Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
503 detections
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Detects execution of "certutil" with the "addstore" flag in order to install a new certificate on the system.
Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers.
Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers.
Detects the use of reg.exe or PowerShell to delete the Windows Defender context menu handler registry keys.
This action removes the "Scan with Microsoft Defender" option from the right-click menu for files, directories, and drives.
Attackers may use this technique to hinder manual, on-demand scans and reduce the visibility of the security product.
This action removes the "Scan with Microsoft Defender" option from the right-click menu for files, directories, and drives.
Attackers may use this technique to hinder manual, on-demand scans and reduce the visibility of the security product.
Detects Stracciatella which executes a Powershell runspace from within C# (aka SharpPick technique) with AMSI, ETW and Script Block Logging disabled based on PE metadata characteristics.
Detects the addition of a new rule to the Windows firewall via netsh
Detects Netsh command execution that whitelists a program located in a suspicious location in the Windows Firewall
Detects base64 encoded "MpPreference" PowerShell cmdlet code that tries to modifies or tamper with Windows Defender AV
Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender configurations using the 'MpPreference' cmdlet
Detects the use of the PowerShell "Set-Service" cmdlet to change the startup type of a service to "disabled" or "manual"
Detects the usage of "reg.exe" to add Defender folder exclusions. Qbot has been seen using this technique to add exclusions for folders within AppData and ProgramData.
Detects the execution of "reg.exe" to alter registry keys that would replace the user's desktop background.
This is a common technique used by malware to change the desktop background to a ransom note or other image.
This is a common technique used by malware to change the desktop background to a ransom note or other image.
Detects execution of "reg.exe" to disable security services such as Windows Defender.
Detects the import of an alternate data stream with regini.exe, regini.exe can be used to modify registry keys.
Detects potential suspicious behaviour using secedit.exe. Such as exporting or modifying the security policy
Detect VBoxDrvInst.exe run with parameters allowing processing INF file.
This allows to create values in the registry and install drivers.
For example one could use this technique to obtain persistence via modifying one of Run or RunOnce registry keys
This allows to create values in the registry and install drivers.
For example one could use this technique to obtain persistence via modifying one of Run or RunOnce registry keys
Detects NetNTLM downgrade attack
Detects tampering with the "ChannelAccess" registry key in order to change access to Windows event channel.
Detects when an attacker or tool disables the Windows Defender service (WinDefend) via the registry
Detects tampering with the "Enabled" registry key in order to disable Windows logging of a Windows event channel
Detects the disabling of the Windows Defender eventlog as seen in relation to Lockbit 3.0 infections
Detects when the "index" value of a scheduled task is modified from the registry
Which effectively hides it from any tooling such as "schtasks /query" (Read the referenced link for more information about the effects of this technique)
Which effectively hides it from any tooling such as "schtasks /query" (Read the referenced link for more information about the effects of this technique)
Detects usage of Windows Input Method Editor (IME) keyboard layout feature, which allows an attacker to load a DLL into the process after sending the WM_INPUTLANGCHANGEREQUEST message.
Before doing this, the client needs to register the DLL in a special registry key that is assumed to implement this keyboard layout. This registry key should store a value named "Ime File" with a DLL path.
IMEs are essential for languages that have more characters than can be represented on a standard keyboard, such as Chinese, Japanese, and Korean.
Before doing this, the client needs to register the DLL in a special registry key that is assumed to implement this keyboard layout. This registry key should store a value named "Ime File" with a DLL path.
IMEs are essential for languages that have more characters than can be represented on a standard keyboard, such as Chinese, Japanese, and Korean.
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