Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects emails containing archive file attachments (zip, rar, 7z). It summarizes the count of such archives per sender, recipient, and file name over a daily period. The rule specifically looks for instances where at least one archive is present in an email.
Microsoft Teams External Link Phishing
Cortex XDR
Detects malicious URLs sent via Microsoft Teams direct messages that contain known phishing Top-Level Domains (TLDs). The rule specifically looks for messages in one-on-one chats containing external links with TLDs commonly associated with phishing, such as '.ru', '.dev', '.xyz', and others, which could indicate Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) infrastructure or device code lure paths.
This rule detects anomalous mass device wipe or deletion activity in Microsoft Intune by comparing current activity against an actor's historical behavior. It identifies four patterns: first-time wipers with high volume, known actors statistically far above their norm (Z-score), thin-history actors exceeding their personal peak, and time-compressed bursts of wipes. The rule calculates a severity based on the volume and rate of wipes.
Detects suspicious app installations, custom app creation, and bot additions in Microsoft Teams. This includes sideloaded apps, which can bypass Teams store vetting and be used for persistence, custom app creation outside of development teams, which may indicate C2 bots or data exfiltration, and the addition of bots with suspicious names. The rule also flags operations like AppShared and TabAdded as medium risk.
Detects sign-in or Microsoft Graph API activity using user-agent strings characteristic of ROADtools and similar Python-based identity-attack tooling. The rule generalizes beyond ROADtools to catch AzureHound, MicroBurst, MFASweep, GraphRunner, and similar identity attack frameworks by looking for scripting user-agents (python, requests, urllib, curl) which signal non-browser, non-app authentication that is inherently suspicious for Entra ID admin operations.
Identifies bursts or requests to high-value Microsoft Graph API discovery endpoints. Tycoon 2FA operators frequently perform automated burst reconnaissance against these endpoints post-compromise to map out roles, tenant relationships, mailbox settings, and contacts.
KQL Query
This rule detects when a device wipe or delete operation is performed via Microsoft Intune. It specifically looks for 'wipe ManagedDevice' or 'Delete ManagedDevice' operations in Intune audit logs within the last 24 hours. The rule is designed to be correlated with other alerts by filtering on a specific ActorUPN, indicating a potential malicious mass device wipe attack.
Detects the export of Microsoft Teams messages, transcripts, recordings, and chat retrieval activities, particularly when performed via the Graph API. This rule identifies suspicious activity by looking for specific operation names in SaaS audit logs from Microsoft Teams and flags user agents commonly associated with automation tools (e.g., python-requests, axios, go-http, curl, wget, powershell, httpx, aiohttp, node) which could indicate post-compromise attackers using stolen tokens to silently export chat history.
This rule detects the creation or modification of Exchange transport rules or inbox rules that forward or redirect emails to external domains. It specifically looks for operations like 'New-TransportRule', 'Set-TransportRule', 'New-InboxRule', 'Set-InboxRule', 'Set-Mailbox', 'UpdateInboxRules', and 'Set-TransportConfig' where the destination is an email address outside of the organization's verified domains. This activity can indicate data exfiltration or an attempt to maintain persistence and collect sensitive information.
This rule detects a high volume (50 or more) of failed authenticated SMTP login attempts to Office 365 Exchange Online from a single IP address within a 24-hour period. The failures are specifically for error codes 50126 (invalid username or password) or 50053 (account locked). This pattern is indicative of a brute-force or password-guessing attack against Exchange Online accounts.
This rule detects a highly suspicious sequence of events in Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) audit logs: a self-service password reset, followed by the registration of new security information, and then the deletion of existing security information, all performed by the same user within a short time window. This pattern is indicative of an attacker taking over an account, resetting the password, establishing their own MFA/security info, and then removing the legitimate user's security info to lock them out. This behavior has been observed in campaigns like Storm-2949.
This rule detects when a file, initially received as an email attachment, is subsequently observed on multiple endpoints within a 7-day period. It correlates SHA256 hashes from email attachment logs with device file events to identify widespread propagation of potentially malicious attachments.
This rule detects emails with subjects related to financial transactions (Invoice, Purchase Order, PO, Payment, Order) that contain attachments with suspicious file extensions (.js, .hta, .vbs). It specifically filters for emails originating from domains not whitelisted as trusted and aggregates the count and average size of such attachments.
KQL Query from file: Email Bombing and Teams Impersonation Detection
Detects when an application is published or updated in the Microsoft Teams app catalog. This activity could indicate malicious app deployment, supply chain tampering via catalog abuse, or unauthorized application changes.
KQL Query
Kali365 PHaaS Device Code Detection
Cortex XDR
This rule detects potential device code phishing attempts by correlating a device code flow initiated from an unmanaged/non-compliant device with a suspicious user agent (e.g., 'python-requests' or '-live') and an 'unbound' signInTokenProtectionStatus, with a subsequent 'Cmsi:Cmsi' token replay event for the same user. This combination suggests a successful device code phishing attack where an adversary has obtained and is replaying a token after the victim has authenticated.
High Email Volume to Personal Accounts
Cortex XDR
Detects potential data exfiltration or policy violation by identifying users sending a high volume of emails, large emails, or emails to many unique personal email addresses (e.g., Gmail, Yahoo, Outlook.com) from an Office 365 Exchange Online mailbox. This rule aggregates email activity by sender and flags if any of the defined thresholds are met: total sent data to personal addresses exceeds 25 MB, total messages sent to personal addresses exceeds 10, emails sent to more than 5 unique personal addresses, or any single message sent to a personal address exceeds 25 MB. This is designed to be ran as a scheduled correlation for a day time frame. Thresholds can also be configured to fit your environment. Each user will have a different line that contains all of the matching emails they sent to, the attachments, and subjects of the emails.
This rule detects potential thread hijacking phishing attempts where an email with a subject starting with 'RE:' or 'FW:' (indicating a reply or forward) contains an attachment with a suspicious file extension (.js, .hta, or .lnk). The rule specifically looks for these emails originating from domains outside of a predefined list of trusted domains and flags instances where more than one such suspicious reply/forward is sent from the same sender with the same subject and filename within a day, suggesting a coordinated attack.
This rule detects authentication attempts to Microsoft 365 Azure AD from a list of known malicious IP addresses and CIDR ranges associated with the EvilToken phishing campaign. It specifically filters for 'Cmsi:Cmsi' request types, which are indicative of session replay signals used in device code phishing.
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