Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the use of the PowerShell 'Start-Process' cmdlet with parameters ('-WindowStyle Hidden', '-NoNewWindow') to execute a process without a visible window. This specific execution pattern was used by the Windows payload (msinit.exe) of the 'ambar-src' malware to evade user detection.
This rule identifies network connections or BITS transfer jobs targeting specific IP addresses and URLs associated with recent ClickFix campaigns. It also detects the use of system utilities like bitsadmin.exe and powershell.exe to download files, a common tactic for these threats.
Detects a low-noise XWorm execution chain described by ANY.RUN where WmiPrvSE.exe spawns PowerShell that uses WebClient to fetch Cloudinary-hosted content and performs in-memory Assembly.Load.
Detects a Windows Script Host process (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) using WMI to spawn a PowerShell process. This technique is used by malware, such as in the Remcos RAT delivery chain, to break the parent-child process relationship and evade detections based on process ancestry.
Detects PowerShell script content consistent with ETW disable (EventProvider.m_enabled) and AMSI bypass (AmsiUtils.amsiInitFailed) described in the MIMICRAT ClickFix chain.
Detects PowerShell one-liners using Invoke-RestMethod (irm) or Invoke-WebRequest (iwr) piped to Invoke-Expression (iex) to download and execute the TrustConnect or DocConnect RAT.
Detects the use of a specific PowerShell command pattern using the '[adsiSearcher]' type accelerator to enumerate and count computer objects in Active Directory. This technique was observed being used for discovery in campaigns following the exploitation of CVE-2026-1731 (BeyondTrust).
This rule set detects attempts to download an 'install.sh' script from the domains 'clawd.bot' or 'openclaw.ai' using various methods. The first rule, 'openclaw_curl_install_script', specifically targets command-line tools like curl, wget, aria2c, and fetch. The 'openclaw_powershell_download' rule focuses on PowerShell commands (Invoke-WebRequest, iwr, Invoke-RestMethod, irm) used for downloading. The 'openclaw_aria2c_fetch_download' rule is redundant with the first rule, as it also targets aria2c and fetch. The 'openclaw_lolbin_download' rule identifies the use of Living Off The Land Binaries (LOLBins) such as certutil, bitsadmin, and mshta for the same download activity. Finally, the 'openclaw_http_install_sh' rule detects direct HTTP network requests to the 'install.sh' path on these domains. Collectively, these rules aim to identify potential initial access or execution attempts involving a suspicious installation script from specific domains.
This rule detects the KongTuke second-stage PowerShell loader. It specifically looks for PowerShell scripts that attempt to read a payload from a file named 'Remove-NetNatStaticMapping.log', decrypt it using DPAPI (Data Protection API) via 'ProtectedData]::Unprotect' and 'DataProtectionScope]::Localmachine', and then execute the decrypted content using an 'iex' alias. The script also includes references to 'Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Security' and 'AppActions', indicating advanced PowerShell capabilities and potential interaction with application-related data. The use of 'ReadAllBytes' and 'UTF8.GetString' suggests the payload is read as raw bytes and then converted to a string for execution.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell with an execution policy bypass, specifically looking for a command line that includes 'AzureRemove-NetNatStaticMapping.ps1' and 'AppActions'. This combination is indicative of the KongTuke malware's second-stage loader, which uses a PowerShell script to load a DPAPI-unprotected payload.
Detects the use of the 'Add-Type' cmdlet in PowerShell to compile and load C# code directly into memory. This technique is used by the TAMECAT backdoor to pivot from PowerShell to C# modules for tasks like exfiltration and browser data theft, bypassing file-on-disk scanning.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using 'schtasks /create' that include suspicious command-line arguments often associated with malicious activity, such as PowerShell execution, web requests (Invoke-WebRequest, curl, wget, bitsadmin), or script execution (.ps1, .vbs, .js). This rule aims to identify persistence mechanisms or initial access attempts.
Detects PowerShell processes executing with command-line arguments that suggest the use of 'Get-Alias' (gal) or 'Get-Command' (gcm) followed by suspicious patterns. This could indicate an adversary attempting to discover system capabilities or installed modules.
Detects the execution of a PowerShell command that reads a file's byte stream and performs a XOR operation on it. This technique is used by the KONNI APT group to decrypt and execute an embedded payload in memory, as seen in their 2026 campaign involving AI-generated backdoors.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with command-line arguments containing keywords indicative of in-memory download and execution, such as '-enc' or '-EncodedCommand' used in conjunction with 'IEX' (Invoke-Expression) or 'DownloadString'. This pattern is a common TTP for initial access and second-stage payload delivery, and was observed in the exploitation of CVE-2025-55182 (React2Shell).
Detects PowerShell downloading a batch file (.bat) into the user's Startup folder. This is a common persistence technique (T1547.001) and was observed in an AsyncRAT campaign where the payload was downloaded from a malicious `trycloudflare.com` domain.
Detects PowerShell commands that utilize string normalization obfuscation techniques before Base64 decoding. This rule identifies a generic pattern where one or two placeholder characters are replaced with a literal character, a technique used by malware like SHADOW#REACTOR to bypass static string analysis of the encoded payload.
This rule detects several suspicious activities often associated with post-exploitation and defense evasion. It identifies PowerShell commands used for recursively searching for msbuild.exe, tampering with Windows Defender settings (disabling real-time monitoring or adding exclusions), and downloading files from the internet to common temporary or application data directories. Additionally, it flags msbuild.exe executing suspicious .proj files from temporary directories, and any executable launched from temporary or program data folders by PowerShell or MSBuild. The rule also includes detection for persistence via .url file creation in the Startup folder and the dropping of specific suspicious files (.proj, pins.dat, staxs.exe, tybd7.exe) by PowerShell or MSBuild in temporary or program data directories.
This rule detects attempts to discover Group Policy settings on a system. It identifies the execution of common command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wmic.exe, rundll32.exe) followed by specific commands or PowerShell cmdlets used for GPO enumeration. This includes native Windows commands like 'gpresult' and 'secedit', registry queries for policy settings, PowerShell cmdlets such as 'Get-GPO' and 'Get-GPResultantSetOfPolicy', and LDAP-related queries for 'groupPolicyContainer'. Additionally, it correlates these process events with network connections to SYSVOL shares or LDAP ports (389, 636) that also contain 'groupPolicyContainer' in the URL, indicating potential GPO access. The rule filters out common system processes to reduce noise.
Detects PowerShell being used with an encoded command that contains download and execution primitives. This is a common technique used by adversaries, including in the exploitation of CVE-2025-55182 (React2Shell), to download and run second-stage payloads in memory.
Detects multiple WMI or PowerShell commands used by a Lumma Stealer loader to perform anti-VM and anti-sandbox checks. This includes querying for video controller details, refresh rates, and disk drive models.
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