Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects a potential SYN flood denial-of-service attack, characterized by a high volume of TCP SYN packets directed at a target within a short timeframe. Such activity is indicative of attempts to exhaust server resources by leaving TCP handshakes incomplete.
This rule detects unauthorized or malicious agentic AI behavior where prompt injection or poisoned content causes an AI agent to execute excessive tool calls or enter an infinite loop of tool invocations. This behavior can lead to compute resource exhaustion, increased operational costs, and potential data exfiltration via excessive querying.
This rule detects potential Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against AI inference endpoints. It monitors for sustained high latency and high error rates combined with a high volume of 'heavy' requests (those exceeding a token/character count threshold) from specific source IPs. This pattern suggests an attempt to exhaust system resources by forcing the processing of complex or overly large prompts.
This rule detects potential Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against AI inference endpoints. It monitors for sustained high latency and high error rates combined with a high volume of 'heavy' requests (those exceeding a token/character count threshold) from specific source IPs. This pattern suggests an attempt to exhaust system resources by forcing the processing of complex or overly large prompts.
Detects high-volume file rename and modification operations occurring across multiple directories, combined with the creation of files indicative of ransom notes (e.g., readme, decrypt, how-to-restore). This pattern is strongly associated with the encryption phase of a ransomware attack.
Detects attempts to inhibit system recovery by deleting the Windows backup catalog or modifying boot configuration data to disable automatic repair features using built-in utilities like wbadmin.exe and bcdedit.exe. This activity is commonly associated with ransomware or destructive attacks attempting to prevent system restoration.
Detects the deletion of Windows Volume Shadow Copies using vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, or PowerShell (WMI/CIM objects). This activity is commonly used by ransomware to prevent local data recovery by destroying shadow copy backups before encryption.
Detects the use of the bcdedit.exe utility to configure the Windows boot configuration to enter Safe Mode (minimal or with networking), immediately followed by the execution of a shutdown command with the reboot flag. This sequence is a known technique utilized by Akira ransomware affiliates to force a system reboot into a restricted environment where security agents and endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may fail to load, allowing for undetected encryption.
Detects a multi-stage extortion tactic where a host is targeted by a mass creation of initial decryption-style ransom notes across multiple directories, followed by a subsequent drop of distinct follow-up 'press release' or 'threat' notes within a 30-minute window, indicative of INC Ransom behavior.
Detects the use of long-lived AWS IAM access keys (AKIA) to perform critical AWS Bedrock operations such as enabling foundation model access (PutUseCaseForModelAccess, CreateFoundationModelAgreement). Such sensitive configurations are typically expected to be performed via the AWS Console using federated credentials; the use of long-lived keys for these specific actions is a strong indicator of potential compromise and unauthorized resource enablement.
Detects unauthorized modifications to AWS Bedrock Agent configurations, specifically identifying high-risk activities such as rewriting system prompts for potential prompt injection or attaching cross-account Lambda functions. The rule monitors for UpdateAgent, CreateAgentActionGroup, UpdateAgentActionGroup, and PrepareAgent events.
Detects a sequence of activity indicative of destructive ransomware or wiper behavior on a Windows device. The rule correlates a high volume of file modification, creation, or rename events within a short timeframe with concurrent attempts to delete or modify Windows backup and recovery mechanisms (such as Volume Shadow Copies or Boot Configuration Data) using native administrative utilities.
Detects outbound network traffic matching Stratum protocol JSON-RPC methods (mining.subscribe, mining.authorize, mining.submit) typically used by XMRig and other cryptomining software to communicate with a mining pool. The rule monitors for established TCP connections on non-standard ports, excluding common web ports 80 and 443.
Detects an exploitation chain in RouterOS where an attacker triggers an SSH rekey before authentication completes, forcing the SSH server into a post-authentication state. This allows the attacker to execute arbitrary commands over an unauthenticated channel, leading to unauthorized creation, modification, or reconstruction of sensitive system and configuration files.
Detects the deletion of volume shadow copies using standard Windows utilities vssadmin.exe or wmic.exe. This activity is a common indicator of ransomware or other destructive attacks attempting to inhibit system recovery.
Detects host-control and management tasks (e.g., shutdown, logoff, scheduled task modification) executed as child processes of the msedge_proxy.exe process. This behavior is indicative of the BotHelper malware implant managing infected endpoints.
Detects the use of legitimate data-transfer utilities (rclone, MEGA client, restic, WinSCP) configured to exfiltrate data to cloud storage providers. This behavior is identified as a precursor to double-extortion ransomware attacks, where attackers steal sensitive data before encrypting it.
Detects suspicious administrative activity involving privileged users performing bulk account/object deletions or stopping critical identity-related services (ADFS, Active Directory Certificate Services). The rule specifically flags events occurring outside standard business hours, involving privileged AD groups, or directly targeting identity infrastructure, indicating a potential attempt to disrupt authentication services or sabotage identity management.
Detects instances where the XMRig cryptominer is masquerading as the legitimate systemd-logind process on Linux hosts. The rule triggers on process execution of /usr/sbin/systemd-logind coupled with suspicious outbound network connections to known mining pools or mining-related ports.
Detects a suspected automated exploitation sequence where a web storefront file (e.g., .phtml, .js, .php) is modified to inject malicious script code (skimmer), followed by an unauthorized SQL DELETE operation on sensitive database tables containing payment, customer, or order information, originating from the same host within a 6-hour window.
Detects attempts by malicious software to inhibit system recovery by deleting Volume Shadow Copies. The rule monitors for the execution of vssadmin.exe with deletion flags or wmic.exe with shadowcopy deletion commands combined with non-interactive flags, which are common indicators of ransomware preparation.
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