Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Total Controlled Folder Access events.
This query helps reviewing malware detections by detection methods
This analytic detects AWS console login events by users who have not previously logged into the AWS console. It uses AWS CloudTrail events and compares them against a baseline of known users. A new user logging into the AWS console could indicate the creation of new accounts or potential unauthorized access, which could lead to unauthorized access to AWS resources, data exfiltration, or further exploitation within the cloud environment.
This rule detects DNS queries made to domains frequently used by threat actors for hosting malware payloads or for URL redirection via shortener services. The identified domains include those associated with platforms like Cloudflare Workers, TryCloudflare, InfinityFree, and URL shorteners such as tinyurl and lihi.cc. Such DNS activity can be an indicator of potential malware delivery attempts or command-and-control (C2) communications.
This rule detects when an executable file (.exe) creates another executable file (.exe). This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity such as malware dropping its components, or legitimate software installers. The rule includes extensive filters to reduce false positives from common system processes, update utilities, and known application behaviors like those from Microsoft Teams, VS Code, and GitHub Desktop.
This rule detects attempts to execute files from external WebDAV shares. It specifically looks for HTTP GET requests where the User-Agent header starts with 'Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/' and the requested URI ends with common executable or script file extensions. This behavior is often observed in initial access campaigns where adversaries leverage WebDAV to deliver and execute malicious payloads.
This rule detects attempts to access domains that have been registered within the last 30 days. It correlates network HTTP or generic network connection events with WHOIS data to identify recently created domains. The rule leverages WHOIS enrichment to determine the creation time of the accessed domain and flags any access to domains created within the specified 30-day window.
Detects suspicious attempts to download files from legitimate Microsoft domains (Outlook and OneNote) using command-line tools or PowerShell. Adversaries may leverage these trusted domains to host malicious files, bypassing traditional perimeter defenses and making the activity appear legitimate. The rule specifically looks for common download utilities like curl, wget, Invoke-WebRequest, and Start-BitsTransfer in conjunction with specific Microsoft attachment/sync domains.
Detects the installation and configuration of PowerShell Web Access, which could be used for remote access and potential abuse. The rule specifically looks for PowerShell script block text containing commands related to installing the Windows feature, installing the PSWA web application, and adding authorization rules.
This rule detects when a network connection is made to a domain that has expired. It leverages WHOIS data to identify domains whose expiration time is before the event timestamp. The rule specifically looks for HTTP network events and joins them with WHOIS information to identify access to recently expired domains. This could indicate access to potentially malicious infrastructure, as expired domains can be re-registered by threat actors for nefarious purposes.
This rule detects the execution of various Windows-based hacktools by matching their import hash (imphash). This method allows for detection even if the tool's filename has been changed. The rule includes imphashes for tools such as PetitPotam, JuicyPotato, RoguePotato, Pwdump, Cobalt Strike beacons, PPLDump, NanoDump, HandleKatz, DripLoader, UACMe, WCE, Sliver Stagers, Dumpert, SysmonEnte, SysmonQuiet, ShaprEvtMute Hook, Forkatz, PPLKiller, Backstab, Forensia, EDRSandBlast, and EDRSilencer.
Detects executables launched from external WebDAV shares using the WebDAV Explorer integration, commonly seen in initial access campaigns.
Detects suspicious ways to download files from Microsoft domains that are used to store attachments in Emails or OneNote documents
This analytic identifies high-severity intrusion events based on the classification assigned to Snort rules within Cisco Secure Firewall logs. It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense logs and focuses on events classified as: A Network Trojan was Detected, Successful Administrator Privilege Gain, Successful User Privilege Gain, Attempt to Login By a Default Username and Password, Known malware command and control traffic, Known malicious file or file based exploit, Known client side exploit attempt, Large Scale Information Leak. These classifications typically represent significant threats such as remote code execution, credential theft, lateral movement, or malware communication. Detection of these classifications should be prioritized for immediate investigation.
Detects the execution of different Windows based hacktools via their import hash (imphash) even if the files have been renamed
Detects the execution of hacktools developed by 'Cube0x0' by identifying the 'Company' field in the executable's PE metadata. This allows detection even if the tool's filename has been changed. Examples of tools by this author include SharpPrintNightmare, KrbRelay, and SharpMapExec, which are often used for credential access and resource development.
Detects the execution of different Windows based hacktools via PE metadata (company, product, etc.) even if the files have been renamed
This analytic detects the use of known suspicious SSL certificates by comparing the SHA1 fingerprint from Cisco Secure Firewall logs against a blacklist. This is crucial for identifying malware distribution, C2 infrastructure, or phishing campaigns that reuse or self-sign certificates. Detection of such activity may indicate beaconing, malware download, or data exfiltration over TLS/SSL.
The analytic identifies a single source IP failing to authenticate into Google Workspace with multiple valid users, potentially indicating a Password Spraying attack. It uses Google Workspace login failure events and calculates the standard deviation for source IPs, applying the 3-sigma rule to detect unusual failed authentication attempts. This activity is significant as it may signal an adversary attempting to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further exploitation within the environment.
This analytic identifies more than 10 GetPasswordData API calls within a 5-minute window in an AWS account. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect this activity by counting the distinct instance IDs accessed. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to retrieve encrypted administrator passwords for running Windows instances, which is a critical security concern. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to administrative credentials, potentially leading to full control over the affected instances and further compromise of the AWS environment.
The analytic identifies AWS console login attempts by users from a new region. It leverages AWS CloudTrail events and compares current login regions against a baseline of previously seen regions for each user. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized access attempts or compromised credentials. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to AWS resources, potentially leading to data breaches, resource manipulation, or further lateral movement within the cloud environment.
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