Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects techniques used by the Dropping Elephant APT group to stage and execute a DLL side-loading attack using VLC Media Player. This includes the execution of VLC from suspicious paths, the use of PowerShell to download and rename payloads into those paths, and the specific scheduled task used for persistence.
Detects the creation of a new HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT (HKCR) shell open command entry that points to an executable in a temporary directory. This persistence technique is used by Warlock Dark Army ransomware.
Detects malicious files (web shells, backdoors, and tools) associated with the exploitation of SharePoint vulnerabilities (e.g., CVE-2025-53770) by the threat actor Storm-2603. This rule matches known file hashes.
This rule detects suspicious device registration activity in Azure Active Directory (now Entra ID). Specifically, it looks for a sequence of two events: first, a 'Device Registration Service' adding a device with 'CloudAccountEnabled' set to true and a specific Windows build number (10.0.19041.928) in the user agent, followed by an attempt to add registered users to the device, referencing 'urn:ms-drs:enterpriseregistration.windows.net'. This sequence could indicate an adversary attempting to register a new device to bypass conditional access policies or gain persistent access.
Detects the AUTHENTIC ANTICS malware by identifying strings related to its registry-based execution frequency control. The malware reads and writes to the 'Counter' value within 'HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office\\16.0\\Outlook\\Logging' to ensure it only runs periodically.
Active exploitation of CVE-2025-53770 involves the creation of this file, indicating successful post-exploitation.
The analytic identifies Cisco Duo admin login attempts originating from operating systems that are unusual for the environment, specifically excluding commonly used OS like Mac OS X. It analyzes Duo activity logs for 'admin_login' actions and filters out expected operating systems. The rule then aggregates events by browser, version, source IP, location, and OS details to highlight anomalies. Detecting admin logins from unexpected operating systems is crucial for a Security Operations Center (SOC) as it may indicate credential compromise, unauthorized access, or attacker activity using unfamiliar devices. Such behavior can precede privilege escalation, policy changes, or other malicious actions within the Duo environment. Early detection enables rapid investigation and response, reducing the risk of account takeover and minimizing potential damage to organizational security controls.
The following analytic detects instances where a Duo administrator performs a bulk deletion of more than three policies in a single action. It identifies this behavior by searching Duo activity logs for the policy_bulk_delete action, extracting the names of deleted policies, and counting them. If the count exceeds three, the event is flagged. This behavior is significant for a Security Operations Center (SOC) because mass deletion of security policies can indicate malicious activity, such as an attacker or rogue administrator attempting to weaken or disable security controls, potentially paving the way for further compromise. Detecting and investigating such actions promptly is critical, as the impact of this attack could include reduced security posture, increased risk of unauthorized access, and potential data breaches. Monitoring for bulk policy deletions helps ensure that any suspicious or unauthorized changes to security configurations are quickly identified and addressed to protect organizational assets and maintain compliance.
Detects potential exploitation of Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) by attackers who abuse app role permissions to backdoor federated domains and escalate to Global Administrator using forged SAML tokens
The analytic detects instances where a Duo user's status is changed to "Bypass" for 2FA, specifically when the previous status was "Active." This behavior is identified by analyzing Duo activity logs for user update actions, extracting the status transitions, and filtering for cases where a user is set to bypass multi-factor authentication. This is a critical event for a Security Operations Center (SOC) to monitor, as bypassing 2FA significantly weakens account security and may indicate malicious insider activity or account compromise. Attackers or unauthorized administrators may exploit this change to disable strong authentication controls, increasing the risk of unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data. Early detection of such changes enables rapid investigation and response, helping to prevent potential breaches and limit the impact of credential-based attacks.
CVE-2025-53770 Exploitation hunt
The following analytic detects when a Duo user generates a bypass code, which allows them to circumvent multi-factor authentication (2FA) protections. It works by monitoring Duo activity logs for the 'bypass_create' action, renaming the affected object as the user, and aggregating events to identify instances where a bypass code is issued. This behavior is significant for a Security Operations Center (SOC) because generating a bypass code can enable attackers, malicious insiders, or unauthorized administrators to gain access to sensitive systems without the required second authentication factor. Such activity may indicate account compromise, privilege abuse, or attempts to weaken security controls. Early detection of bypass code generation is critical, as it allows the SOC to investigate and respond before an attacker can exploit the reduced authentication requirements, helping to prevent unauthorized access, data breaches, or further lateral movement within the environment. Monitoring for this action helps maintain strong authentication standards and reduces the risk of credential-based attacks.
Detects activity related to exploitation of Ivanti Connect Secure vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-0282, CVE-2025-22457) using MDifyLoader, Cobalt Strike, vshell, DslogdRAT, and Fscan. Includes file, process, and network-based IOCs from JPCERT report.
The analytic identifies instances where a Duo administrator creates or updates a policy to allow the use of outdated Flash components, specifically by detecting policy changes with the `flash_remediation=no remediation` attribute. This behavior is significant because permitting old Flash increases the attack surface due to known vulnerabilities. Attackers may exploit such policy changes to bypass security controls, introduce malware, or escalate privileges. Detecting these modifications helps prevent potential exploitation and reduces organizational risk. Immediate investigation is recommended to determine if the change was authorized or indicative of malicious activity.
This detection identifies when a Microsoft Teams message containing a URL associated with a known Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool was sent and subsequently clicked by the intended recipient or the original sender. The domain is not part of the organization's approved RMM solutions, indicating a potential use of Living-off-the-Land RMM (LOLRMM) techniques often employed in initial access or persistence stages by threat actors.
This activity may reflect attempted remote access, lateral movement, or data collection through unauthorized RMM deployment.
This activity may reflect attempted remote access, lateral movement, or data collection through unauthorized RMM deployment.
The analytic identifies instances where a Duo admin logs in using a browser other than Chrome, which is considered unusual based on typical access patterns. This behavior is significant for a SOC because the use of an unexpected browser may indicate credential compromise, session hijacking, or the use of unauthorized devices by attackers attempting to evade detection. Detecting such anomalies enables early investigation and response, helping to prevent privilege escalation, policy manipulation, or further compromise of sensitive administrative accounts. The impact of this attack could include unauthorized changes to security policies, user access, or the disabling of critical security controls, posing a substantial risk to the organizations security posture.
This rule detects a specific DLL hash (3d3837eb69c3b072fdfc915468cbc8a83bb0db7babd5f7863bdf81213045023c) associated with the SLOW#TEMPEST campaign. This file is the loader DLL responsible for executing the malware's payload. The rule looks for this hash in both executed processes and files on disk.
Detects the creation of `spinstall0.aspx`, a known indicator of successful post-exploitation of the SharePoint vulnerability CVE-2025-53770.
The following analytic detects potential post-exploitation activity related to the Microsoft SharePoint CVE-2025-53770 vulnerability. After successful exploitation via the ToolPane.aspx endpoint, attackers typically deploy a webshell named "spinstall0.aspx" in the SharePoint layouts directory. This detection identifies GET requests to this webshell, which indicates active use of the backdoor for command execution, data exfiltration, or credential/key extraction. Attackers commonly use these webshells to extract encryption keys, authentication tokens, and other sensitive information from the compromised SharePoint server.
The analytic detects potential exploitation attempts against Microsoft SharePoint Server vulnerability CVE-2025-53770, also known as "ToolShell". This detection monitors for POST requests to the ToolPane.aspx endpoint with specific DisplayMode parameter, which is a key indicator of the exploit. This vulnerability allows unauthenticated remote code execution on affected SharePoint servers, enabling attackers to fully access SharePoint content, file systems, internal configurations, and execute code over the network.
The analytic detects instances where a Duo policy is created or updated to allow access without two-factor authentication (2FA). It identifies this behavior by searching Duo administrator activity logs for policy changes that set the authentication status to "Allow access without 2FA." By monitoring for these specific actions, the analytic highlights potential attempts to weaken authentication controls, which could be indicative of malicious activity or insider threats. This behavior is critical for a SOC to identify, as bypassing 2FA significantly reduces the security posture of an organization, making it easier for attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data. Detecting and responding to such policy changes promptly helps prevent potential account compromise and mitigates the risk of broader security breaches.
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