tray argument from a Trays subfolder or a batch script, as observed in the RareWolf BAT dropper ahead of a silent AnyDesk installation.
Detects potential C2Agent parent-spoofing behavior characterized by short-lived scheduled tasks (created and deleted within a 10-minute window with names matching c2a_<n>) or process relaunches carrying specific -fork2 command-line markers.
Detects PowerShell using System.Net.WebClient DownloadFile or related commands to fetch tool dependencies (such as 7z, MSTSCLib, ffmpeg) from GitHub repositories associated with the 'websalat' naming convention, indicative of Salat Stealer or similar tool-loading activity.
Detects GitLab backend processes (such as puma, sidekiq, rails, ruby, bundle) spawning shells, scripting interpreters, or network tools with suspicious command-line parameters, potentially indicating post-exploitation activity or vulnerability exploitation.
Detects behavioral indicators of shell-driven cryptocurrency miner staging where a hidden .trace file or binary is created, executed, or referenced via command-line arguments within go2rtc or shared memory directories (/config/, /opt/go2rtc/, /etc/go2rtc/, /.config/go2rtc/, /dev/shm/), alongside indicators of mining pools or software such as XMRig.
Detects the execution of the public Horizon3.ai PoC exploit for CVE-2026-106173 (FortiSIEM gRPC path traversal RCE) utilizing python interpreters with specific command-line arguments indicative of the exploit tool.
Detects the creation of AI coding assistant configuration files (such as .cursorrules, CLAUDE.md) in user directories (Downloads, Desktop, Temp) by non-git processes, followed within a short time window by execution of interpreters or tools (like node, npm, powershell, cmd, curl) with suspicious command line parameters indicating possible download or script execution.
Detects a burst of newly created Python or Shell scripts on a host running the Zammad ticketing system, which can indicate post-exploitation activity or automated staging.
Detects potential remote code execution against Xinference or Xoscar pool processes, identified by an inbound network connection accepted by a Python-based worker followed shortly by the spawning of a shell process (sh, bash, dash) by the same process.
Detects an Xoscar or Xinference Python actor pool process spawning a Unix shell child process with suspicious command-line flags (such as reverse shell indicators, downloads, or base64 decoding), potentially indicative of cloudpickle deserialization remote code execution (CVE-2026-49950).
Detects web server processes (Apache httpd, apache2, php-cgi, php-fpm) spawning a Unix shell (sh, bash, dash) that executes a wget or curl command piped directly into the shell for execution, indicative of potential remote code execution or web shell activity.
Detects execution and network activity associated with the cache_base operator toolkit, including JuicyPotatoNG (kitanai.exe), RegPwn (nandemo.exe), ufw.exe reverse shell, and upd-ms.bat launching these tools with connections to *.strangled.net on port 7070.
Detects observable hiding actions targeting ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control) clients, such as modifying registry keys to hide uninstall entries, using attrib.exe to set hidden attributes, or launching management tools with hidden window styles.
Detects script execution (such as wscript, cscript, mshta) spawned from a shell parent process (like explorer.exe or cmd.exe) referencing browser cache files (matching f_* in browser profile directories) or copying scripts to the local Temp directory as t.vbs.
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