Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of known offensive powershell scripts used for exploitation or reconnaissance
This rule detects instances where PowerShell (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) spawns 'node.exe' with command-line arguments containing '-e' and the process path is located within the 'AppData\Roaming' or 'AppData\Local' directories. This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity, such as the execution of Node.js-based scripts or malware by PowerShell, potentially for persistence or further execution within user-specific application data folders.
Detects the use of a PowerShell download cradle, a technique observed in the PhantomCaptcha campaign to download and execute a next-stage payload. This pattern often involves stealthy flags to evade detection.
Detects the use of the AADInternals PowerShell module, a tool used by threat actors like MERCURY and DEV-1084 for credential theft and privilege escalation in Azure AD environments.
Detects usage of the powerShell New-MailboxExportRequest Cmdlet to exports a mailbox to a remote or local share, as used in ProxyShell exploitations
Detects PowerShell command clobbering techniques, where a module is installed or imported with the intent to overwrite existing system commands. This can be used in supply chain attacks via repositories like PowerShell Gallery.
Detects enabling or disabling of Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) using alternate methods such as WMIC or PowerShell.
In PowerShell one-liner commands, the "SetAllowTSConnections" method of the "Win32_TerminalServiceSetting" class may be used to enable or disable RDP.
In WMIC, the "rdtoggle" alias or "Win32_TerminalServiceSetting" class may be used for the same purpose.
In PowerShell one-liner commands, the "SetAllowTSConnections" method of the "Win32_TerminalServiceSetting" class may be used to enable or disable RDP.
In WMIC, the "rdtoggle" alias or "Win32_TerminalServiceSetting" class may be used for the same purpose.
This detection identifies network connections to external DNS servers over TCP (port 53) initiated by common scripting engines like PowerShell, Python, or WScript. While DNS over TCP is a valid protocol, it is less common for standard queries and is often used by malware for command and control (C2) or data exfiltration through DNS tunneling.
Detects attempts to disable PowerShell command history logging using 'Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing'. This is a defense evasion technique used by attackers to hide their activities, as seen in the PhantomCaptcha campaign.
This rule detects PowerShell scripts attempting to perform keylogging. It specifically looks for the string 'Get-Keystrokes' which is often associated with keylogging scripts, or a combination of 'Get-ProcAddress user32.dll GetAsyncKeyState' and 'Get-ProcAddress user32.dll GetForegroundWindow' which are API calls commonly used in PowerShell keyloggers to capture keyboard input and determine the active window.
Detects the use of PowerShell to decode a Base64 encoded string and write it to the filesystem. This technique is used by adversaries, including in the PassiveNeuron campaign, to drop web shells or other malicious payloads.
This rule detects the execution of various hack tools and scripts commonly used for SMB relay attacks and privilege escalation on Windows systems. It specifically looks for process creations or command-line arguments associated with tools like PetitPotam, RottenPotato, HotPotato, JuicyPotato, Responder, ntlmrelayx, and smbrelayx, as well as PowerShell scripts like Invoke-Tater and Invoke-PetitPotam. The rule aims to identify attempts to exploit NTLM relay vulnerabilities to gain elevated privileges or access credentials.
The following analytic detects the use of default or publicly known named pipes associated with Cobalt Strike. It leverages Sysmon EventID 17 and 18 to identify specific named pipes commonly used by Cobalt Strike's Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. This activity is significant because Cobalt Strike is a popular tool for adversaries to conduct post-exploitation tasks, and identifying its named pipes can reveal potential malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate an active Cobalt Strike beacon, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
This rule detects the usage of the 'Get-ReverseShell' PowerShell tool by looking for specific strings associated with its code and its GitHub repository. The rule specifically targets the string "odTPYnuuGIGzrAeHM ", the obfuscation string "Invoke-PSObfuscation", and the GitHub repository URL "https://github.com/gh0x0st". This tool is designed to create reverse shells, which are commonly used by attackers for remote access and control.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell cmdlets from the 'Microsoft.PowerShell.LocalAccounts' module, which are used to manipulate local user accounts. This includes actions such as disabling, enabling, getting information about, setting properties of, creating, renaming, and removing local users. Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to victim systems, modify credentials, or change permission groups.
This rule detects attempts to leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable for process scope hijacking. Adversaries may use COR_PROFILER to load a malicious DLL into .NET processes, enabling persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion. The detection specifically looks for PowerShell script block text that sets the COR_ENABLE_PROFILING, COR_PROFILER, and COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variables, which are indicative of this technique.
Detects the usage of the Windows native Cipher tool within PowerShell or cmd.exe to wipe the contents of the C Drive. The rule specifically looks for the 'cipher /W:C' command, which is used to remove data from available unused disk space on the C: drive, making previously deleted data unrecoverable.
The following analytic identifies the use of Living Off the Land Binaries and Scripts (LOLBAS) with network traffic. It leverages data from the Network Traffic data model to detect when native Windows binaries, often abused by adversaries, initiate network connections. This activity is significant as LOLBAS are frequently used to download malicious payloads, enabling lateral movement, command-and-control, or data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe threat to organizational security.
The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell execution using Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104). It leverages specific patterns and keywords within the ScriptBlockText field to detect potentially malicious activities. This detection is significant for SOC analysts as PowerShell is commonly used by attackers for various malicious purposes, including code execution, privilege escalation, and persistence. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands, exfiltrate data, or maintain long-term access to the compromised system, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
This rule detects PowerShell commands that attempt to copy files into critical Windows system directories like "System32" or "SysWOW64". This activity can be indicative of persistence mechanisms, defense evasion, or credential access attempts, such as installing a malicious password filter DLL.
This rule detects attempts to add users to highly privileged groups on Windows systems. It specifically looks for command-line executions of 'net localgroup <groupname> /add' or 'Add-LocalGroupMember -Group <groupname>' where the group name is either 'Group Policy Creator Owners' or 'Schema Admins'. These groups are considered highly privileged, and unauthorized additions could indicate privilege escalation or persistence.
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