Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects when an OAuth application is granted sensitive Exchange Online permissions, such as 'full_access_as_app', 'Mail.Read', 'Mail.ReadWrite', or 'Mail.Send'. Granting these permissions allows an application to access mailboxes across the tenant without requiring a signed-in user context, which is a common persistence and data exfiltration technique used in Business Email Compromise (BEC) and espionage campaigns.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) cross-tenant access settings where a new partner is added or inbound trust settings (such as MFA or device compliance) are enabled for an external tenant. This activity may indicate an attempt to establish a persistent backdoor or facilitate initial access into the environment via a compromised or malicious external identity provider.
Detects the creation or modification of Granular Delegated Administrative Privileges (GDAP) relationships, or the assignment of highly privileged (Tier 0) roles, when performed by an application identified as a partner provider or via delegated administration. This rule monitors for potential abuse of trusted partner relationships to escalate privileges or establish persistence within a tenant.
This rule detects administrative changes to cloud storage configurations (AWS S3, Azure Blob, and GCP Storage) that result in public or anonymous read/write access to buckets or containers, which could lead to unauthorized data exposure.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious modifications to audit and logging configurations across AWS, Azure, and GCP. The rule identifies actions such as stopping, deleting, or updating logging trails, diagnostic settings, or logging sinks, which may indicate an adversary attempting to impair visibility into their activities (Anti-Forensics).
Detects the creation of high-cost, resource-intensive compute instances (such as GPU-enabled or large-scale VMs) within cloud regions that have not been previously utilized by the account, subscription, or project. This behavior is often indicative of unauthorized resource hijacking, such as crypto-mining or large-scale data processing by threat actors.
Detects the creation or modification of serverless functions (AWS Lambda, Azure Function Apps, GCP Cloud Functions) that exhibit high-risk configurations. These include functions assigned overly permissive IAM roles, configured for public or unauthenticated invocation, or tied to event triggers commonly abused for persistence in cloud environments.
This rule detects the creation or modification of identity federation trust configurations across multiple cloud platforms (AWS, Azure AD, GCP). Attackers often modify trust relationships to establish persistence, forge credentials, or escalate privileges by introducing malicious identity providers (SAML/OIDC) that grant unauthorized access to the environment.
Detects modifications to cloud storage configurations in Azure and GCP that grant public access to containers or blobs. Attackers may leverage this to expose sensitive data stored in cloud environments by changing permissions to be publicly readable.
Detects unauthorized modifications or deletions of cloud logging sinks in Google Cloud Platform (GCP) or diagnostic settings in Azure, which may indicate an attacker attempting to disable audit logs to cover their tracks or evade detection.
Detects unauthorized or risky configuration changes in Google Cloud Storage or Azure Storage accounts that grant public access (e.g., allUsers/allAuthenticatedUsers or public blob access) specifically on storage resources identified as production or sensitive (PII/financial data).
Detects instances where an administrative user grants 'AllPrincipals' OAuth consent to a multi-tenant application that is unverified or lacks a trusted publisher. This behavior is indicative of an attacker tricking a global admin into granting broad permissions (e.g., Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite.All) to a malicious application, bypassing per-user consent restrictions.
Detects the addition of suspicious, attacker-controlled URLs (such as webhook.site, ngrok.io, or pipedream.net) as valid redirect URIs in an OAuth application's configuration. This technique can be used by an adversary to intercept OAuth authorization codes or tokens by luring users through a malicious authorization link, enabling persistent unauthorized access without further consent.
Detects the addition of a Service Principal to an Azure AD group that has the 'isAssignableToRole' property set to true. This behavior is a known privilege escalation technique where the service principal inherits the privileged roles assigned to that group, bypassing standard direct role-assignment monitoring.
This rule detects when new credentials (secrets or certificates) are added to an Azure Active Directory Service Principal. It flags this activity as suspicious if it occurs outside of typical business hours or if it exhibits signs of 'rapid re-keying', where multiple credentials are added to the same service principal within a 24-hour window. This behavior is a common indicator of persistence maintenance or credential rotation to support unauthorized access.
This rule detects scenarios where an external user is invited to an Azure AD tenant and subsequently granted a highly privileged role (such as Global Administrator or User Administrator) within a short window of time (1 hour). This pattern is indicative of potential persistence establishment or privilege escalation by an adversary using guest accounts.
Detects modifications to federated domain authentication, identity provider trusts, or federation settings in cloud environments (e.g., Entra ID, Okta). Unauthorized changes to these configurations can be used to establish persistence, enable SAML token forgery, or bypass Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA).
Detects OAuth2 permission consent events where a user grants a third-party or newly registered application access to high-risk scopes (such as Mail, Files, or Directory). This technique is commonly used to establish persistence and bypass MFA by gaining access to user accounts via malicious or compromised OAuth applications.
Detects high-risk activities related to SAML token-signing certificates, including certificate export from Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) or Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) and unauthorized configuration changes to enterprise application certificate management. These activities are potential precursors to Golden SAML attacks, where an adversary attempts to forge authentication tokens.
Detects anomalous sign-in activity for service principals (non-interactive accounts) where the same application authenticates from multiple distinct countries within a 24-hour window. This behavior often indicates the unauthorized use of compromised service principal credentials, such as client secrets or certificates, from distributed attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Detects potential abuse of Azure Cloud Shell backing storage (acsCloudShell) to stage or persist malicious scripts following an Azure AD session compromise. Adversaries may use this storage to blend in with legitimate engineering operations while maintaining persistent access to their tooling.
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