Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the silent or command-line driven installation of macOS configuration profiles (`profiles install`), which attackers use to bypass security settings or manage device configurations maliciously.
Detects macOS system fingerprinting targeting IOPlatformUUID using the ioreg command. This technique was observed being used by the FlutterShell malware (Operation FlutterBridge) to uniquely identify victims upon installation.
Detects instances where the 'killall' command is used to forcefully terminate Google Chrome processes. This activity can be indicative of malware attempting to disrupt browser activity, potentially to prevent detection, interfere with user sessions, or facilitate other malicious actions. Specifically, this behavior has been associated with the FlutterShell backdoor.
Detects unauthorized modification of the Google Chrome Secure Preferences file, specifically targeting the default search provider data to hijack browser searches. This behavior is actively used by malware such as FlutterShell to redirect all Chrome searches to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Detects the creation or modification of specific LaunchAgent plist files used by JINX-0164's AUDIOFIX and MINIRAT malware for persistence on macOS. The rule monitors for file creation, renaming, or modification events within the /Library/LaunchAgents/ directory, specifically targeting plist files with names known to be used by this malware.
macOS dscl User Creation
Gravwell
Detects the creation of local user accounts on macOS using the 'dscl' utility, specifically looking for the '-create' action within the '/Users/' directory and the presence of 'UniqueID' or 'IsHidden' parameters. The rule excludes common system-related UniqueIDs (0, 1, 202, 205, 248) to reduce false positives from legit system operations.
Identifies Node.js processes downloading the Bun runtime from GitHub Releases. This behavior was observed in the vpmdhaj npm supply chain attack, where Gen-2 stagers silently downloaded Bun to execute bundled credential harvesting payloads without an immediate C2 payload drop.
KQL Query
KQL Query
This rule detects modifications, creations, or renames of the Google Chrome 'Secure Preferences' file on macOS. This activity can be indicative of malware, such as FlutterShell, attempting to alter browser settings or inject malicious configurations for persistence or other malicious purposes.
Identifies the creation of a stage-2 binary named 'payload.bin' within a 'node_modules' directory. This artifact is dropped by the Gen-1 stager used in the vpmdhaj malicious npm campaign, which targets cloud and CI/CD credentials.
Detects the execution of known typo-squatted npm packages linked to TeamPCP copycats (Shai-Hulud clones and DDoS botnets). The rule specifically looks for process creation events involving npm, node, or yarn, and then filters for command lines containing specific malicious package names identified in threat intelligence.
Detects the use of launchctl submit to establish persistence on macOS.
Unlike the more common LaunchAgent/LaunchDaemon plist approach, launchctl
submit registers a job directly via the command line without creating a
plist file on disk, making it harder to discover through filesystem
sweeps. This technique is used by JINX-0164 (Wiz CIRT) to persist
AUDIOFIX and MINIRAT payloads with job labels like chrome.job and
coreaudio.job, but the technique itself is rare in legitimate software.
The rule catches any launchctl submit invocation and flags known
JINX-0164 job labels for high-confidence triage.
Unlike the more common LaunchAgent/LaunchDaemon plist approach, launchctl
submit registers a job directly via the command line without creating a
plist file on disk, making it harder to discover through filesystem
sweeps. This technique is used by JINX-0164 (Wiz CIRT) to persist
AUDIOFIX and MINIRAT payloads with job labels like chrome.job and
coreaudio.job, but the technique itself is rare in legitimate software.
The rule catches any launchctl submit invocation and flags known
JINX-0164 job labels for high-confidence triage.
This rule detects attempts to extract the system's hardware UUID using the `ioreg` command, specifically looking for arguments used by the FlutterShell backdoor to query `IOPlatformExpertDevice` and `IOPlatformUUID`. This activity is indicative of system information discovery, often performed by malware to fingerprint a compromised host.
Detects the execution of 'launchctl submit' with specific job names ('chrome.job' or 'coreaudio.job') that have been observed in JINX-0164 macOS campaigns to establish persistence.
Detects the exploitation primitive of CVE-2026-3102 at the post-injection execution layer. The exploit succeeds when exiftool constructs a /usr/bin/setfile command line containing attacker-injected shell metacharacters (single quotes for command injection, backticks or $() for command substitution, semicolons for command chaining). Detecting setfile invocations spawned by exiftool with these characters in arguments is the smoking-gun signal. Even future variants of this vulnerability class (or related n-day exploits in the same family) would produce this same parent/child + metacharacter pattern.
Detects Node.js or Bun processes accessing sensitive developer configuration directories such as .ssh and .npmrc, indicating potential credential harvesting. This rule specifically looks for file access or open events initiated by 'node.exe', 'node', 'bun.exe', or 'bun' processes targeting paths containing '.ssh' or '.npmrc', or files named '.npmrc'.
Detects the creation of an unexpected LaunchAgent property list named 'com.google.keystone.agent.plist' paired with the creation or execution of a binary at '~/Library/Application Support/Google/GoogleUpdate.app/Contents/MacOS/GoogleUpdate'. This exact path and plist combination is used by the SHub Reaper malware to establish persistent backdoor access while masquerading as a Google software update.
Node.js Accessing Developer Secrets
Cortex XDR
Detects Node.js processes rapidly reading multiple sensitive developer configuration or credential files (e.g., .env, AWS credentials, SSH keys) within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of infostealer activity, often observed with malicious npm packages.
Detects the creation or modification of VS Code tasks or Claude Code settings referencing suspicious setup scripts, indicating persistence mechanisms used by the Mini Shai-Hulud worm. This rule specifically looks for modifications to configuration files like `.vscode/tasks.json` or `.claude/settings.json` by processes with command lines containing known malicious script names, or the direct dropping of these malicious scripts into IDE directories.
Detects network connections from Node.js or Bun runtime processes to common cloud instance metadata service IPs (AWS, Azure, GCP) or to the default HashiCorp Vault port (8200). This activity can indicate credential access attempts, especially in the context of a supply chain attack where malicious code might be injected into a Node.js/Bun application to exfiltrate sensitive information or gain further access. The rule correlates network connection events with process execution events to identify the specific runtime responsible.
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