Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential session token theft or replay attacks by identifying non-interactive sign-in events that occur from a different IP or geographic location than the user's most recent successful MFA-authenticated interactive session. It flags cases where a non-interactive token is used within a short timeframe (1 hour) of an interactive session from a different location, which may indicate the exfiltration and subsequent use of session cookies or OAuth tokens.
Detects potential Pass-the-Hash (PtH) activity by identifying NTLM Type 3 logons where the account domain originates from outside the local or known corporate domain. The rule specifically excludes system-related accounts such as ANONYMOUS LOGON, WORKGROUP, and NT AUTHORITY, focusing on attempts to authenticate against internal resources using potentially forged or captured credentials.
Detects network traffic attempting to exploit the SMBv1 vulnerability (CVE-2017-0144), commonly known as EternalBlue. The rule monitors for specific SMB Trans2 SESSION_SETUP packet structures associated with this remote code execution exploit.
This rule detects potential lateral movement activity by monitoring for Kerberos service ticket requests (Event ID 4769) and Kerberos-based network logons (Event ID 4624, Logon Type 3) originating from source IP addresses that deviate from an account's established baseline of activity over the previous 14 days.
Detects a suspicious spike in Microsoft Teams external meeting or chat invitations directed at a single user within a 30-minute window. This behavior is consistent with UNC6692 tactics, where attackers impersonate internal IT helpdesk staff via Teams to perform vishing and social engineering attacks.
This rule identifies web requests containing path traversal sequences (such as '..', '..%2f', or null bytes) or attempts to access sensitive system files (e.g., 'etc/passwd', 'proc/self/environ') within URL query parameters. The rule normalizes different URL query fields and applies regex matching to detect common encoding bypass techniques used to exploit web applications.
Detects a single user account authenticating via RDP (Logon Type 10) to three or more distinct target hosts within a 15-minute window, which is often indicative of an adversary performing lateral movement using compromised credentials.
This rule detects potential lateral movement by monitoring for successful Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) logons (Event ID 4624, Logon Type 10) occurring directly between workstations, excluding connections where the destination computer name indicates a typical server or infrastructure naming convention (e.g., ends with $).
Detects network exploitation attempts targeting the SMBv1 protocol using the EternalBlue vulnerability (MS17-010). This vulnerability was famously exploited by the WannaCry and NotPetya ransomware to propagate across networks.
This rule detects when a single account initiates 5 or more successful Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections within a one-hour window. This behavior can be indicative of an adversary attempting to gain widespread access within a network, potentially through credential stuffing, brute-force attacks, or lateral movement using compromised credentials.
Detects the presence of the 'x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential' cookie in requests directed to 'login.microsoftonline.com' originating from a client that does not identify as Windows. This behavioral pattern is associated with session hijacking techniques where an attacker uses a tool (e.g., Device Code Lab) to inject a session cookie into a browser, allowing for unauthorized access to Microsoft 365 services.
Detects outbound SSH connections to TCP port 2222 that exhibit specific cipher negotiation patterns (curve25519-sha256 and chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com) associated with a known malicious SSH server exploit scaffold for CVE-2026-55200. This vulnerability involves a pre-authentication heap out-of-bounds write in libssh2 clients.
Detects the creation or update of Azure Network Security Group (NSG) rules that allow inbound traffic from the entire internet (0.0.0.0/0 or *) to management ports (RDP 3389 or SSH 22). This behavior often indicates an attempt to expose administrative services to the public internet.
Detects anomalous SSH connections originating from internal network appliances or DMZ-segment devices (e.g., storage, firewalls) to multiple internal network hosts. This behavior is indicative of lateral movement or SSH tunneling as observed in the VerdantBamboo BRICKSTORM campaign, where edge devices are leveraged as pivot points.
Detects activity associated with the RoguePlanet exploit, which involves creating EICAR content and NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS) within specific staging directories (wdtest_temp or RP_<UUID>). This behavior is intended to trigger Windows Defender scans and induce a TOCTOU race condition (CVE-2026-50656) by manipulating file operations near the wermgr.exe process.
This rule detects the execution of the QEMU virtualization engine (qemu-system-x86_64.exe) when associated with specific toolset files (e.g., BloodHound, Metasploit) or suspicious network activity patterns indicative of lateral movement, such as connecting to administrative ports (SMB, RDP, WinRM) on external or sensitive network ranges. The rule calculates a risk score based on the presence of these indicators.
Detects the execution of known Impacket framework tools (such as secretsdump, wmiexec, smbexec, atexec, GetUserSPNs, or ntlmrelayx) which are commonly used for credential dumping, remote service execution, and lateral movement.
Detects the execution of wmic.exe with arguments typical for remote process creation, such as using the /node switch to execute commands on remote systems. This behavior is commonly associated with lateral movement or remote administration.
This rule detects successful authentication attempts directed at network devices from sources not explicitly marked as authorized management systems. It identifies users or systems that are not recognized service accounts authenticating against network infrastructure and flags activity that involves multiple unique destination targets as high risk.
Detects the simultaneous execution of QEMU virtualization processes and post-exploitation tools (Metasploit, Impacket, Havoc, NXC) on the same host. This combination is indicative of an adversary using a local virtual machine to tunnel or pivot lateral movement activities while leveraging post-exploitation frameworks on the host system, a behavior observed in specific campaigns.
This rule detects potential lateral movement activity by monitoring for Kerberos service ticket requests (Event ID 4769) and Kerberos-based network logons (Event ID 4624, Logon Type 3) originating from source IP addresses that deviate from an account's established baseline of activity over the previous 14 days.
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