Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
12,585 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
5,139
3,901
1,034
828
478
Contributors
2,488
1,655
1,442
1,408
970
Categories
3,446
1,826
1,661
1,578
1,417
Platforms
8,041
1,889
1,335
1,053
778
Products / Services
1,979
1,796
1,633
1,096
1,041
MITRE Techniques
18,116
15,638
12,585
8,395
6,225
CVEs
21
21
21
19
14
IDS Classtypes
136
73
43
15
14
IDS Protocols
150
123
15
12
6
Detects the persistence mechanism and command and control (C2) communication used by the Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS) backdoor. This includes the creation of a LaunchDaemon, download of a helper binary, and C2 task polling.
KQL Query from file: Threat Hunt: Potential Password Spray Attacks
Detects dll-sideloading attempts via licensingdiag.exe
This detection identifies attempts to establish persistence by modifying known Windows startup registry keys. These keys control which programs are automatically executed during system boot or user logon and are frequently abused by adversaries to maintain access across reboots.
Analysts will need to tune the rule through testing and using the exclusion statements to remove noise of what is known good within their environments.
Analysts will need to tune the rule through testing and using the exclusion statements to remove noise of what is known good within their environments.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task with specific names and comments used by the BugSleep backdoor for persistence, as seen in recent MuddyWater campaigns.
The following analytic detects the use of the Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) client application in allowed outbound connections. It leverages logs from Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense devices and identifies instances where BITS is used to initiate downloads from non-standard or unexpected domains. While BITS is a legitimate Windows service used for downloading updates, it is also commonly abused by adversaries to stealthily retrieve payloads or tools. This analytic filters out known Microsoft Edge update URLs and focuses on connections that may indicate suspicious or unauthorized file transfers. If confirmed malicious, this could represent a command and control (C2) channel or a download of malware or tooling as part of an attack chain.
This KQL detection is designed for use in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Advanced Hunting or Microsoft Sentinel, depending on table availability.
It focuses on identifying two common persistence techniques used by threat actors:
COM hijacking via user-specific registry hives (InprocServer32 and LocalServer32), particularly when leveraged by .NET or PowerShell-based malware; and uncommon registry-based persistence through suspicious keys such as DelegateExecute, TreatAs, and ScriptletURL.
The KQL focusses on user-specific registry hives as they don't require elevated privileges to modify and is why we also ignore "nt authority" activity as this detection is focused on low hanging fruit that would be easily accessible to a threat actor initially for persistence without privilege escalation.
It focuses on identifying two common persistence techniques used by threat actors:
COM hijacking via user-specific registry hives (InprocServer32 and LocalServer32), particularly when leveraged by .NET or PowerShell-based malware; and uncommon registry-based persistence through suspicious keys such as DelegateExecute, TreatAs, and ScriptletURL.
The KQL focusses on user-specific registry hives as they don't require elevated privileges to modify and is why we also ignore "nt authority" activity as this detection is focused on low hanging fruit that would be easily accessible to a threat actor initially for persistence without privilege escalation.
KQL Query from file: Potential MFASweep (tool) activity has been detected.
Detects indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the Ducktail Infostealer malware. This malware often targets Facebook Business accounts and exfiltrates data such as browser cookies, cryptocurrency wallet information, and account details.
Detects post-exploitation techniques used by the GoldMelody Initial Access Broker (also tracked as TGR-CRI-0045 and UNC961). This activity includes the use of a specific staging directory 'C:\Windows\Temp\111t' for custom tooling like 'updf.exe' for privilege escalation and 'txp.exe'/'txpm.exe' for port scanning.
This query detects potential Fox Kitten threat actor activity by analyzing ScheduledTaskCreated events.
It filters for suspicious task names (e.g., "update", "sync", "\Microsoft\Windows\EnterpriseMgmt"), non-system accounts, and risky commands (e.g., powershell, certutil). It also extracts task details, assigns risk levels (HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW) based on command patterns, and orders results by risk and timestamp for prioritized investigation.
It filters for suspicious task names (e.g., "update", "sync", "\Microsoft\Windows\EnterpriseMgmt"), non-system accounts, and risky commands (e.g., powershell, certutil). It also extracts task details, assigns risk levels (HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW) based on command patterns, and orders results by risk and timestamp for prioritized investigation.
Detects host-based and network activity associated with the RondoDox botnet, including defense evasion, system sabotage, persistence, and known IOCs.
Detects when a Global Administrator elevates access to all subscriptions and management groups in a tenant. When a Global Administrator elevates access they are assigned the User Access Administrator role at root scope. This Sentinel analytics rule monitors who has elevated access in your tenant so that admins can take appropriate action.
KQL Query from file: Hunting Exposed JDWP
This detection identifies when Microsoft Copilot Studio agents are created in your organization's tenant. This activity is significant as the default behavior in Copilot agent creation is to configure a new service principal with cloud app administrator role.
Copilot agents can be found in the Microsoft Admin Portal https://admin.microsoft.com/Adminportal/Home#/copilot/agents
Copilot agents can be found in the Microsoft Admin Portal https://admin.microsoft.com/Adminportal/Home#/copilot/agents
Generic rule content from file: LOLBAS - Execution - Outbound Traffic to Suspicious TLD
Detects TTPs and IOC´s associated with a cryptomining campaign that exploits exposed Java Debug Wire Protocol (JDWP) services. Attackers gain remote code execution to download and execute a dropper script (`logservice.sh`), which in turn deploys a modified XMRig miner disguised as `logrotate`. The malware establishes persistence through multiple methods, including systemd services, cron jobs, and shell startup scripts.
Detects suspicious script download attempts initiated by a Java process, indicative of potential JDWP exploitation leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE). Attackers often leverage exposed JDWP interfaces to execute commands like downloading and running malicious scripts.
Detects components of the Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS) malware, specifically the backdoor and persistence artifacts described in a July 2025 report.
Generic rule content from file: Masquerade - Suspicious ScreenConnect Install
KQL Query
Page 466 of 600