Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects anomalous sign-in attempts to VPN or SSO services by identifying deviations from a user's established baseline of device and location combinations. It flags sign-ins where there are at least two anomalies (new country, new ASN, new device ID, new user agent), or specific critical combinations like a new country and new device, or an unmanaged device signing in from a new country or ASN. This pattern is consistent with adversaries using stolen credentials, potentially from infostealer logs, to access enterprise resources.
This rule monitors the creation of new Azure Function Apps and identifies those that receive external, non-private network requests within 48 hours of their creation. This pattern may indicate the deployment of malicious or unauthorized serverless infrastructure for command-and-control, proxying, or automated tasks.
Detects a sequence of events indicative of a successful phishing attack: a user receives an email containing a suspected phishing URL, clicks the URL, and subsequently performs a successful sign-in from an IP address not seen in their recent 14-day history within 15 minutes of the click.
Correlates the execution of commands or Graph calls attempting to list Global Administrators or highly privileged roles within the tenant, specifically looking for 'List directory roles' actions combined with Azure AD sign-in events from non-corporate IP addresses.
Detects real-time Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) OTP relay, commonly associated with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) phishing frameworks like Bluekit. The rule flags successful sign-ins where MFA methods (SMS, TOTP, or Authenticator app) are completed with an abnormally low latency (under 10 seconds), suggesting automated relay, or where discrepancies exist in session context indicative of proxy-based interception.
This rule detects successful self-service password reset (SSPR) operations performed by users from IP addresses geolocated to a country that does not match their typical sign-in activity over the past 30 days. This behavior may indicate account takeover where an adversary has compromised credentials and is resetting the password to maintain access or gain further persistence.
This rule detects successful sign-ins using the OAuth 2.0 Device Code Flow. This flow is often abused in phishing attacks (device code phishing) where an attacker tricks a user into authenticating a malicious application. A successful sign-in using this method could indicate a compromised account or a successful phishing attempt.
Detects Microsoft 365 sign-ins using the device code grant flow from an unusual location or a previously unseen/unmanaged device. This behavior is consistent with OAuth phishing abuse, specifically 'device code phishing' where an adversary tricks a user into entering a code/credentials on a malicious authorization page to obtain a device token.
Detects high-frequency enumeration of privileged roles or role assignments within Azure AD (Entra ID) by a single user or IP address within a short time window. This activity often precedes more targeted attacks aimed at compromising highly privileged identities.
This rule detects potential password spraying attacks against Azure Active Directory by identifying sign-in failures from a single source IP address targeting a large number of distinct user accounts within a short time window. It specifically filters for common authentication failure codes and checks for low volume of failures per account, which is characteristic of password spraying behavior.
Detects MFA push bombing attacks by identifying a high volume of MFA challenge failures (errorCode 500121) associated with a single user account within a short time window. This activity often indicates an attempt to overwhelm or fatigue a user into inadvertently approving an MFA request.
Detects rapid deletion and recreation of cloud storage buckets (S3 or Azure Storage) within a short timeframe (60 seconds). This behavior is often indicative of an attempt to hijack a bucket name or gain unauthorized access to data by exploiting race conditions or misconfigurations in infrastructure management.
Detects users who modify their MFA settings (registration/update/delete) and subsequently perform privileged actions (such as adding role members or service principal credentials) within a short timeframe, while simultaneously observed active in communication applications like Teams, Zoom, or Webex. This behavior is indicative of potential account takeover where an adversary modifies authentication methods to gain persistent access, followed by privilege escalation.
Detects successful user sign-ins from a country that has not been observed in the user's sign-in activity over the past 30 days. This baseline helps identify potentially compromised accounts by surfacing geographic anomalies.
Detects any modification (add, update, or delete) to Entra ID cross-tenant access settings. Adversaries may manipulate these trust configurations to weaken inbound security restrictions, establish unauthorized access between tenants, or facilitate cross-tenant impersonation.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity within Azure Automation by monitoring for the creation or modification of runbooks and jobs, combined with the presence of suspicious command-line or script patterns in job stream output, such as credential harvesting (e.g., Get-AutomationPSCredential) or execution of web-based payloads (e.g., IEX, Invoke-WebRequest).
This rule detects potential token theft or MFA bypass by correlating successful MFA-satisfied interactive sign-ins with subsequent non-interactive sign-ins (token refreshes) occurring within a 60-minute window from different IP addresses for the same user. This pattern is indicative of an attacker stealing a session token (e.g., via session cookie theft or AiTM phishing) and using it to authenticate from a different location.
Detects when a single user account performs 3 or more Privileged Identity Management (PIM) role activations within a 30-minute window. This behavior may indicate an attacker who has compromised a privileged account and is rapidly assuming multiple roles to perform lateral movement or privilege escalation.
Detects the addition of secrets or certificates to Azure service principals during non-business hours (before 7 AM or after 7 PM, or on weekends). This behavior may indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence in a cloud environment by adding their own credentials to an existing service principal.
Detects instances where a user successfully authenticates using Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) from one location, followed by a Single-Factor Authentication (SFA) logon from a different location within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of potential session hijacking or session cookie theft where an attacker reuses an authenticated session or manipulates the authentication flow to bypass MFA requirements.
Detects the use of the AADInternals PowerShell module for suspicious device registration activities, such as phantom device creation and Primary Refresh Token (PRT) manipulation, which are common techniques used to bypass Conditional Access policies. The rule correlates PowerShell command execution containing AADInternals cmdlets with subsequent Azure AD device registration events originating from the same host within a 15-minute window.
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