Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects successful network connections from external (internet) IP addresses to common Industrial Control System (ICS) ports, such as Modbus (502) and EtherNet/IP (44818). This activity could indicate unauthorized access attempts, reconnaissance, or exploitation of internet-exposed ICS assets. The rule specifically filters for allowed/accepted/permitted connections and excludes connections from RFC 1918 private IP addresses and a configurable list of authorized external IPs.
KQL Query designed to detected tactics employed during active exploitation of WinRAR Zero-Day ( CVE-2025-8088)
Detects suspicious service installation scripts
Detects suspicious IIS native-code module installations via command line
Detects the simultaneous modification of 'msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink' and 'msDS-DelegatedMSAState' attributes on a delegated Managed Service Account (dMSA) object. This activity is a strong indicator of the BadSuccessor privilege escalation technique, where an attacker simulates a dMSA migration to impersonate a target account.
Detects modifications to the registry key "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\Userlist" where the value is set to "0" in order to hide a user account from being listed on the logon screen. This is a defense evasion technique used by adversaries to maintain stealth.
This rule detects the presence and activity of PAM-based backdoors on Linux systems by looking for specific SHA256 hashes and filenames associated with known PAM backdoors. It monitors process events, general device events, file events, and image load events on Linux devices.
Detects a Chromium-based browser process being launched with the '--load-extension=' command-line flag. This flag allows an instance of the browser to be started with a custom extension, which can be abused by adversaries for persistence, data exfiltration, or other malicious activities. This technique is often associated with malware like ChromeLoader.
Detects a suspicious process spawning a Chromium-based browser process with the '--load-extension' flag to start an instance with a custom extension. This technique is often used by adversaries to establish persistence or execute malicious code within the browser environment.
Detects specially crafted RAR archives that exploit the CVE-2025-8088 directory traversal vulnerability. This technique is used to drop files into the Windows Startup folder for persistence, as seen in campaigns by the RomCom threat actor.
Detects MucorAgent, a multi-stage .NET backdoor used by the Curly COMrades threat actor. It uses COM hijacking for persistence and executes AES-encrypted PowerShell scripts.
This rule detects the creation of new Microsoft Power Automate flows that are configured to use connectors capable of exfiltrating data via email or collaboration platforms like Microsoft Teams. It specifically looks for flows created with connectors which could indicate an attempt to send sensitive information outside the organization.
This detection identifies the use of two drivers, rwdrv.sys and hlpdrv.sys, which have been observed in Akira ransomware campaigns. The activity includes dropping these drivers, creating associated services, and disabling Windows Defender.
This query identifies browser extensions with a low global prevalence, which could indicate a malicious or unwanted extension. It specifically looks for .crx files created in "Webstore Downloads" folders and enriches the data with file prevalence information.
Detects the creation of files and services associated with malicious drivers (hlpdrv.sys, rwdrv.sys) used by Akira ransomware affiliates for defense evasion, as reported by GuidePoint Security. This rule specifically looks for the creation of these driver files and the associated service registrations in the Windows Registry.
This rule detects potential DLL sideloading attempts by monitoring the loading of specific DLLs (version.dll and rtworkq.dll) from non-standard Windows system directories. It specifically looks for these DLLs being loaded by 'icardagt.exe' or 'mfpmp.exe' processes outside of 'C:\Windows\System32\' or 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to execute malicious code by tricking legitimate applications into loading their malicious DLLs instead of the legitimate ones.
This rule detects successful device registrations to the 'Device Registration Service' in Azure Entra. It specifically looks for sign-in events where the ResourceDisplayName is 'Device Registration Service', the ErrorCode is '0' (indicating success), and the ConditionalAccessStatus is not '1' (which typically means that conditional access did not block the authentication flow for device registration).
The rule is pivotal for hunting devices registered for persistence, post-successful phishing campaign execution, where >= 1 accounts were compromised.
The rule is pivotal for hunting devices registered for persistence, post-successful phishing campaign execution, where >= 1 accounts were compromised.
This query detects the creation of local user accounts on Linux systems using the 'useradd' or 'adduser' commands. Monitoring for local account creation is crucial as adversaries may create accounts for persistence, privilege escalation, or to facilitate lateral movement.
NTLM Relay Attempt
YARA-L
Detects NTLM successful network logons where the source and destination workstations are the same, excluding loopback addresses. This behavior can be indicative of NTLM relay attacks where an attacker relays authentication from a victim to the victim's own machine, or other forms of NTLM abuse.
This detection identifies changes to the VIB (vSphere Installation Bundle) acceptance level on an ESXi host. Modifying the acceptance level, such as setting it to CommunitySupported, lowers the system's integrity enforcement and may allow the installation of unsigned or unverified software. This action can be an indicator of an adversary attempting to install malicious VIBs for persistence or other malicious activities.
This analytic monitors Windows RDP client connection sequence events (EventCode 1024) from the Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RDPClient/Operational log. These events track when RDP ClientActiveX initiates connection attempts to remote servers. The connection sequence is a critical phase of RDP where the client and server exchange settings and establish common parameters for the session. Monitoring these events can help identify unusual RDP connection patterns, potential lateral movement attempts, unauthorized remote access activity, and RDP connection chains that may indicate compromised systems.
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