Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects PowerShell commands used by Kyber ransomware to enumerate and forcefully shut down Hyper-V virtual machines. This action is typically performed to release file locks on virtual disks prior to encryption.
Detects PowerShell processes executing 'Invoke-WebRequest' with command-line arguments containing 's3' and 'usoshared'. This combination could indicate an attempt to download or interact with S3 buckets, potentially for data exfiltration, staging, or retrieving malicious payloads, specifically referencing 'usoshared' which might be a specific bucket name or a keyword used by certain threat actors.
This rule detects instances where PowerShell (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) spawns suspicious child processes. The suspicious child processes include certutil.exe, mshta.exe, rundll32.exe, curl.exe, wget.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, bitsadmin.exe, regsvr32.exe, msiexec.exe, and cmd.exe. The rule also includes a join to ensure the parent PowerShell process was launched by explorer.exe, which can help filter out some automated or administrative PowerShell activities.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell to re-enable the Server Message Block version 1 (SMB1) protocol on Windows systems. SMB1 is a deprecated and insecure protocol, and its re-enablement often indicates an attempt to support legacy systems or could be exploited by adversaries for lateral movement or data access.
Detects the use of PowerShell to re-enable the deprecated and vulnerable SMB1 protocol. This protocol is often used by attackers for lateral movement to legacy systems, as highlighted by groups like The Gentlemen RaaS.
Detects the classic Matt Graeber AMSI bypass technique using reflection to set amsiInitFailed to True. This one-liner disables AMSI scanning for the entire PowerShell session.
Detects the use of PowerShell with Uninstall-WindowsFeature or Remove-WindowsFeature cmdlets to disable or remove the Windows Defender GUI feature, a common technique used by adversaries to evade defenses.
Detects base64 encoded "MpPreference" PowerShell cmdlet code that tries to modifies or tamper with Windows Defender AV
Detects calls to "LoadAssemblyFromPath" or "LoadAssemblyFromNS" that are part of the "CL_LoadAssembly.ps1" script. This can be abused to load different assemblies and bypass App locker controls.
Detects the use of the PowerShell "Set-Service" cmdlet to change the startup type of a service to "disabled" or "manual"
Detects PowerShell download activity, via the .DownloadFile() or .DownloadString() methods of the Net.WebClient class.
This technique is often abused by attackers to download additional payloads.
This technique is often abused by attackers to download additional payloads.
Detects the use of PowerShell's BitsTransfer module to download a payload named "syncobs.exe". This specific file and behavior are associated with the REF6598 campaign, where it is used as a secondary staging mechanism to deliver the PhantomPull in-memory loader and ultimately the PhantomPulse RAT.
Attempting to disable scheduled scanning and other parts of Windows Defender ATP or set default actions to allow.
Detects attackers attempting to disable Windows Defender using Powershell
Detects the secondary staging mechanism used by the intermediate PowerShell script before the PhantomPull in-memory loader is executed. This rule specifically looks for PowerShell or PowerShell Core processes executing commands that utilize `Start-BitsTransfer` to download a file named `syncobs.exe`.
Detects suspicious base64 encoded and obfuscated "LOAD" keyword used in .NET "reflection.assembly"
Detects calls to base64 encoded WMI class such as "Win32_ShadowCopy", "Win32_ScheduledJob", etc.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that attempt to install MSI packages via the
Windows Installer COM object (`WindowsInstaller.Installer`) hosted remotely.
This could be indication of malicious software deployment or lateral movement attempts using Windows Installer functionality.
And the usage of WindowsInstaller COM object rather than msiexec could be an attempt to bypass the detection.
Windows Installer COM object (`WindowsInstaller.Installer`) hosted remotely.
This could be indication of malicious software deployment or lateral movement attempts using Windows Installer functionality.
And the usage of WindowsInstaller COM object rather than msiexec could be an attempt to bypass the detection.
Detects attempts to disable the Windows Firewall using PowerShell
Detects various command line and scripting engines/processes such as "PowerShell", "Wscript", "Cmd", etc. spawning a "regsvr32" instance.
Detects PowerShell downgrade attack by comparing the host versions with the actually used engine version 2.0
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