Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The PowerShell implementation of DNSCat2 calls nslookup to craft queries. Counting nslookup processes spawned by PowerShell will show hundreds or thousands of instances if PS DNSCat2 is active locally.
Detects the execution of "ConfigSecurityPolicy.EXE", a binary part of Windows Defender used to manage settings in Windows Defender.
Users can configure different pilot collections for each of the co-management workloads.
It can be abused by attackers in order to upload or download files.
Users can configure different pilot collections for each of the co-management workloads.
It can be abused by attackers in order to upload or download files.
'This query helps detect new Microsoft Entra ID sign in from a new location correlating with Office Activity data highlighting cases where user mails are being forwarded and shows if it is being forwarded to external domains as well.'
'Identifies patterns in the time deltas of contacts between internal and external IPs in Fortinet network data that are consistent with beaconing.
Accounts for randomness (jitter) and seasonality such as working hours that may have been introduced into the beacon pattern.
The lookback is set to 1d, the minimum granularity in time deltas is set to 60 seconds and the minimum number of beacons required to emit a detection is set to 4.
Increase the lookback period to capture beacons with larger periodicities.
The jitter tolerance is set to 0.2 - This means we account for an overall 20% deviation from the infered beacon periodicity. Seasonality is dealt with automatically using series_outliers.
Note: In large environments it may be necessary to reduce the lookback period to get fast query times.'
Accounts for randomness (jitter) and seasonality such as working hours that may have been introduced into the beacon pattern.
The lookback is set to 1d, the minimum granularity in time deltas is set to 60 seconds and the minimum number of beacons required to emit a detection is set to 4.
Increase the lookback period to capture beacons with larger periodicities.
The jitter tolerance is set to 0.2 - This means we account for an overall 20% deviation from the infered beacon periodicity. Seasonality is dealt with automatically using series_outliers.
Note: In large environments it may be necessary to reduce the lookback period to get fast query times.'
This query lists files copied to USB external drives with USB drive information based on FileCreated events associated with most recent USBDriveMount events befor file creations. But be aware that Advanced Hunting is not monitoring all the file types.
Well-known DNS Exfiltration tools execution
This query looks for users sharing access to files with external users.
This applies to SharePoint and OneDrive users.
Audit event and Cloud application identifier references.
Reference - https://learn.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/compliance/audit-log-sharing?view=o365-worldwide
Reference - https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/entities-reference#cloud-application-identifiers
This applies to SharePoint and OneDrive users.
Audit event and Cloud application identifier references.
Reference - https://learn.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/compliance/audit-log-sharing?view=o365-worldwide
Reference - https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/entities-reference#cloud-application-identifiers
Detects usage of the powerShell Set-Mailbox Cmdlet to set-up an SMTP forwarding rule.
'This query looks for any mass download by a single user with possible file copy activity to a new USB drive. Malicious insiders may perform such activities that may cause harm to the organization.
This query could also reveal unintentional insider that had no intention of malicious activity but their actions may impact an organizations security posture.
Reference:https://docs.microsoft.com/defender-cloud-apps/policy-template-reference'
This query could also reveal unintentional insider that had no intention of malicious activity but their actions may impact an organizations security posture.
Reference:https://docs.microsoft.com/defender-cloud-apps/policy-template-reference'
Detects potential exfiltration attempt via audio file using PowerShell
Detects the execution of the "curl" process with "upload" flags. Which might indicate potential data exfiltration
Detects PowerShell scripts that make use of the "Compress-Archive" cmdlet in order to compress folders and files.
An adversary might compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.
An adversary might compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.
Detects Rclone which is commonly used by ransomware groups for exfiltration
Detects the execution of the "curl" process with "upload" flags. Which might indicate potential data exfiltration
This query searches for file copies which occur within a period of time (by default 15 min) to volumes other than the C drive or UNC shares. By default, this query will
search all devices. A single device can be specified by entering the DeviceName in the DeviceNameToSearch variable. Additionally, to change the period of time from when
the USB device was inserted, adjust the TimespanInSeconds value.
Happy hunting!
search all devices. A single device can be specified by entering the DeviceName in the DeviceNameToSearch variable. Additionally, to change the period of time from when
the USB device was inserted, adjust the TimespanInSeconds value.
Happy hunting!
Detects Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - ICMP. Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel.
Detects network connections to Devtunnels domains initiated by a process on a system. Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine.
Well-known DNS Exfiltration tools execution
'Identifies anomalous data transfer to public networks. The query leverages built-in KQL anomaly detection algorithms that detects large deviations from a baseline pattern.
A sudden increase in data transferred to unknown public networks is an indication of data exfiltration attempts and should be investigated.
The higher the score, the further it is from the baseline value.
The output is aggregated to provide summary view of unique source IP to destination IP address and port bytes sent traffic observed in the flagged anomaly hour.
The source IP addresses which were sending less than bytessentperhourthreshold have been exluded whose value can be adjusted as needed .
You may have to run queries for individual source IP addresses from SourceIPlist to determine if anything looks suspicious'
A sudden increase in data transferred to unknown public networks is an indication of data exfiltration attempts and should be investigated.
The higher the score, the further it is from the baseline value.
The output is aggregated to provide summary view of unique source IP to destination IP address and port bytes sent traffic observed in the flagged anomaly hour.
The source IP addresses which were sending less than bytessentperhourthreshold have been exluded whose value can be adjusted as needed .
You may have to run queries for individual source IP addresses from SourceIPlist to determine if anything looks suspicious'
This query helps hunting for BEC - File sharing tactics - OneDrive or SharePoint
Custom detection to find use of torrenting software or browsing related to torrents.
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