Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects execution of "tar.exe" in order to create a compressed file.
Adversaries may abuse various utilities to compress or encrypt data before exfiltration.
Adversaries may abuse various utilities to compress or encrypt data before exfiltration.
Detects execution of "tar.exe" in order to extract compressed file.
Adversaries may abuse various utilities in order to decompress data to avoid detection.
Adversaries may abuse various utilities in order to decompress data to avoid detection.
Microsoft has observed Bazacall using a renamed version of Rclone for data exfiltration.
'This hunting query identifies GitHub activites where a repo was changed from private to public that may be a sign of compromise.'
As described in previous guidance, Nobelium may re-purpose legitimate existing OAuth Applications in the environment to their own ends. However, malicious activity patterns may be discernable from legitimate ones.
The following query returns OAuth Applications that access mail both directly and via Graph, allowing review of whether such dual access methods follow expected use patterns.
Reference - https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
The following query returns OAuth Applications that access mail both directly and via Graph, allowing review of whether such dual access methods follow expected use patterns.
Reference - https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
Intent:
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
'Identifies when multiple (more than one) users mailboxes are configured to forward to the same destination.
This could be an attacker-controlled destination mailbox configured to collect mail from multiple compromised user accounts.'
This could be an attacker-controlled destination mailbox configured to collect mail from multiple compromised user accounts.'
This query helps you review all OAuth applications accessing user mail via Graph. It could return a significant number of results depending on how many applications are deployed in the environment.
Intent:
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
Intent:
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
'This detection will identify network requests in HTTP proxy data that contains Base64 encoded usernames from machines in the DeviceEvents table.
This technique was seen usee by POLONIUM in their RunningRAT tool.'
This technique was seen usee by POLONIUM in their RunningRAT tool.'
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Ransomware continues to hit healthcare, critical services. There is also a related blog.
In April of 2020, security researchers observed multiple ransomware campaigns using the same set of techniques.
The following query detects suspicious use of Alternate Data Streams (ADS), which may indicate an attempt to mask malicious activity. These campaigns have been known to deploy ransomware in-memory and exploit ADS.
The See also section below lists more queries related to techniques shared by these campaigns.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/28/ransomware-groups-continue-to-target-healthcare-critical-services-heres-how-to-reduce-risk/
https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/streams
In April of 2020, security researchers observed multiple ransomware campaigns using the same set of techniques.
The following query detects suspicious use of Alternate Data Streams (ADS), which may indicate an attempt to mask malicious activity. These campaigns have been known to deploy ransomware in-memory and exploit ADS.
The See also section below lists more queries related to techniques shared by these campaigns.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/28/ransomware-groups-continue-to-target-healthcare-critical-services-heres-how-to-reduce-risk/
https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/streams
Private Key Files.
This query identifies file operation with files having.
One of the extensions commonly used to save a private.
Key. The risk is that if an attacker were to obtain.
The file, they could brute force any password on it.
And potentially obtain a powerful certificate. To do.
This, they would only need to obtain read access to.
The file.
The risk associated with these files is heavily.
Determined by the value of the certificate. For example,.
Loss of a self-signed certificate created by Adobe Acrobat.
Is significantly less impactful than loss of a website.
SSL certificate.
Recommendation: Know where these files are, and if possible.
Back them up and remove them. You might also consider.
Creating an informational alert.
This query identifies file operation with files having.
One of the extensions commonly used to save a private.
Key. The risk is that if an attacker were to obtain.
The file, they could brute force any password on it.
And potentially obtain a powerful certificate. To do.
This, they would only need to obtain read access to.
The file.
The risk associated with these files is heavily.
Determined by the value of the certificate. For example,.
Loss of a self-signed certificate created by Adobe Acrobat.
Is significantly less impactful than loss of a website.
SSL certificate.
Recommendation: Know where these files are, and if possible.
Back them up and remove them. You might also consider.
Creating an informational alert.
'This hunting query looks for hosts exporting a mailbox from an on-prem Exchange server, followed by
that same host removing the export within a short time window. This pattern has been observed by attackers
when exfiltrating emails from a target environment. A Mailbox export is unlikely to be a common command run so look for
activity from unexpected hosts and accounts.
Reference: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/'
that same host removing the export within a short time window. This pattern has been observed by attackers
when exfiltrating emails from a target environment. A Mailbox export is unlikely to be a common command run so look for
activity from unexpected hosts and accounts.
Reference: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/'
Device Network Events Involving Low Count FQDNs.
This query reduces network events to only those with the RemoteURL column populated,.
Then parses the DNS name from the URL (if needed) and finds the least prevalent.
FQDNs. The result is then joined with DeviceNetworkEvents to highlight anomalous.
Network communication.
This query reduces network events to only those with the RemoteURL column populated,.
Then parses the DNS name from the URL (if needed) and finds the least prevalent.
FQDNs. The result is then joined with DeviceNetworkEvents to highlight anomalous.
Network communication.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, "Exchange Server zero-days exploited in the wild".
In early March 2021, Microsoft released patches for four different zero-day vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft Exchange Server. The vulnerabilities were being used in a coordinated attack. For more information on the vulnerabilities, visit the following links:
1. CVE-2021-26855
2. CVE-2021-26857
3. CVE-2021-26858
4. CVE-2021-27065
The following query detects 7-zip activity associated with this threat. 7-ZIP is a legitimate tool used for file archiving; however, unusual 7-ZIP activity combined with other evidence might indicate that an attacker is compressing data for exfiltration.
More queries related to this threat can be found under the See also section of this page.
Reference - https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server/
In early March 2021, Microsoft released patches for four different zero-day vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft Exchange Server. The vulnerabilities were being used in a coordinated attack. For more information on the vulnerabilities, visit the following links:
1. CVE-2021-26855
2. CVE-2021-26857
3. CVE-2021-26858
4. CVE-2021-27065
The following query detects 7-zip activity associated with this threat. 7-ZIP is a legitimate tool used for file archiving; however, unusual 7-ZIP activity combined with other evidence might indicate that an attacker is compressing data for exfiltration.
More queries related to this threat can be found under the See also section of this page.
Reference - https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server/
Intent:
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
'This hunting query identifies a fork activity against a repository done by a user who is not the owner of the repo nor a contributes.'
'This hunting query looks for anomalously large LA queries by users.'
Snip3 is a family of related remote access trojans. Although the malware in this family contain numerous small variations, they all exhibit similar behaviors and techniques.
The following query looks for network connections using any protocols associated with recent RevengeRAT, AsyncRAT, and other malware campaigns targeting the aviation industry.
This activity is often followed by connections to copy-and-paste sites such as pastebin.com, stikked.ch, academia.edu, and archive.org. Many of these connections will occur on non-standard ports.
The following query looks for network connections using any protocols associated with recent RevengeRAT, AsyncRAT, and other malware campaigns targeting the aviation industry.
This activity is often followed by connections to copy-and-paste sites such as pastebin.com, stikked.ch, academia.edu, and archive.org. Many of these connections will occur on non-standard ports.
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel.
The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
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