Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the suspicious loading of both 'FrameworkBase.dll' and 'sdkcra.dll' by the 'ReportDump.exe' process within a two-minute window. This behavior is often associated with the execution of specialized tools or potential post-exploitation activity where legitimate processes are abused to load specific modules.
Detects the execution of 'ReportDump.exe' from within the 'C:\ProgramData' directory when initiated by system processes associated with scheduled tasks (svchost.exe, taskeng.exe, schtasks.exe) containing 'Schedule' in the command line. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms or malicious file execution using legitimate Windows scheduling utilities.
Detects the use of ntdsutil.exe to create an Install From Media (IFM) set, which copies the NTDS.dit file and registry hives to a specified folder. Adversaries often use this technique to stage Active Directory credentials for exfiltration, frequently using the C:\Windows\Temp directory as a staging area. The rule includes exclusions for common legitimate system management and backup agents.
Detects suspicious activity associated with the DarkMe RAT, specifically targeting cryptocurrency wallet data files. The rule correlates file access to known wallet data paths by a hollowed process 'clspack.exe', followed by suspicious outbound network activity originating from that same process, and potentially preceded by WMI-based antivirus enumeration.
Detects anomalous command execution patterns indicative of DarkMe/Graphalgo-style RATs. The detection triggers when a single parent process initiates multiple suspicious C2-driven actions within a 24-hour window. These actions include executing Go language commands, Node.js script execution, or delayed self-deletion sequences.
Detects potential exfiltration of sensitive DevOps credentials or configuration files (such as AWS credentials, SSH keys, Kubernetes configs, or cryptocurrency wallets) by monitoring for file access events followed by outbound network connections to known exfiltration channels like Slack or specific C2 infrastructure within a 30-minute window.
Detects post-exploitation shell activity spawned from the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe), narrowed to command lines carrying encoded/obfuscated PowerShell flags, remote-download cradles, or basic recon/persistence commands (whoami, certutil, bitsadmin, schtasks, reg add). This reduces noise from benign w3wp.exe-initiated automation while retaining the behavioral pattern seen in the Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX unauthenticated RCE chain (webshell/in-memory DLL execution dropping to a shell).
Detects execution of potentially malicious scripts (a2.cmd) or unusual DLL loading behavior via rundll32.exe. This activity is often associated with staging or executing malicious payloads using non-standard naming conventions.
Detects instances where a Terraform provider process spawns a child process (go.exe or cmd.exe) to execute 'go run .'. This behavior is atypical for standard Terraform provider execution and may indicate the use of malicious providers that compile and execute code on-the-fly, a technique used to evade signature-based detection.
Detects instances where a Terraform provider process spawns a child process (go.exe or cmd.exe) to execute 'go run .'. This behavior is atypical for standard Terraform provider execution and may indicate the use of malicious providers that compile and execute code on-the-fly, a technique used to evade signature-based detection.
Detects instances where a Terraform provider process initiates a child process that is either the Go runtime (executing 'go run') or a Windows command shell (cmd.exe, powershell.exe). This behavior is often indicative of malicious code execution during the provider's execution lifecycle, potentially exploiting vulnerabilities in the Terraform provider ecosystem.
Detects a Go toolchain process (go.exe) spawning potentially suspicious child processes such as secondary 'go run' commands or Node.js execution. This behavior is indicative of a malicious Go module executing embedded or decrypted code during the build process, a tactic seen in supply chain attacks targeting development environments.
Detects the execution of package management commands (npm, pip, python) within directories or command-line arguments containing 'veltrix' or 'veltrix-capital', which may indicate the use of malicious dependencies or cloned repository lures.
Detects instances where a process that is not a recognized web browser accesses or enumerates the file storage path of the MetaMask browser extension. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized reconnaissance or credential theft attempt targeting cryptocurrency wallet data stored locally, often performed by malware following successful system compromise.
Detects suspicious execution patterns characteristic of post-exploitation activity, such as invoking 'go run' or 'node' from non-standard directories like AppData or Temp, as well as the use of command-line routines to delete files after execution (often associated with self-deleting secondary payloads or persistence cleanup).
Detects network connections to the Slack API (api.slack.com) initiated by processes executing from temporary directories commonly used by the Go build system ('go-build'). This pattern is indicative of a second-stage RAT or malicious payload compiled on-the-fly using 'go run' or similar mechanisms, utilizing Slack's infrastructure for C2 communication.
Detects instances where Node.js, Python, or Go processes spawn command shell interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, etc.). This behavior is often indicative of C2 command execution by malware, such as the Graphalgo RAT, which may use these languages to execute shell-level commands after initial infection or payload execution.
Detects instances where common scripting or development language runtimes (Go, Node.js, WScript, CScript) access sensitive configuration or credential files, such as AWS credentials, Kubernetes configs, SSH keys, or environment files. This activity is often indicative of credential harvesting or unauthorized access to sensitive secrets by potentially malicious scripts or processes.
Detects the drop and execution of the AvisLoader rootkit component, hmn_hook.dll. The rule identifies suspicious file drops in non-standard, user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) that are not associated with legitimate installers, as well as the loading of unsigned or non-Microsoft-signed versions of the DLL accompanied by hook-related process arguments such as HMN_HideStart or NtQuerySystemInformation.
Detects potential manual paste-and-run execution patterns where a shell or interpreter is launched directly from Windows Explorer (e.g., via the Run dialog or manual clipboard paste), correlated with either command-line references to or outbound network connections towards Cloudflare Tunnel services (trycloudflare.com, workers.dev). The rule specifically identifies one-off execution events by excluding cases where explorer.exe spawns multiple child processes simultaneously, indicating non-routine shell behavior.
This rule detects a specific persistence technique used by AvisLoader malware. It monitors for the creation of a .lnk.backup file alongside a corresponding .lnk shortcut modification in common shell locations (Desktop, Taskbar, etc.), coupled with the execution of wscript.exe or cscript.exe referencing the 'VLCAssistant' VBScript within a short time window. This sequence indicates an attempt to persist malicious activity by backing up existing shortcuts and replacing them with a launcher for the AvisLoader payload.
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