Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

2,008 detections

Detects suspicious "epmap" connection to a remote computer via remote procedure call (RPC)
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
Detect use of PDQ Deploy remote admin tool
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
Detects the execution of netsh commands that configure a new port forwarding (PortProxy) rule
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
This query will hunt for files matching the current abuse.ch recent threat feed based on Sha256. Currently the query is set up to analyze the last day worth of events, but this is configurable using the MaxAge variable.
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
4022
Detects the execution of "reg.exe" for enabling/disabling the RDP service on the host by tampering with the 'CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server' values
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
Detects the execution of netsh to configure a port forwarding of port 3389 (RDP) rule
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
Detects the execution of the hacktool Rubeus via PE information of command line parameters
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
Detects when an admin share is mounted using net.exe
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
Detects KrbRelayUp used to perform a universal no-fix local privilege escalation in Windows domain environments where LDAP signing is not enforced
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
Detects RDP session hijacking by using MSTSC shadowing
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
Detects the execution of SharpMove, a .NET utility performing multiple tasks such as "Task Creation", "SCM" query, VBScript execution using WMI via its PE metadata and command line options.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
Csi.exe is a signed binary from Microsoft that comes with Visual Studio and provides C# interactive capabilities. It can be used to run C# code from a file passed as a parameter in command line. Early version of this utility provided with Microsoft “Roslyn” Community Technology Preview was named 'rcsi.exe'
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
104
Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
Detects signs of the WMI script host process "scrcons.exe" loading scripting DLLs which could indicates WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers EventConsumers activity.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
Action "PnpDeviceConnected" reports the connection of any plug and play device.
Read more online on event 6416: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-6416.
Query #1: look for rare one-time devices connected to a specific machine.
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
0022
Detects default RemCom pipe creation
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
First query digs in print spooler drivers folder for any file creations,
MANY OF THE FILES THAT SHOULD COME UP HERE MAY BE LEGIT. Unsigned files
or ones that don't have any relations to printers that you are using are
suspicious.
Second query that can be used for finding client machines that
could be operating print servers or file servers is also included here.
As additional mitigation for the exploit you might want to block the
incoming traffic to the SMB or EPMAP Ports (445) if you need to keep the
spooler service running to print from clients.
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
0022
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Exploitation of CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep).
CVE-2019-0708, also known as BlueKeep, is a critical remote code execution vulnerability involving RDP. Soon after its disclosure, the NSA issued a rare advisory about this vulnerability, out of concern that it could be used to quickly spread malware. Attackers have since used this vulnerability to install cryptocurrency miners on targets.
Microsoft has issued updates for this vulnerability, as well as guidance for protecting operating systems that we no longer support. Microsoft Defender ATP also contains behavioral detections for defending against this threat.
The following query detects devices with RDP connections that could be exploitation attempts.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0708
https://www.nsa.gov/News-Features/News-Stories/Article-View/Article/1865726/nsa-cybersecurity-advisory-patch-remote-desktop-services-on-legacy-versions-of/
https://www.wired.com/story/bluekeep-hacking-cryptocurrency-mining/
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0708
https://support.microsoft.com/help/4500705/customer-guidance-for-cve-2019-0708
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2019/11/07/the-new-cve-2019-0708-rdp-exploit-attacks-explained/
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
0021
Get all filtering events done by the Windows filtering platform.
This includes any blocks done by Windows Firewall rules, but also blocks triggered by some 3rd party firewalls.
When no Firewall rules are configured, the default behavior is to block all incoming network connections.
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
1021
Query 1 shows you any network communication happened from endpoints to a specific Remote IP or Remote URL.
Ensure to update RemoteIP and RemoteURL variable.
For questions @MiladMSFT on Twitter or milad.aslaner@microsoft.com by email.
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
0021
'The query below identifies powershell commands used by the threat actor Mango Sandstorm.
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/25/mercury-leveraging-log4j-2-vulnerabilities-in-unpatched-systems-to-target-israeli-organizations/'
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
1021
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