Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
582 detections
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Detects instances of Node.js processes executing command-line instructions related to publishing packages (npm, twine, or cargo). This behavior is characteristic of Miasma malware's 'trySpread' routine, which attempts to propagate the malware by leveraging compromised package repository tokens.
Detects the execution of Node.js processes launched by VS Code (via task runner) that reference known Miasma malware persistence paths (e.g., sync.js in hidden NodeJS directories across Windows, Linux, or macOS).
This rule detects node.js processes that either attempt to read sensitive cloud credential or configuration files (AWS, Google Cloud, Azure) or establish network connections to a specific remote IP address (85.137.53.71) on ports 8080 or 8081. This behavior is indicative of credential theft or potential command and control (C2) activity from a compromised node environment.
This rule detects the installation of a specific potentially malicious NPM package ('mouse5212-super-formatter') via the npm command-line interface, followed by the execution of a node process initiated by the npm command within a 5-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a software supply chain attack where a developer or automated process is tricked into installing a backdoored dependency that subsequently executes malicious code.
Detects the execution of a file named 'intro.js' by the Node.js runtime located within a 'node_modules' directory. This pattern is often associated with the execution of suspicious scripts, persistent backdoors, or malicious packages that attempt to masquerade as standard dependencies.
This rule monitors for direct execution of Node.js binaries (node.exe or node) where the target script or binary is located within a 'node_modules' directory. By excluding standard file extensions (.js, .mjs, .cjs, .json) and common npm installation command lines, the rule aims to identify potentially malicious or non-standard binaries being executed in a context often used by adversaries for persistence or lateral movement within software dependency environments.
Detects a Node.js process termination followed by a quick respawn of a new Node.js process by the same parent process. This pattern suggests a watchdog persistence mechanism where the parent process monitors the child, automatically restarting it if it is terminated, consistent with behaviors observed in malware such as Void Dokkaebi.
Detects execution of 'npm install' or 'npm ci' commands that explicitly include '@marketfront' or '@tqm-mfe' scopes. This detection is designed to identify potential dependency confusion attacks where malicious actors publish public packages with the same names as internal private packages to trick build systems into downloading malicious code instead of legitimate internal modules.
Detects execution of Node.js applications that utilize specific Jscrambler obfuscation versions or the presence of these versions in package.json files, which may indicate the use of compromised or unauthorized supply chain dependencies.
This rule detects the execution of Python (pip) or Node.js (npm) package managers with command-line arguments specifying alternative package repositories (e.g., --index-url, --registry) that do not belong to the standard, trusted public repositories (pypi.org or npmjs.com/npmjs.org). This behavior is often indicative of supply chain attacks, where attackers attempt to trick users or automated systems into installing malicious dependencies from compromised or attacker-controlled repositories.
Detects the creation or modification of a .vscode/tasks.json file, followed by the execution of a process (specifically node.exe) that targets a script file without a standard JavaScript extension (.js, .mjs, .cjs). This behavior is consistent with an adversary configuring a hidden VS Code task (e.g., using 'hide:true' and 'runOn:folderOpen') to silently execute arbitrary code or assets when a project folder is opened.
Detects the execution of npm install commands that include known malicious package names associated with a supply chain attack linked to the Lazarus Group. These packages are designed to impersonate the legitimate 'rollup-plugin-polyfill-node' package.
Detects post-compromise persistence techniques, including crontab modifications, SSH authorized_keys updates, and systemd service creation, when performed by child processes of AI agentic tools like Claude, Node.js, or Python. This activity suggests malicious persistence establishment following an indirect prompt injection or supply-chain compromise of the AI agent environment.
Detects MCP (Model Context Protocol) server processes or developer tools spawned by IDE extensions performing environment variable enumeration to access cloud credentials (e.g., AWS, Azure, GCP, GitHub tokens) followed by anomalous outbound network connections, indicating potential exfiltration of sensitive developer environment secrets.
Detects exploitation attempts against the Flowise Model Context Protocol (MCP) environment, specifically targeting the node_options case-sensitivity bypass (CVE-2026-20182). The rule monitors for malicious node child process spawning, command line injection via the --require flag, suspicious file creation (flowise_marker.txt), and unauthorized outbound network connections from the Flowise process.
Detects node.exe accessing sensitive SSH configuration and key files (id_rsa, id_ed25519, id_ecdsa, known_hosts, authorized_keys) within the user's .ssh directory. This behavior is associated with the Miasma and MYRA infostealers identified in the Polymarket Trap npm supply chain attack campaign, which exfiltrate developer credentials.
Detects the execution of Node.js where the command line arguments reference a .woff2 font file. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to execute a malicious payload disguised as a legitimate font file, a technique previously associated with the PolinRider campaign.
Detects the AWS CLI being spawned by processes associated with AI coding extensions (e.g., VS Code extension hosts, Cursor, Windsurf) while executing commands indicative of cloud credential discovery or harvesting (e.g., sts, get-caller-identity, configure export). This activity is indicative of a supply chain compromise or exploitation where an adversary leverages an AI coding tool environment to access cloud credentials stored on the developer's workstation.
Detects Node.js processes attempting to access sensitive files or environment variables associated with Claude AI (e.g., Anthropic API keys, .claude configuration files), which may indicate credential harvesting activity by malicious code.
Detects the installation of known malicious npm packages designed to impersonate the legitimate 'rollup-plugin-polyfill-node' dependency. This pattern is associated with Lazarus Group supply chain attacks targeting developer environments and CI/CD pipelines.
Detects Node.js processes accessing sensitive configuration and credential files such as AWS credentials, .npmrc tokens, SSH keys, and Docker configurations. This behavior is consistent with infostealer activity, including malicious supply chain attacks designed to harvest developer secrets from local filesystems.
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